Buchanan v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers

• Decision Date: 09 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 46647,46647
• Citation: 94 Wn.2d 508,617 P.2d 1004
• Parties: , 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3461, 91 Lab.Cas. P 55,294 Wesley D. BUCHANAN, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, and its agent, International Trustee Earl Bush; Independent Local 313, Petitioners, Dale D. Dressel and Jane Doe Dressel, husband and wife; James E. Reich and Jane Doe Reich, husband and wife; Gary C. Eaton and Jane Doe Eaton, husband and wife; David L. Greinke and Jane Doe Greinke, husband and wife; Joseph L. Jonas and Jane Doe Jonas, husband and wife, Defendants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 508

94 Wn.2d 508

617 P.2d 1004, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3461,

91 Lab.Cas. P 55,294

Wesley D. BUCHANAN, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, and its agent International Trustee Earl Bush Independent Local 313, Petitioners Dale D. Dressel and Jane Doe Dressel, husband and wife; James E. Reich and Jane Doe Reich, husband and wife; Gary C. Eaton and Jane Doe Eaton, husband and wife; David L. Greinke and Jane Doe Greinke, husband and wife; Joseph L. Jonas and Jane Doe Jonas, husband and wife, Defendants.

No. 46647.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Oct. 9, 1980.

Vance, Davies, Roberts, Reid & Anderson, Denny E. Anderson, Seattle, Bonneville, Viert, Morton & McGoldrick, William G. Viert, James V. Handmacher, Tacoma, for petitioners.

Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson & O'Hern, Gary A. Burns, Jerome F. McCarthy, Tacoma, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

A labor strike by members of Independent Local 313 in Tacoma (Local), of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers (International) is the source of this lawsuit. Plaintiff, not a union member, drove a delivery truck across the picket lines. He alleges that he was severely beaten by the individual union member defendants. He also sued the Local, the International and the trustee appointed by the International, since the Local was in trusteeship at the time of the incident.

The question is whether the construction of RCW 49.32.070 ¹ announced in Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local 25, Int'l Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, 62 Wash.2d 461, 383 P.2d 504 (1963), should continue as the law in this state. An opposite result was reached 3 years later in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The United States Supreme Court was construing an identical federal statute.

Feeling bound by the Titus decision, the trial court found that there was an issue of material fact and denied the motion for summary judgment submitted by the unions. We affirm the trial court.

If the statute is applicable, it contains two requirements. Liability will attach to the union, its officers and members only upon (1) clear proof of (2) actual participation in, or actual authorization of unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, or ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof. This would be a substantial variation of the usual rules of vicarious agency liability and proof thereof.

In Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, supra, we held that RCW 49.32.070, with its high standard of proof and limitation of vicarious liability, did not apply to tort actions of this nature.

Instead the court ruled that the general rules of agency law were applicable. The court said at page 469, 383 P.2d at page 509-510:

We agree with the plaintiffs that the general rules of agency law should be applied in this case. It is the general rule that a master may be held liable for the tortious acts of his servant, although he may not know or approve of them, if such acts are done within the scope of the employment ...

RCW 49.32.070 is part of the "little" Norris-LaGuardia Act, so-called since it was patterned after the federal act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. Our statute, RCW 49.32.070, is identical to 29 U.S.C. § 106, except for the reference to the courts to which each is applicable.

In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, the court specifically applied section 106 to a claim under state tort law which was brought in federal court. It held that the proof in that case did not meet the special proof requirements of section 106. It traced legislative history, including the subsequent enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 which imposes liability upon unions and their members under ordinary doctrines of agency rather than the more stringent standards of section 106. It found that the legislature intentionally did not repeal section 106 in view of the court's prior construction of section 106 in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947).

To the contrary, in Titus our court rejected such a reading of the Carpenters case. Rather it looked to the title of RCW 49.32 and read therefrom a legislative intent to limit that act, and therefore 49.32.070, to restraining orders, injunctions, and contempt matters arising out of labor disputes.

Petitioners urge us to overrule Titus. It is contended that Titus was in error because the language of the statute is not ambiguous and thus examination of the title and interpretation by the court was both unnecessary and improper. Ayers v. Tacoma, 6 Wash.2d 545, 557, 108 P.2d 348 (1940).

The question is close, particularly in hindsight, since the Gibbs case reached a contrary result.

However, there is one fact which leads us to reaffirm Titus and leave the ultimate resolution of this issue to the legislature. That fact is that Titus was decided in 1963. Since then the legislature has met in 22 sessions. The legislature is presumed to know the decision in Titus and its effect. State v. Fenter, 89 Wash.2d 57, 569 P.2d 67 (1977); Daly v. Chapman, 85 Wash.2d 780, 539 P.2d 831 (1975). It has never amended the statute.

The legislature, within constitutional constraints, is the body to make the policy decisions on this matter. The failure of the legislature to amend the statute in the 17 years since the Titus decision was rendered convinces us that it was and is the policy of the legislature to concur in that result.

We therefor defer to the legislative conclusion of inaction which affirms the result of Titus, decline to reexamine it, and remand to the trial court for trial upon the merits consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, HICKS, and WILLIAMS, JJ., and HAMILTON, J. Pro Tem., concur.

ROSELLINI, Justice (concurring).

In United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947), an indictment was brought for conspiracy under the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) involving a group of local manufacturers and dealers in millwork, their incorporated trade associations and officials thereof, and a group of unincorporated trade unions and their officials and business agents. The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70-71, limited the power of the trial court in trying the case. After holding that the limitations of the section applied to all federal courts in matters growing out of labor disputes, the court explored the legislative history of the section and determined that it was intended

to relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital, and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member charged with responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration.

(Footnotes omitted.) 330 U.S., at 403, 67 S.Ct., at 780.

The court continued:

Thus § 6 limited responsibility for acts of a co-conspirator-a matter of moment to the advocates of the bill. Before the enactment of § 6, when a conspiracy between labor unions and their members, prohibited under the Sherman Act, was established a widely publicized case had held both the unions and their members liable for all overt acts of their co-conspirators. This liability resulted whether the members or the unions approved of the acts or not or whether or not the acts were offenses under the criminal law. While of course participants in a conspiracy that is covered by § 6 are not immunized from responsibility for authorized acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy, they now are protected against liability for unauthorized illegal acts of other participants in the conspiracy.

(Footnotes omitted.) 330 U.S. at 404, 67 S.Ct. at 780. This paragraph and the further discussion which the court pursued concerning the legislative history reflect the court's view that the section was enacted to forestall judicial discouragement of legitimate union activity through application of rules of conspiracy liability. The focus was indeed upon removing unjust judicial obstacles to labor organization and union activities. The court observed that proponents of the section had argued that it was not its purpose to affect the law of agency in civil matters. This court, when it decided Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, 62 Wash.2d 461, 383 P.2d 504 (1963), was not unjustified in concluding from the language of United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, supra, that the United States Supreme Court had found the thrust of the federal provision to be aimed at criminal prosecutions, rather than at damage suits by persons who have suffered physical injuries at the hands of overzealous picketers.

While the same court, in the later case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), extended the holding of the United Brotherhood case to cover a civil conspiracy action it did so without discussion of the intended scope of section 6 of the federal act. The wrong complained of there was, like that in United Brotherhood, economic harm resulting from union activities. In neither case was the court called upon to decide whether the section was meant to restrict recovery in cases of physical assault. I see no reason to assume that it would reach that conclusion were such a case before it. Certainly, in a case such as this, where the evidence before the court shows grave bodily injury inflicted upon the plaintiff by a band of pickets and direct evidence that the international union's...