Bruttomesso v. Northeastern Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc.

• Citation: 698 A.2d 795,242 Conn. 1
• Decision Date: 22 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15646,15646
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mary BRUTTOMESSO, et al. v. NORTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT CRISIS SERVICES, INC.

Page 795

698 A.2d 795

242 Conn. 1

Mary BRUTTOMESSO, et al. v. NORTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT CRISIS SERVICES, INC.

No. 15646.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 30, 1997.

Decided July 22, 1997.

John E. Nimlo, Willimantic, with whom, on the brief, was Richard E. Joaquin, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Joseph B. Curran, Rocky Hill, for appellee (defendant).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and MCDONALD, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a sexual assault crisis center that provides counseling to victims of sexual assault or abuse is a "health care provider" within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-190a. ¹ We conclude that because neither the defendant, Northeastern Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Connecticut, ² nor its employees is licensed or certified by the department of public health, ³ the defendant does not fall within the statutory definition and, consequently, the plaintiffs cannot rely upon the extension of the statute of limitations provided by § 52-190a(b) to save their action, which was brought beyond the two year limitation of General Statutes § 52-584, ⁴ from being time barred.

The plaintiffs have set forth the following allegations in their complaint. The named plaintiff, Mary Bruttomesso, is the natural mother and next friend of the plaintiffs T, G and C, all of whom are minors (minor plaintiffs). ⁵ Following incidents involving the minor plaintiffs that led to the arrest and imprisonment of Darrell Spencer for sexual assault in the first and second degree and risk of injury to a child, Bruttomesso sought counseling for the minor plaintiffs with the defendant. The defendant, through its agent and employee, Rene Suprenat, also counseled Spencer while he was incarcerated awaiting trial at the Brooklyn Correctional Center in Brooklyn. During the course of those counseling services, Suprenat established a relationship with Spencer and assisted him in the defense of the criminal charges against him and put up her personal residence as collateral, allowing him to post bond for his release. The minor plaintiffs learned of Spencer's release and, as a result, until the time that Spencer pleaded guilty and was reincarcerated, suffered constant fear, apprehension, anxiety, and emotional pain and stress. Furthermore, as a result of the defendant's alleged negligence and carelessness, ⁶ the minor plaintiffs were compelled to secure counseling with other therapists, which in turn delayed their recovery and caused them to incur additional treatment expense.

Along with their complaint, the plaintiffs provided, as required by § 52-190a(a), a certificate of reasonable inquiry that grounds existed for a good faith belief that the defendant's alleged negligence caused their injuries. Although this action was brought more than two years after Spencer's release, the plaintiffs received an extension of time pursuant to § 52-190a(b), which provides a ninety day extension to permit the reasonable inquiry necessary to obtain the foundation for this good faith certificate. The plaintiffs rely on this extension to argue that their action is not time barred by § 52-584.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs' action was time barred because the defendant is not a health care provider and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the ninety day extension provided by § 52-190a(b). The trial court agreed and rendered judgment for the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court and the appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We conclude that the defendant is not a health care provider within the meaning of § 52-190a. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant makes the same claim on appeal that it made in its motion for summary judgment: because it does not provide medical treatment, a rape crisis center is not a health care provider within the meaning of § 52-190a. The plaintiffs assert that the defendant is a health care provider under § 52-190a because it is "licensed," and, consequently, the action was brought in a timely manner and the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. "Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact ... a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 202, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995); see also Practice Book § 384.

The plaintiffs do not contest that, in the absence of the savings clause of § 52-190a(b), the action was untimely. Therefore, the only issue before the trial court was whether the defendant was a health care provider within the meaning of § 52-190a. The trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, the defendant was not a health care provider because it was not a medical care provider. The plaintiffs concede that the defendant did not provide medical care but, nevertheless, they argue that the defendant is a health care provider because it was "licensed." Although such a claim might otherwise require consideration of facts as well as law, under the facts and circumstances of this case, there are no material facts in dispute. Therefore, the issue of whether the defendant was a health care provider is an appropriate matter for summary judgment.

The rules of statutory construction are well settled. "Because our fundamental objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature; Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); we will not undertake an examination of [§ 52-190a] with blinders on regarding what the legislature intended [it] to mean. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). Accordingly, our analysis of [§ 52-190a] is not limited solely to the words of the statute. Instead, we must also look ... to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 850, 675 A.2d 835 (1996).

"A thorough examination using all these factors is especially important in the present case because, although our initial guide [to interpreting a statute] is the language of the statute itself ... the particular term in issue is a word of many meanings. ['Health care provider'] has been defined many ways, and the applicable definition often turns on the specific facts of the case and the context in which it is used.... ⁷ Consequently, in construing its meaning, we are guided by the language of [§ 52-190a], both alone and in the context of [the cause of action], as well as the underlying legislative purpose of the harm at which it is directed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 851, 675 A.2d 835.

Section 52-190a does not specifically define "health care provider." Although the trial court recognized that many other statutes expressly define the term; see footnote 7; it nevertheless confined its inquiry to General Statutes § 52-184c because that provision is expressly referenced in § 52-190a(a) as follows: "[G]ood faith may be shown to exist if the claimant or his attorney has received a written opinion ... of a similar health care provider as defined in section 52-184c...." ⁸ By relying solely on that statute's definitions of "similar health care provider," which utilize the terms "medical," "medicine" and "treatment or diagnosis," the trial court concluded that § 52-190a applies only to a medical professional whose business is the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of physical or mental illness. Because there was no claim that the plaintiffs received medical treatment for physical or mental illness from the defendant, the trial court held that, as a matter of law, § 52-190a did not apply to the plaintiffs' claim. Although we agree with the trial court that a rape crisis center is not a health care provider as envisioned by § 52-190a, we do so not because a rape crisis center does not provide medical services, but because it is not licensed by the state to provide the professional services it does offer. We leave for another day the issue of whether the term "health care provider" should be restricted to medical care providers.

In defining a cause of action against a health care provider, § 52-184c incorporates the definition of health care provider set forth in General Statutes § 52-184b, which, in turn, provides that a health care provider "is any person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this state to provide health...