Bryan v. Eason
| Decision Date | 08 April 1908 |
| Parties | BRYAN et al. v. EASON. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Johnston County; E. B. Jones, Judge.
Proceedings by J. W. Bryan and others against Julius C. Eason, for the partition of real estate. From a judgment for defendant petitioners appeal. Affirmed.
A quitclaim deed operates as a release only of such interest as the grantor has or as may be specifically named, and it does not operate as an estoppel on the grantee, so as to preclude him from denying that he received any estate thereby or from setting up rights under superior titles.
This proceeding was brought before the clerk, for the partition of land, and transferred to the superior court for trial upon the issues raised by the pleadings. It was referred to Hon F. A. Daniels, from whose findings of fact it appears that on August 12 1857, Betsy Eason, being the owner of the tract of land described in the petition, joined with her husband, John Eason, in the execution of a deed for the same to their sons, Julius C. Eason and John V. Eason, by which they conveyed to them the said tract of land in fee, reserving a life estate to themselves. At the same time they made the following indorsements on the deed:
The execution of the deed and the indorsements were attested by the same witnesses. It further appeared that the acknowledgment and privy examination of Betsy Eason were taken September 2, 1857, before two justices of the peace, appointed by the county court; and the execution as to John Eason, her husband, was proven by one of the subscribing witnesses at February term, 1858, of that court, and the deed ordered to be registered. The certificate of acknowledgment and privy examination of Betsy Eason expressly mentioned the indorsements on the deed. The certificate of probate, as to John Eason, refers to the instruments as the "deed and conveyance." The deed and indorsements were duly registered. John V. Eason, on February 5, 1874, executed to Julius C. Eason, for the recited consideration of $1, a release or quitclaim deed for his right, title, and estate, it being the one-half interest of J. C. Eason in the land, as described in the deed of August 12, 1857. The quitclaim deed was duly proven and registered August 11, 1876. Betsy Eason, widow of John Eason, on June 2, 1883, conveyed to Julius C. Eason and his heirs all her real estate in Sampson county (including the land described in the deeds of August 12, 1857, and February 5, 1874) "in trust to hold the same for the use of himself and his heirs and his brother John V. Eason and his heirs," provided "that if either should die without leaving issue at his death, the portion so held in trust for him shall be held to the use of the other and his heirs." This deed conveyed a part of the said lands to each of the brothers by metes and bounds, and further provided that the part held in trust by Julius C. Eason for his brother John V. Eason should be subject to a life estate, which was reserved to the mother, Betsy Eason. The deed expressly refers to the deed of August 12, 1857; and it is stated in the premises that it was executed to carry out more effectually the intention and purpose of John and Betsy Eason in making the said deed, and further recites that it was made in consideration of the said premises and $1. It further appeared that the interest of John V. Eason in the land, in excess of his homestead, was sold, under execution against him, by the sheriff, March 13, 1900, and bought by Julius C. Eason at the price of $125, and a deed was executed to the purchaser, which was duly proven and registered. Julius C. Eason announced at the sale, and before the land was sold, "that it belonged to him at the death of his brother, John V. Eason." The latter was about 50 years old at the time, had been married many years, and had no children. He died intestate, and without issue, in November, 1900, leaving a widow, Kate Eason, and the other plaintiffs and the defendant as his heirs at law. Betsy Eason died in 1892, before this proceeding was commenced.
The referee concluded, as matter of law: (1) That the deed of August 12, 1857, was inoperative and void, as it had not been properly probated, and the defective probate had not been cured by any statute; but, if it is valid, the indorsements are integral parts of the deed, the same as if they had been written into it, and the deed thus considered conveyed the land to the defendant, J. C. Eason, and his heirs, if he survived his brother, and the latter died without issue living at the time of his death. (2) That the quitclaim deed did not estop Julius C. Eason from asserting title to the interest in the land now claimed by the petitioners. (3) That Julius C. Eason, by virtue of the sheriff's sale and deed, acquired the interest of John V. Eason in the land, whether a life estate or fee simple, under the deed of August 12, 1857, if valid, and that there is no evidence of any suppression of biddings to render the sheriff's deed invalid. (4) That the defendant, Julius C. Eason, is sole seised of the land in controversy, and the petitioners, other than Kate Eason, have no interest therein, but that she is entitled to dower in the original share of John V. Eason.
The petitioners filed numerous exceptions to the report, which were all overruled by the court, and the report in all respects confirmed, the court holding with the referee that Julius C. Eason is sole seised of the land, subject to the dower of Kate Eason, widow of John V. Eason. Judgment was entered accordingly, and the petitioners appealed.
F. H. Brooks, for appellants.
W. C. Munroe, for appellee.
The first question to be determined is as to the effect of the three paper writings executed by John and Betsy Eason August 12, 1857. Do they all constitute one deed, or is the first of the writings to be treated as separate and distinct from the others, and to be regarded as a deed conveying the land in fee to Julius C. and John V. Eason in severalty; each taking the part allotted to him? These writings were all executed at one and the same time, and in our opinion must be considered together as intended to be one deed. Helms v. Austin, 116 N.C. 751, 21 S.E. 556. But, whether this is so or not, the three instruments express the true intent of the parties; and, upon the allegation of the answer that the purpose was to convey the land to Julius C. and John V. Eason in fee, with a proviso that, if either of them should die without issue living at the time of his death, his share should go to the other, we would, upon a bare inspection, so reform the first instrument as to express what was unmistakably the real intention of the parties. Vickers v. Leigh, 104 N.C. 248, 10 S.E. 308; Helms v. Austin, supra. The makers of these instruments evidently intended that they should be considered as parts of one indivisible transaction, and have the force and effect of conveying the estate as above indicated, the same as if the words of limitation had been contained in one deed. This construction of the instruments as one deed, conveying an estate in fee to the brothers, Julius C. and John V. Eason, with a shifting use to the survivor in case either should die without issue living at his death, does not produce any repugnancy in the different clauses of the deed. It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the first of the indorsements should be treated as a last clause in the deed. Wilkins v. Norman, 139 N.C....
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