Bryant v. State
| Citation | 56 Wyo. 596,7 Wyo. 311,51 P. 879 |
| Parties | BRYANT v. STATE |
| Decision Date | 03 April 1899 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Original Opinion of January 26, 1898, Reported at: 7 Wyo. 311.
Rehearing denied.
KNIGHT, J., did not sit.
On Petition for Rehearing.
On application for rehearing counsel for plaintiff in error again adverts to the evidence, and insists that it is insufficient to establish either the making of an assault, or an intent to commit murder.
The authorities cited by counsel upon the proposition that there was no evidence of an assault do not support his contention. Yoes v. State, 9 Ark. 42, was a case of assault and battery. A conviction was set aside because of the giving of an instruction to the effect that if the defendant called the prosecuting witness out for the purpose of having a difficulty with him he must be found guilty; and it was held that the motives which induced the defendant to go to the place where the witness was, might be legitimately inquired into in case it should be proven that he had actually made an assault in pursuance of his preconceived and settled intention, but could not under any state of the case have furnished conclusive evidence of his guilt.
In People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159, the court holds that there is a difference between preparation and attempt, and applied that principle to the case in hand where the accused was charged with an attempt to contract an incestuous marriage. The difference between preparation and attempt was illustrated by the court by reference to the purchase and loading of a gun with the declared intention of shooting a neighbor; and it was said, "Until some movement is made to use the weapon upon the person of his intended victim, there is only preparation and not an attempt."
In the case at bar not only had the gun been obtained and loaded, but the defendant resorted to the house of the one charged to have been assaulted, and as the latter testified, pointed the weapon at her. It is not necessary to again rehearse the testimony. We held that the act of pointing the loaded gun at the woman at the hour and place and under the circumstances shown by the testimony constituted an assault, and we have found nothing in the books or authorities which require us to change our views in that particular.
In the late case of State v. Archer decided by the court of appeals of Kansas, 8 Kan.App. 737, 54 P. 927, it was held that the pointing of an unloaded revolver, in a threatening manner, at another is an assault when the party at whom it is pointed is not aware that it is not loaded or has no reason to believe that it is not, and is by the act of the menacing party, put in fear of bodily harm. The court in support of its conclusion refers to State v. Taylor, 20 Kan. 643; 2 Bish. New Crim. L., Sec. 32; State v. Shepard, 10 Iowa 126; Com. v. White, 110 Mass. 407; and State v. Horne, 9 Kan. 119.
In the case at bar the woman was clearly put in fear of bodily harm, which impelled her to flee and call for assistance.
Counsel again insists that the evidence is insufficient to disclose an intent to murder. It may be that counsel understands our former opinion to disregard the principle of law that in cases of this character the specific intent must be proven as laid in the indictment or information. If so, he misinterprets the reasons given for our conclusion. We are well aware and in full accord with that doctrine which is well expressed in the case of Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401, cited by counsel, as follows: "When a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, that intent is just as...
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Stuebgen v. State, 4325
...Early Wyoming Cases The history of the law of specific intent in our state has been rather tortuous. It began in 1898 in Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 51 P. 879 and its denial of rehearing in 7 Wyo. at 318, 56 P. 596 (1899). The defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder......
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Richey v. State
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Smith v. State
...82.) Upon the material evidence in the cause the crime charged is not established, and the cause should be reversed and remanded. (Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 312.) The plea of guilty put in issue every material allegation of the information. (State v. Pressler (Wyo.), 92 P. 806.) The branding ......
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Berry v. State
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