Bruno v. Bruno
| Decision Date | 30 October 1980 |
| Citation | 10 Mass.App.Ct. 918,411 N.E.2d 1324 |
| Parties | Mary J. BRUNO v. Robert E. BRUNO et al. 1 |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Joseph C. Cove, Uxbridge, for defendants.
C. A. Peairs, Westboro, (Adele E. Moroney, Worcester, with him), for plaintiff.
Before BROWN, ROSE and PERRETTA, JJ.
RESCRIPT.
The defendants Robert and Doris Bruno appeal from a judgment of a Probate Court in favor of the plaintiff, who is Robert's aunt. The defendants contend that the judge's ultimate finding that the deed conveying certain of the plaintiff's property in Douglas to the defendants was procured by undue influence is not warranted by his subsidiary findings. We agree. The judge's factual findings may be summarized as follows. Sometime in late November of 1976, after Robert had made substantial repairs to the property which repairs the judge found to be worth $2,500, the plaintiff approached Robert and asked him if he would like to purchase the property for $5,000, a price he had offered many years previously. Robert retained an attorney to prepare the deed and during a meeting on January 19, 1977, at which Robert, his attorney, and the plaintiff were present, the plaintiff signed the deed conveying the property to the defendants. Thereafter, Robert paid the taxes on the property for the years 1977 and 1978. The judge specifically found that although the plaintiff was ninety-nine years of age, she was of sound mind, lived alone and was self-sufficient. Nevertheless, he found that because of her advanced years, a "most subtle kind of undue influence was sufficient to overcome (her) will." He also found that as a result of Robert's undue influence (accomplished without malice), the plaintiff did not understand the consequences of her signature on the deed and that "because of her advanced age, it was incumbent upon the defendant (Robert) ... to deal with the plaintiff with extraordinary care."
One who signs a writing that is obviously a legal document is presumed to be fully aware of its terms, unless it can be proved that he was induced to sign it by fraud or undue influence. Dobija v. Hopey, 353 Mass. 600, 233 N.E.2d 920 (1968). Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc., --- Mass.App. ---, --- a, 402 N.E.2d 76 (1980). The burden of proving undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence rests on the party so alleging. Cereghino v. Giannone, 247 Mass. 319, 142 N.E. 153 (1924). Viens v. Viens, 302 Mass. 366, 19 N.E.2d 306 (1939). Undue influence is "... whatever destroys free agency and constrains the person whose act is under review to do that which is contrary to his own untrammeled desire." Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 369, 126 N.E. 93 (1920). See also Miles v. Caples, 362 Mass. 107, 284 N.E.2d 231 (1972). Mere suspicion is not enough to warrant a finding of undue influence. "There must be a solid foundation of established facts upon which to rest an inference of its existence." Neill v. Brackett, supra, 234 Mass. at 370, 126 N.E. 93. See also New England Merchants Natl. Bank v. Mahoney, 356 Mass. 654, 657-658, 255 N.E.2d 592 (1970). Even though the judge found that the plaintiff was of "advanced age" and was not represented by her own attorney in the transaction, there was no evidence to warrant the conclusion that Robert exercised any influence on the plaintiff or otherwise exploited her advanced age in the conveyance of the property.
The plaintiff argues that because of the special nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and her nephew, he owed her a greater duty of care in order to insure that she understood the consequences of her act. This argument must fail. Apart from the narrow circumstances where a fiduciary relationship is implied as a matter of law, whether a relationship of trust and confidence exists is a question of fact. Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc., supra --- Mass. at --- b, 402 N.E.2d 76. Whether such a...
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