BS v. State, 2D01-1842.

• Citation: 862 So.2d 15
• Decision Date: 17 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2D01-1842.,2D01-1842.
• Parties: B.S., a child, and D.L.S., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

862 So.2d 15

B.S., a child, and D.L.S., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D01-1842.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 17, 2003.

Bruce G. Howie of Piper, Ludin, Howie & Werner, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellants.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, C. Suzanne Bechard and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Under section 985.215(6), Florida Statutes (2000), the circuit court must require the parents or guardian of a child who is detained during delinquency proceedings to pay fees to the State for the cost of the child's subsistence. B.S., a minor, and his mother, D.L.S., challenge the constitutionality of this statute. They maintain that it violates equal protection when it results in exonerated juveniles being treated differently than exonerated adults. They also contend the statute violates substantive due process insofar as it requires payment of subsistence costs for a child's detention at home. We agree with both assertions.

Subject to some exceptions not germane here, the disputed portion of the statute provides in pertinent part:

When any child is placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care or into other placement pursuant to a court order following a detention hearing, the court shall order the natural or adoptive parents of such child, including the natural father of such child born out of wedlock who has acknowledged his paternity in writing before the court, or the guardian of such child's estate ... to pay to the Department of Juvenile Justice fees in an amount of $20 per day related to the cost of the care, support, and maintenance of the child, as established by the Department of Juvenile Justice, unless the court makes a finding on the record that the parent or guardian of the child is indigent.

§ 985.215(6), Fla. Stat. (2000).¹

As used in the juvenile delinquency chapter, "home detention" is defined as "temporary custody of the child while the child is released to the custody of the parent, guardian or custodian in a physically nonrestrictive environment under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice staff pending adjudication, disposition, or placement." § 985.03(18)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000).

In this case, B.S. was taken into police custody on November 5, 2000 and remained there until the next morning, when the circuit court ordered home detention and released him to his parents' custody. On November 30, 2000, the court ordered the parents to pay $20 per day for the cost of B.S.'s care through that date. Subsequently the State filed a "no petition" in the case. D.L.S. then filed a pro se motion to rescind the costs order. She argued that she should not be required to pay because the State had decided not to prosecute the case and because B.S.'s detention was in her home. Noting the mandatory language of section 985.215(6), the court denied the motion.²

At the outset, the State contends that B.S. and D.L.S. did not raise the validity of the statute in the circuit court and therefore failed to preserve the constitutional issues for appeal. We disagree. We have reviewed D.L.S.'s pro se motion and her argument in the circuit court and conclude that they adequately asserted the constitutional challenges. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)

(noting that the allegations of a pro se litigant are held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings drafted by lawyers).

I. EQUAL PROTECTION

The heart of an equal protection argument is that the State has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal fashion. B.S. and D.L.S. claim that the State treats accused juvenile offenders differently from accused adult offenders with respect to the payment of subsistence costs. Under section 951.033(2), Florida Statutes (2000), adult prisoners must pay for their subsistence costs. But section 939.06, Florida Statutes (2000), provides that, if an adult criminal defendant is acquitted or discharged, he is not liable for court costs, fees of a ministerial government office, or subsistence costs. See also Williams v. Ergle, 698 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)

. For these purposes, the State's entry of nolle prosequi amounts to a discharge. Clark v. State, 570 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In contrast, section 985.215(6) mandates payment of a daily fee to the Department of Juvenile Justice for the "cost, care, support, and maintenance" of an accused child who has been placed in detention, but it does not relieve a parent or guardian from paying the fee if the child is acquitted of the charged delinquent act or the State decides not to proceed against him.

When considering whether a statute runs afoul of equal protection, we must first determine what level of scrutiny to apply: "(1) `ordinary' scrutiny; (2) `mid-level' scrutiny; or (3) `strict' scrutiny." N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S549, 552, ___ So.2d ___,___, 2003 WL 21546546 (Fla. July 10, 2003) (citations omitted). Ordinary scrutiny applies to most legislation; mid-level scrutiny applies to certain types of speech and some suspect classifications; strict scrutiny applies when the legislation affects a fundamental right or a suspect class. Id. at S563 n. 14-16, ___. We conclude that ordinary scrutiny is appropriate in this case because no fundamental right is asserted and youth is not a suspect classification. D.P. v. State, 705 So.2d 593, 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

Under ordinary scrutiny, a legislative act is presumed constitutional. State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985). To withstand such scrutiny, the law must "bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Statutory classifications that treat one group differently than others must appear to be based on a rational distinction having a reasonable relation to a legitimate state objective. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Thomas ex rel. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla.1983).

In some circumstances the State may treat juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders. These differences are justified because the objectives of the juvenile justice system differ from those of the criminal justice system. In the case of adult offenders, the State's primary objective is to punish them for their crimes. But for juvenile offenders, its goal is to

ensure the protection of society, by providing for a comprehensive standardized assessment of the child's needs so that the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and treatment can be administered consistent with the seriousness of the act committed, the community's long-term need for public safety, the prior record of the child, and the specific rehabilitation needs of the child....

§ 985.01(c); see also P.W.G. v. State, 682 So.2d 1203, 1207-08 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996),

approved, 702 So.2d 488 (Fla.1997); In re J.P., 405 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Thus, for example, a statute imposing a five-day detention period on a juvenile who commits an offense using a firearm does not violate equal protection, even when no like penalty is imposed on an adult offender because the statute is rationally related to the legislature's purpose of preventing the juvenile's escalation into the adult criminal justice system. T.M. v. State, 689 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

Although we recognize that the criminal and juvenile justice systems have different correctional objectives, the issue here is not the disparate treatment of offenders. Rather, the issue is whether the State has a legitimate objective that justifies discriminating between adults and children when they have not been prosecuted for an offense or have been found not to have committed one.

We previously have held that the legislative purpose behind section 939.06 is to protect a criminal defendant from paying costs when he is innocent or when the State fails to vigorously prosecute him. State v. Crawford, 378 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49-50, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974)

(noting the policy behind a similar Oregon enactment that freed an exonerated defendant from liability for costs: the statute attempts to achieve fairness for a defendant whose trial ends without conviction because that person "has been seriously imposed upon by society without any conclusive demonstration that he is criminally culpable"). We can conceive of no reason why this policy or purpose is not equally applicable to a juvenile. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966) (holding that a New Jersey statute imposing a duty to reimburse county for cost of transcript in case of an unsuccessful appeal only on indigent defendants who were imprisoned and not imposing the cost on defendants who received a suspended sentence, were placed on probation, or who were sentenced only to pay a fine, violated equal protection). To the extent that section 985.215(6) requires the payment of fees for the "cost of the care, support, and maintenance" of a child who has been acquitted of the charged offense or whom the State has determined not to prosecute, it violates equal protection and is unconstitutional.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

"To comply with the constitutional guarantee of due process, a state statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. Further, the statute must not be discriminatory,...