Bryant v. City of Memphis, Case No. 15-5005
| Decision Date | 19 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-5005,Case No. 15-5186 |
| Parties | GREGORY BRYANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
COOK, Circuit Judge. In response to a physical altercation between Gregory Bryant (an African-American firefighter with the City of Memphis Fire Department) and Mark Forrest (Bryant's white battalion chief), Bryant sued Forrest for assault and sued the City of Memphis for negligent failure to train and supervise Forrest. Bryant also sued both defendants for intentional racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though his complaint cited § 1981.1 The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim for failure to allege an adverse employment action and dismissed the negligence claim against the City on immunity grounds. After a three-day trial on the remaining assault claim, a jury found in Forrest's favor. Bryant appeals the dismissal of his negligence claim against the City, three pretrial evidentiary rulings, and the jury verdict asfounded on insufficient evidence. The defendants request sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal. We AFFIRM the district court on all grounds and DENY sanctions.
During an attempt by the Memphis Fire Department to extinguish a fire at a vacant house, Bryant was operating the firetruck's hose. Battalion Chief Forrest provided all tactical orders from inside his vehicle stationed in front of the house. When the hose manned by Bryant proved ineffective, Forrest ordered it shut down so that firemen could enter the house with hand-held hoses. While the firefighters geared up in the front yard, Bryant tried to use the truck's hose again. Chief Forrest tried to get Bryant's attention—to tell him to turn off the hose—by radio and then by signaling with his siren. Getting no response, he jumped out of his truck and headed toward Bryant. Bryant alleges that Forrest then "violently grabbed him by his arm and shoved him up against the equipment . . . with his arm pressed against his neck." Forrest says that he only grabbed Bryant's arm, turned him around, and ordered him to shut down the hose.
Upset about the scuffle, Bryant brought various claims against Forrest and the City of Memphis for assault, negligent failure to train, and intentional racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court dismissed the discrimination claim for lack of an adverse employment action. The court also dismissed the negligent-training claim against the City on immunity grounds. The jury returned a verdict in Forrest's favor on the remaining assault claim, and Bryant now appeals.
Bryant brought three claims against the City: (1) intentional race discrimination, (2) "intentional aggravated assault," and (3) negligent failure to train Forrest in relation to aggressive physical contact on the job. The district court dismissed the last two claims on statesovereign immunity grounds and Bryant appeals that decision. We review de novo. Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth. of Ga., 723 F.3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing S.J. v. Hamilton Cnty., 374 F.3d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 2004)).
First, we agree that sovereign immunity bars Bryant's assault claim against the City. The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act provides that "all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may result from" the exercise of governmental duties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a). The Act excludes an "injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. Bryant sued the City for intentional assault—not negligence—by one of its employees. The Act therefore immunizes the City from Bryant's assault claim.
Second, sovereign immunity also bars Bryant's negligent-training claim. Although Bryant points to § 29-20-205 of the Act as grounds for viewing the negligent-training claims as non-immunized, that section contains an exception. The City retains immunity for negligence claims "aris[ing] out of the same circumstances giving rise to [a] civil rights claim." Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 872 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-20-205. Because Bryant's negligent-training claim arises out of the same facts underlying his § 1983 claim, the City enjoys immunity from suit. See Campbell v. Anderson Cnty., 695 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) ().
In challenging the immunity finding, Bryant criticizes the district court's decision to construe his § 1981 claim as having been brought under § 1983. He reasons as follows: if the district court had dismissed his improperly brought §1981 claim, there would have been no civil-rights bypass to the City's liability for negligent training. Not so. The district court properlyrecast Bryant's complaint because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the exclusive vehicle by which plaintiffs may bring 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims against state governmental units. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 594-99 (6th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court recently reversed a district court that failed to accord a complaint this relaxed reading. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (). The district court, therefore, properly dismissed the claims against the City.
Bryant next asks this court to reverse three of the district court's evidentiary rulings as abuses of discretion. Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 592 (6th Cir. 2012). "Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment." Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982)). A district court abuses its discretion when it "relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law, or employs an erroneous legal standard." Griffin, 689 F.3d at 592 (quoting Barner v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc., 399 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, we reverse an erroneous evidentiary ruling only if it "affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Marrero, 651 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Bryant sought to introduce evidence to the jury regarding the interaction the City Attorney had with witnesses to the incident. Bryant's counsel suggests that the witnesses—all City employees—may have adjusted their testimony as a result.
The City Attorney and David Rudolph (Forrest's counsel) invited these witnesses to City Hall prior to their depositions so that the witnesses could examine their post-incident written statements and view a page of Bryant's complaint describing the alleged assault. The City Attorney also attended the witnesses' depositions. Bryant describes this conduct as an attempt to influence the witnesses' deposition and trial testimony. Defendants, on the other hand, insist that the City had the "legal right to protect its interests and the interests of its current employees being deposed."
Absent evidence of wrongdoing, the district court committed no abuse of discretion in excluding as irrelevant evidence of the City Attorney's interaction with these witnesses. Before the district court, Bryant's attorney labeled the City Attorney's conduct as "blatant witness tampering" but supported this assertion with no specific factual allegations. Indeed, when questioned during their depositions about the City Hall meeting, the witnesses' responses offered no support for the witness-tampering suggestion.
In any event, we are confident that even if the jury heard this evidence, the verdict in Forrest's favor would still stand. While the district court excluded the interaction evidence, it nonetheless invited Bryant's attorney to cross examine the witnesses about any inconsistencies between their post-incident written statements—completed before the City Hall meeting—and their trial testimony. At trial, Bryant's attorney repeatedly asked two of the witnesses to read directly from their statements and exposed only trivial inconsistencies. Bryant's counsel thus had ample opportunity to expose any tampering, bias, or improper influencing.
Bryant also wanted to introduce into evidence as exhibits the witnesses' post-incident written statements. Though he conceded the hearsay nature of the unsworn statements, heproposed several hearsay exceptions to the district court as authorizing their admission. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find that the denial of these statements on hearsay grounds was well within the district court's discretion.
Regardless, any error in the court's refusal to admit the statements into the record was harmless and reversal unwarranted. Again, Bryant's attorney repeatedly cross examined the witnesses with their written statements. Bryant thus fails to show that admission of the statements themselves as exhibits would have altered the trial's outcome.
Finally, Bryant sought to testify about Forrest's hot-headed and aggressive character, making two arguments for admissibility. First, he contended that Forrest's character was evidence of habit—admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 406—because Forrest "has a habit of putting his hands on others when he feels his authority has been challenged." Second, he pressed for admissibility because Forrest's...
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