Brunson v. Colo. Cab Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 2018
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 16CA1864
• Citation: 433 P.3d 93
• Parties: Daniel BRUNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO CAB COMPANY, LLC, and Shamrock Charters, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

433 P.3d 93

Daniel BRUNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.COLORADO CAB COMPANY, LLC, and Shamrock Charters, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1864

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division I.

Announced February 8, 2018

Law Office of Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC, Brian D. Gonzales, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Sherman & Howard, LLC, Patrick R. Scully, Matthew M. Morrison, Denver, Colorado; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Christopher A. Parlo, Melissa C. Rodriguez, Jason D. Burns, New York, New York, for Defendants-Appellees

Opinion by JUDGE LICHTENSTEIN

¶ 1 This case addresses, as a matter of first impression, whether shuttle van drivers who transport passengers to and from Denver International Airport (DIA), but do not drive outside of the state, are considered to be "interstate drivers," and thus are exempt, under the Colorado Minimum Wage Order, from receiving overtime pay.

¶ 2 Plaintiff, Daniel Brunson, a shuttle van driver, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Shamrock Charters, Inc. and Colorado Cab Company, LLC, (collectively, Shamrock) on Brunson's claim¹ that Shamrock's failure to pay him overtime compensation violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, section 8-6-101, et seq., C.R.S. 2017, and the Colorado Wage Claim Act, section 8-4-101, et. seq., C.R.S. 2017 (the Acts).

¶ 3 The Acts are implemented by Colorado Minimum Wage Order 31 (Wage Order),² promulgated by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (the Department). See Colo. Minimum Wage Order No. 31, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1103-1 (effective Dec. 30, 2014-Dec. 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/PTD2-TSUN (hereinafter Wage Order). The Wage Order regulates wages and requires certain employers to pay overtime compensation to its employees. As pertinent here, the Wage Order exempts "interstate drivers" from all its provisions. Wage Order § 5.

¶ 4 Neither the Acts nor the Wage Order implementing these Acts defines the term "interstate drivers." The district court relied on federal law to conclude that "interstate drivers" includes drivers involved in interstate commerce, even if their work travel is entirely within the state.

¶ 5 But, because Colorado provides more employee protection than does federal law, and the Department has published clear persuasive evidence of its intent to provide greater protections than those provided under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219 (2012), we conclude that federal case law's interpretation of "interstate drivers" does not apply to Brunson's state claims. We therefore reverse the court's summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings on Brunson's claim.

I. Background

¶ 6 Shamrock operates the SuperShuttle van service to and from DIA. Brunson, as a SuperShuttle driver, transports passengers between DIA and their homes, hotels, or a transportation hub location. Brunson claims that he was entitled to overtime pay. Shamrock contends that Brunson was exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the Wage Order.

¶ 7 In granting summary judgment for Shamrock, the district court found that the Wage Order's language closely follows the federal Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption of the FLSA. It therefore relied on federal case law interpreting the MCA exemption to conclude that although Brunson's shuttle driving remained within state lines, his driving involved interstate commerce, and, thus, he was an "interstate driver." As a matter of law, therefore, Brunson was exempt from the Wage Order's overtime pay requirements.

¶ 8 In rejecting Brunson's state law claims, the district court drafted a thorough and well-reasoned summary judgment order interpreting the Wage Order consistent with the federal MCA exemption. However, Brunson contends, and we agree, that the federal interpretation of the MCA exemption does not apply to his state claims.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 9 We review de novo the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Grippin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 2016 COA 127, ¶ 8, 409 P.3d 529. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no disputed issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c) ; Chase v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 129 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 10 We also review administrative regulations de novo. Our primary task in this review is to give effect to the promulgating body's intent. See Colo. Coffee Bean, LLC v. Peaberry Coffee Inc. , 251 P.3d 9, 22 (Colo. App. 2010). In construing an administrative regulation, we apply the same rules of construction that we would apply in interpreting a statute. Berumen v. Dep't of Human Servs ., 2012 COA 73, ¶ 19, 304 P.3d 601 ; see also Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court , 53 Cal.4th 1004, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513, 527 (2012) ("When a wage order's validity and application are conceded and the question is only one of interpretation, the usual rules of statutory interpretation apply."). And as with statutes, if the language of a regulation is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to other rules of construction. Berumen , ¶ 19.

