Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc.

• Decision Date: 18 October 1999
• Citation: 738 A.2d 839,1999 ME 144
• Parties: BRYAN R. v. WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

738 A.2d 839

1999 ME 144

BRYAN R. v. WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 4, 1999.

Decided October 18, 1999.

Michael J. Waxman (orally), Portland, for plaintiff.

Bruce C. Mallonee (orally), Rudman & Winchell, LLC, Bangor, and Paul D. Polidoro, Patterson, NY, for Watchtower and others, defendants.

Frederick C. Moore (orally), Robert C. Robinson, Daniel Nuzzi, Robinson Kriger & McCallum, Portland, for the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, amicus curiae.

Paul C. Catsos, Thompson & Bowie, Portland, did not file briefs for additional church defendants.

M. Michaela Murphy, Daviau Jabar & Batten, Waterville, did not file briefs for Baker.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, SAUFLEY, and ALEXANDER, JJ.

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1] Bryan R. alleges that he was sexually abused during several of his adolescent years by Larry Baker, an adult member of his church. He has obtained a judgment against Baker, but his complaint against the church and its elders was dismissed by the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Calkins, J.) for failure to state a claim. He appeals from the judgment dismissing the claims against the church defendants. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Because this matter was presented to the Superior Court on the church's motion to dismiss, we take the material allegations of the complaint as admitted. See McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463, 465 (Me.1994)

. The following facts were alleged in Bryan's complaint:

[¶ 13] The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society is a New York-based nonprofit corporation, better known as the Jehovah's Witnesses. It is a religious organization. When the events at issue occurred, Robert Wells, Pat LaBreck, and Bryan's stepfather were "elders" and members of the "judicial body" of the Augusta congregation of the church, Larry Baker was an adult member of the church, and Bryan R. and his family were members of the congregation.

[¶ 4] At some time in the past, also while Larry Baker was an adult member of the church, he molested a minor member of the congregation identified as "John Doe." The elders of the Augusta congregation knew that Baker had molested John Doe. Wells, LaBreck, and Bryan's stepfather, in their roles as the judicial body of the Augusta congregation, decided on the following response to Baker's actions: (1) they demoted Baker from "ministerial servant" to "baptized entry level member"; (2) they "privately rebuked" Baker; and (3) and they temporarily "forbade Baker from having any contact with minor members" of the church. The defendants did not alert the members of the church to Baker's misdeeds.¹

[¶ 5] Eventually, Baker was allowed by the defendants to resume activities as an ordinary member of the church. Bryan alleges that Baker was able to earn his trust and confidence because the church placed Baker in a position of leadership and respect. Bryan was molested by Baker from 1989 through 1992 while Bryan was a teenager and lived next door to Baker. He alleges that his stepfather, who was aware of Baker's history, nonetheless allowed Baker to spend time alone with Bryan at his home. As a result of Baker's repeated sexual abuse, Bryan suffered significant emotional harm necessitating psychiatric hospitalization. [¶ 6] Bryan filed this action against Baker, the church, and its elders to recover damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of Baker's assaults on him. In count I of his complaint, he alleged that each of the defendants breached a fiduciary duty owed to him as a member of the congregation; in counts II and III, he alleged that the defendants were liable to him for negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count IV contained Bryan's claim against Baker for battery, and in count V. Bryan alleged that his stepfather was individually liable for negligence. The stepfather was later dismissed from the action pursuant to a joint motion filed by the parties, thereby resolving count V.

[¶ 7] The Watchtower Society, Robert Wells, and Pat LaBreck filed a motion to dismiss each of the claims against them. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted the motion, concluding that Bryan had failed to state a claim, relying on Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, 692 A.2d 441. Bryan's appeal from that judgment was remanded for lack of finality because the claims against Larry Baker had not yet been adjudicated. The Superior Court, based on a stipulation of the parties, entered judgment against Baker. After the entry of judgment against Baker, Bryan appealed from the court's judgment dismissing the claims against the church defendants. Baker did not appeal the judgment against him.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Claims Asserted

[¶ 8] In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of a complaint, we "examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief" pursuant to a valid cause of action. McAfee, 637 A.2d at 465, quoted in Hamilton v. Greenleaf, 677 A.2d 525, 527 (Me.1996)

. "The legal sufficiency of a complaint challenged pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law." Hamilton, 677 A.2d at 527.

[¶ 9] Before examining the claims asserted by Bryan, it is instructive to address those claims that he does not assert. He does not allege that Baker was an agent or employee of the church. Nor does he claim that Baker occupied any clerical position such as priest, minister, or pastor. Cf. Swanson, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 13,

692 A.2d at 445.² Moreover, the complaint does not allege that the church affirmatively placed Baker in a position of control and supervision of children, such as a Sunday school teacher or youth coordinator, or that the church knowingly placed Baker in a position where he could sexually abuse children within a church setting. Rather, Bryan alleges that Baker was "able to earn [Bryan's] trust and confidence" because of his position of power and authority in the church.³ These allegations place Baker in a relationship to Bryan that was not different in quality from any other member in good standing of the church.

[¶ 10] The crux of Bryan's claim is that the church, because of an alleged special relationship with its members, has a duty to protect its members from each other, at least when the church and its agents are aware of a potential danger posed by a member. Because the church elders knew of Baker's propensity to abuse children, Bryan argues that they had an independent duty to protect him from Baker.⁴ He addresses that duty through three separate counts. We address each count in turn.

B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

[¶ 11] Bryan bases his first theory of liability on an alleged duty on the part of the church to protect him from the actions of dangerous third parties. Whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a matter of law for the court. See McPherson v. McPherson, 1998 ME 141, ¶ 8, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045

; Fish v. Paul, 574 A.2d 1365, 1366 (Me. 1990). In determining whether a duty exists, we must ascertain whether the alleged wrongdoer is "`under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff.'" Trusiani v. Cumberland & York Distribs., Inc., 538 A.2d 258, 261 (Me.1988) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 356 (5th ed.1984)).

[¶ 12] There does not exist a general obligation to protect others from harm not created by the actor. "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). In other words, the mere fact that one individual knows that a third party is or could be dangerous to others does not make that individual responsible for controlling the third party or protecting others from the danger.⁵

[¶ 13] Indeed, at early common law, inaction or nonfeasance was seldom actionable. As commentators have noted, "[l]iability for nonfeasance was ... slow to receive recognition in the law." KEETON, supra, § 56, at 373. Over decades, however, courts have come to recognize a duty on the part of certain groups to protect others from harm caused by third parties. "Certain relationships are protective by nature, requiring the defendant to guard his charge against harm from others." Id. § 56, at 383.⁶ Nonetheless, "in the absence of the requisite relationship, there generally is no duty to protect others against harm from third persons." Id. § 56, at 385.

[¶ 14] Even with the emergence of expanded liability for nonfeasance, that principle has remained clear — in instances of "nonfeasance rather than misfeasance, and absent a special relationship, the law imposes no duty to act affirmatively to protect someone from danger unless the dangerous situation was created by the defendant." Jackson v. Tedd-Lait Post No. 75, 1999 ME 26, ¶ 8, 723 A.2d 1220, 1221. Only when there is a "special relationship," may the actor be found to have a common law duty to prevent harm to another caused by a third party.⁷ There is simply "no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless. . . a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965).⁸

[¶ 15] Therefore, in order to determine whether the church owed Bryan a duty of care to protect him from other members of the church, we must determine whether a special relationship, reviewable by the secular courts, exists between a church and its members in this context. Bryan asserts that such a relationship does exist, and he refers to it as a "fiduciary" relationship. "One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to...