Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland

• Decision Date: 04 April 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. CUM-96-305
• Citation: 692 A.2d 441,1997 ME 63
• Parties: Albert SWANSON, et al. v. The ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PORTLAND, et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 441

692 A.2d 441

1997 ME 63

Albert SWANSON, et al. v. The ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PORTLAND, et al.

Docket No. CUM-96-305.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 5, 1996.

Decided April 4, 1997.

Douglas S. Carr, Peter S. Carlisle, Perkins, Thompson, Hinckley & Keddy, Portland, for Albert Swanson.

Judy R. Potter, Cape Elizabeth, for Ruth Swanson.

Frederick C. Moore, Thomas R. Kelly, Robinson, Kriger & McCallum, Portland, for Roman Catholic Bishop.

Peter DeTroy, Terry Fralich, Norman, Hanson & Detroy, Portland, for Fr. Maurice Morin.

Before: WATHEN, C.J., ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.

WATHEN, Chief Justice.

¶1 For the first time, we must decide whether courts may constitutionally impose and enforce a duty of employee supervision derived from secular agency principles against a religious organization. The issue is presented on the report of the interlocutory order of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Saufley, J.) declining to dismiss Albert and Ruth Swanson's claim against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, a corporation sole, ¹ and Bishop Joseph Gerry in his personal capacity (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the church") for negligently supervising a member of the clergy. On constitutional grounds, the court dismissed a claim against the church for negligently selecting and training the priest but denied the motion to dismiss their claim for negligently supervising him. ² On report, the church contends that the constitutional principles that bar plaintiffs' negligent selection and training claim bar their negligent supervision claim. We agree and remand with instructions to dismiss the remaining count against the church.

¶2 The facts alleged in the complaint brought by plaintiffs against the church and Father Maurice Morin are as follows. Morin was the parish priest of Saint Gregory's Catholic Church in Gray and Mr. and Mrs. Swanson were parishioners. In 1990, plaintiffs approached Morin to discuss the possibility of remarrying in a Catholic ceremony. Morin "performed interviews" with the couple and "counseled" Mrs. Swanson individually. While doing so, he encouraged her to postpone her remarriage ceremony and initiated a sexual relationship with her.

¶3 The complaint further alleges that Mr. Swanson also sought "counseling and guidance" from Morin, confiding that he suspected his wife was infatuated with another man. Morin acknowledged that Mrs. Swanson needed counseling, recommended two individuals who could help her, and indicated "that he would do all he could to help the situation." Shortly thereafter, Mr. Swanson returned and indicated to Morin that his wife's infatuation was with the priest. Morin acknowledged that this seemed to be true. He told Mr. Swanson, however, that he was trained to handle the situation and was "working with Mrs. Swanson on this issue." After this meeting, Mr. Swanson discovered the sexual relationship between Father Morin and his wife. Mrs. Swanson then filed a complaint for divorce.

¶4 During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, plaintiffs' son committed suicide. They are now allegedly undergoing extensive marriage counseling, have experienced extreme emotional distress and psychological damage, and have incurred the costs of divorce litigation due to the actions of Morin. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court seeking damages against Morin for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent pastoral counseling. The claims against Morin are not before us. We are concerned only with the count of the complaint alleging that the church negligently selected, trained, and supervised Morin.

¶5 After considerable discovery activity on the part of all litigants, the church moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of negligent selection, training, and supervision on the ground that Article I, section 3 of the Maine Constitution and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution bar such claims. The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of negligent selection and training, but permitted their negligent supervision claim to proceed. Upon the motion of the parties, the Superior Court reported the case to this Court pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 72(c).

¶6 The exception to the final judgment rule created by M.R.Civ.P. 72(c) is narrow. Luhr v. Bickford, 661 A.2d 1141, 1142 (Me.1995). Questions of law reported must be of sufficient importance and doubt to outweigh the policy against piecemeal litigation. Id. If the First Amendment bars claims of negligent supervision against religious institutions, the church is entitled to protection from the very process of litigation itself. Further factual development is not required for resolution of the constitutional issue presented, and the issue admits of much doubt and is of great public importance. Although not required by Rule 72(c), our decision will in at least one alternative dispose of the action against the church. We conclude that the interlocutory ruling in this case was appropriately reported.

¶7 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 3 of the Maine Constitution both guarantee citizens the right to freely exercise their chosen religion and forbid the establishment of religion by the government. ³ When interpreting these guarantees, courts have generally held that states are forbidden from interfering in matters concerning religious doctrine or organization. By dictating neutrality on the part of the courts, our constitutions ensure that religious organizations remain free from "secular control or manipulation" and retain "power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian O. Ch., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) (invalidating NY legislature's attempt to transfer control of Russian Orthodox Churches in NY from Moscow to governing church authority in the U.S.); see also Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960) (state court cannot interpret matters of strictly ecclesiastical concern in applying common law); Parent v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 436 A.2d 888 (Me.1981) (inquiry into authority of Bishop under canon law and into propriety of his exercise of that authority constitutionally impermissible).

¶8 These principles "severely circumscribe[ ] the role that civil courts may play in resolving" disputes involving religious organizations or doctrine. Presbyterian Ch. v. Mary E.B. Hull Mem.Pres. Ch., 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). Courts, however, "do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to [civil] disputes [and] there are neutral principles of law ... which can be applied...." Id.; see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (states may adopt a "neutral principles" approach to church dispute resolution); Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627, 634-635 (Me.1981) (adopting neutral principles approach to resolving church property disputes). In applying neutral principles to resolve church-related disputes, courts must not consider doctrinal matters, deferring "to the resolution of [any] doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." Jones, 443 U.S. at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026.

¶9 The plaintiffs contend that their claim for negligent supervision against the church can be resolved by the application of neutral tort principles. They argue that inquiry into the church's knowledge of any risk presented by Morin and the reasonableness of the church's supervisory acts involve nothing beyond the application of secular legal standards to secular conduct. We have never decided that the negligent supervision of an employee constitutes an independent basis for liability on the part of an employer. Assuming that it does, however, ⁴ we conclude that constitutional considerations bar such a claim against the church in this case.

¶10 The tort of negligent supervision is based upon the concept that principals have certain duties to supervise those under their control. ⁵ See e.g. Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 323-327 (Colo.1993) (a prerequisite to establishing negligent hiring and supervision is an employment or agency relationship). When a civil court undertakes to compare the relationship between a religious institution and its clergy with the agency relationship of the business world, secular duties are necessarily introduced into the ecclesiastical relationship and the risk of constitutional violation is evident. The exploration of the ecclesiastical relationship is itself problematic. To determine the existence of an agency relationship based on actual authority, the trial court will most likely have to examine church doctrine governing the church's authority over Morin. ⁶ As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in one case, determining the authority of a religious body under religious law,

frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide ... religious law [governing church polity] ... would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.

Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, etc. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (citation omitted).

¶11 Some courts have ruled that negligent supervision claims against churches may be resolved "without determining questions of church law and policies." Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F.Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D.Mich.1995). This has led them to conclude that "no First Amendment issues are implicated which would mandate dismissal of the negligent supervision claims." Id.; see also Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Co...