¶ 11 But if the language of a regulation or administrative rule is ambiguous or unclear, we may consider an agency's interpretation of its own regulation or rule. Sierra Club v. Billingsley , 166 P.3d 309, 312 (Colo. App. 2007) ; see also Christensen v. Harris Cty. , 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) ("[D]eference [to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation] is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.").

¶ 12 When a promulgating body provides an interpretation contained in other formats, such as opinion letters, internal agency guidelines, manuals or bulletins—all of which lack the force of law—such interpretations are "entitled to respect," but only to the extent that those interpretations have the "power to persuade." Christensen , 529 U.S. at 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655 (citation omitted); see Preserve at the Fort, Ltd. v. Prudential Huntoon Paige Assocs. , 129 P.3d 1015, 1020 (Colo. App. 2004).

III. Discussion

¶ 13 The General Assembly has given the Department the power to promulgate regulations, among them wage orders. Bonidy v. Vail Valley Ctr. for Aesthetic Dentistry, P.C. , 186 P.3d 80, 84 (Colo. App. 2008) ; see § 24-1-121(1), C.R.S. 2017. A wage order "regulates the ‘wages, hours, working conditions and procedures’ for certain employers and employees performing work in Colorado." Chase , 129 P.3d at 1012 (quoting Colo. Wage Order No. 22).

¶ 14 The Wage Order, by its own terms, applies only to work performed "within the boundaries of the state of Colorado." Wage Order § 1. Among its provisions, and as relevant here, the Wage Order requires covered employers to pay overtime at one-and-one-half times the employee's normal rate of pay. Id. § 4. The Wage Order also exempts several categories of employees from all its provisions.³ Among those exempt, the Wage Order lists "interstate drivers." Id. § 5. The Wage Order does not define who qualifies as an "interstate driver."

¶ 15 When the terms at issue are not defined, we look to the plain meaning of the language used, considered within the context of the regulation as a whole. See Berumen , ¶ 19. If the plain meaning of the language of a regulation is clear and unambiguous, we need not look further. Id. But if the words chosen by the enacting body are capable of two or more constructions leading to different results, the regulation is ambiguous. See State v. Nieto , 993 P.2d 493, 500-01 (Colo. 2000) (discussing ambiguous statutory language).

¶ 16 When the language is ambiguous, we look beyond the express regulatory language for other evidence of the promulgating body's intent and purpose. See Crandall v. City & Cty. of Denver , 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo. 2010) ; Sierra Club , 166 P.3d at 312.

A. The Wage Order's Language Is Ambiguous

¶ 17 Considered in the context of the regulation as a whole, it would seem reasonable to construe the categorical exemption of "interstate drivers" from the Wage Order's provisions as applying only to drivers who cross state lines. After all, the Wage Order's coverage provision states that it regulates wages for work performed within state boundaries. See Wage Order § 1.

¶ 18 It is also reasonable to construe the term "interstate drivers" as drivers whose transport—within state lines—involves interstate commerce.⁴ Since the disputed term "interstate driver" is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning, it is ambiguous.

¶ 19 We therefore look beyond the express language for other evidence of the promulgating body's intent and purpose. See Crandall , 238 P.3d at 662.

B. Federal Law Is Not Instructive

¶ 20 As the district court noted, there is a body of federal law that interprets interstate drivers in the FLSA for purposes of the exemption from receiving overtime pay. Under that interpretation, certain drivers who work entirely within a state are considered interstate drivers under the MCA exemption of the FLSA, and are thus exempt from the federal statute's overtime pay provisions. For the following reasons, we conclude that federal law is neither controlling nor persuasive.

¶ 21 First, it is well settled that states may provide employees with benefits beyond those set out in the FLSA. Idowu v. Nesbitt , 2014 COA 97, ¶ 51, 338 P.3d 1078. "The FLSA sets a floor, not a ceiling, on compensation that employees must receive." Id. (quoting Barefield v. Vill. of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 1996) ); see Martinez v. Combs , 49 Cal.4th 35, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259, 280-81 (2010) ("Courts must give ... wage orders independent effect in order to protect the commission's delegated authority to enforce the state's wage laws and, as appropriate, to provide greater protection to workers than federal law affords.").

¶ 22 The Department did just that here: it promulgated a wage order independent of the FLSA, expressly stating that the Wage Order shall...