Bruns v. State, 91-1919
Decision Date | 21 July 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 91-1919,91-1919 |
Citation | 503 N.W.2d 607 |
Parties | Keith W. BRUNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Elizabeth E. Quinlan and B. John Burns, Asst. State Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., and Suzie A. Berregaard Thomas and Layne Lindebak, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and SCHULTZ, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
Iowa's postconviction relief statute has two statutes of limitation: a ninety-day period for postconviction appeals involving a prison disciplinary decision and a three-year period for collaterally attacking criminal convictions. See Iowa Code § 663A.3 (1991). The applicant in this disciplinary proceeding claims the shorter period of limitations is constitutionally infirm because it violates his equal protection rights. He also claims that correctional officials violated his due process rights by not informing him that he had only ninety days to appeal the disciplinary decision against him to the district court. We reject both claims and affirm the district court's order dismissing the applicant's application for postconviction relief.
Keith W. Bruns is an inmate at the Iowa state mens' reformatory. Allegedly, he unsuccessfully plotted with another inmate to escape from the institution. In January 1990 Bruns appeared before a prison disciplinary committee who found that he had violated the two disciplinary rules covering attempt or complicity and escape. As punishment, Bruns (1) lost ninety days good time credit, (2) was removed from the honor roll, (3) was sanctioned ten days full disciplinary detention, and (4) was sanctioned ninety days half disciplinary detention.
After exhausting his administrative remedies without success, Bruns appealed the committee's decision to the assistant warden who denied the appeal. Bruns' subsequent appeal in March 1990 to the deputy director for institutions was also denied.
Bruns then filed a section 1983 action in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). That court ordered Bruns to exhaust his state administrative remedies before proceeding with a federal action.
Some seventeen months later Bruns filed an application for postconviction relief in the district court. The State moved for summary judgment, alleging Bruns had failed to comply with the Iowa Code section 663A.3 ninety-day statute of limitations for postconviction relief applications involving prison disciplinary proceedings.
Bruns resisted the State's motion, claiming section 663A.3 violated his equal protection rights. He also filed a personal affidavit in which he swore that he had received no notice of the ninety-day statute of limitations. He alleged that this failure by correctional officials to notify him denied him due process.
The district court sustained the State's motion for summary judgment. Bruns then petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari which we treated as a notice of appeal.
Constitutional rights are implicated so our review is de novo. State v. Fox, 491 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 1992). We consider the case in light of the totality of the circumstances and the record upon which the postconviction court ruling was made. LuGrain v. State, 479 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 1991). Statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality, and the challenger bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise. CMC Real Estate Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 475 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Iowa 1991).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits a state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Iowa Constitution recognizes this limitation upon state power by providing that
[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.
Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. We have interpreted these constitutional provisions similarly. See Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Iowa 1986).
No fundamental right or suspect classification is alleged. So we apply a rational basis analysis. See Suckow v. NEOWA F.S., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Iowa 1989). In so doing, we reject Bruns' suggestion that we apply a "means scrutiny analysis," a supposedly more stringent analysis than rational basis.
Under a rational basis analysis, Bruns must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the classifications in section 663A.3 deny him equal protection. He must also show with particularity how that denial occurs. To meet this burden he must negate every reasonable basis that may support the classifications. Id. at 779. A rational basis exists if the statute bears some fair relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Koch v. Kostichek, 409 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Iowa 1987).
The classifications we are talking about of course involve inmates challenging prison disciplinary decisions versus inmates collaterally challenging their convictions. In this connection section 663A.3 pertinently provides:
A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction or sentence took place. However, if the applicant is seeking relief under section 663A.2, subsection 6 [prison disciplinary proceedings], the application shall be filed with the clerk of the district court ... within ninety days from the date the disciplinary decision is final. All other applications [those collaterally challenging convictions] must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final, or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.
The gist of Bruns' equal protection challenge is that there exists no reason justifying the legislature's shortening the statute of limitations for inmates challenging prison disciplinary decisions. Bruns argues that the shorter limitations period is neither reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, nor does it bear a fair and substantial relationship to any purpose the legislature may have.
The equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions guarantee that the government will treat similar individuals in a similar way. Conversely, the government is not required to treat those in dissimilar situations equally. Koch, 409 N.W.2d at 683 ( ).
Inmates challenging prison disciplinary proceedings are in a far different situation than inmates collaterally challenging their convictions. They are challenging prison disciplinary decisions that have resulted in the loss of good time because of rule violations. Consequently, they frequently face penalties that are substantially less, their complaints are usually over trivial matters with little legal significance, and their complaints directly involve the authority of correctional officials to control behavior within the prisons. Shortridge v. State, 478 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1991).
In contrast, inmates collaterally challenging their convictions often raise substantial legal questions that do have meaningful legal significance. The stakes are much higher because a victory could mean immediate freedom from a prison sentence and a record clean of the conviction. Additionally, their challenges do not involve the authority of correctional officials in any way. Cf. Sweazea v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 742 F.2d 482, 483 (8th Cir.1984) ( ).
Based on these dissimilarities, we conclude similar treatment is not required under either the federal or state constitutions. A rational basis does exist for the different statutes of limitation in Iowa Code section 663A.3.
Bruns next contends that the correctional officials did not advise him of the ninety-day statute of limitations in section 663A.3. He claims this failure violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. Like equal protection we usually deem the federal and state due process clauses to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1989). The federal due process clause prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Iowa due process clause mandates that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.
Inmates, such as Bruns, claiming a due process violation under the federal Due Process Clause must show that they have been deprived of some protected liberty or property interest by arbitrary government action. See Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 879 (7th Cir.1988). Because he is incarcerated, Bruns has a limited due process right. The extent of this limited due process right is governed by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94...
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