Buchanan v. Maine

• Decision Date: 22 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 04-26-B-W.,CIV. 04-26-B-W.
• Citation: 377 F.Supp.2d 276
• Parties: Daniel BUCHANAN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Buchanan, et al., Plaintiffs, v. State of MAINE, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

377 F.Supp.2d 276

Daniel BUCHANAN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Buchanan, et al., Plaintiffs, v. State of MAINE, et al. Defendants.

No. CIV. 04-26-B-W.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

July 22, 2005.

Robert J. Stolt, Lipman, Katz & McKee, Augusta, ME, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher C. Taub, Maine Attorney General's Office, Augusta, ME, Cassandra S. Shaffer, Peter T. Marchesi, Wheeler & Arey, P.A., Waterville, ME, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

WOODCOCK, District Judge.

Relying on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the state of Maine asks this Court to reconsider its earlier decision that the Plaintiff had stated a viable reasonable accommodation claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Although this Court agrees that Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) does not extend to the non-fundamental, though important, rights protected by Title II, this Court denies the State's Motion for Reconsideration. By entering into a consent decree, the State may have consented to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2005, this Court issued an Order Affirming in Part and Rejecting in Part the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 65). The Order, inter alia, concluded Count VII of Plaintiff Daniel Buchanan's¹ Complaint stated a viable reasonable accommodation claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act against the State and Lincoln County, and rejected the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the ADA count be dismissed.² The State filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing it is entitled to sovereign immunity from Title II claims.³ Buchanan has since filed a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint with the ADA claim restated against each Defendant.

Earlier Orders fully set out the facts. See Recommended Decisions of the Magistrate Judge (Docket Nos. 43, 44); Order Affirming in Part and Rejecting in Part the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 65). Briefly, this lawsuit tests the legal implications of the death of Michael Buchanan, a person with a disability, who was shot and killed by Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Hatch.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Abrogation of State Immunity: General Principles

The State contends that even if the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint stated a viable Title II claim, it is entitled to qualified immunity under Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). Generally, the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from suing states for monetary relief based on violations of federal law. See U.S. Const. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). There is one relevant exception: congressional abrogation of state immunity.⁴ Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55-56 116 S.Ct. 1114. This exception is created by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, (its) provisions." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. Even though Congress has the right to abrogate state immunity under section 5, it may not do so consistent with the restrictions of the Eleventh Amendment unless its action is consistent with the overriding purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. "When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives" of the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Lane, 541 U.S. at 520, 523, 124 S.Ct. 1978.

Whether Congress' abrogation of state immunity is proper depends on whether Congress: (1) unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity; and, (2) acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Lane, 541 U.S. at 517, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)). The answer to the first question is clear; the answer to the second, as Magistrate Judge Kravchuk said, is "thorny". Rec. Dec. for State Def.'s at 5 (Docket No. 43). This Court steps gingerly into the thicket.

1. The Unequivocal Expression of Congressional Intent

Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Act defines "public entity" to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies and instrumentalities. § 12131(1). Persons with disabilities are "qualified" if they, "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, mee [t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." § 12131(2). Title II's enforcement provision incorporates by reference § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, which authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. It provides also that "[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." § 12202. A more unequivocal expression of the congressional intent to abrogate state immunity is difficult to imagine.

2. The Valid Exercise of Congressional Power

To determine whether a § 5 abrogation is a "valid exercise of power," the Supreme Court provided a road map in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) and its progeny. The Court held that § 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Lane, 541 U.S. at 520, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157). Whether Congress's enactment of Title II of the ADA satisfies the Boerne "congruence and proportionality" requirement in the context of public accommodations requires a three step analysis. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). The first step is "to identify the scope of the constitutional rights at issue." Id. at 365, 121 S.Ct. 955. Second, the court must examine whether Congress "identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional ... discrimination by the States against the disabled." Id. at 368, 121 S.Ct. 955. Third, the court must assess whether the remedy is an "appropriate response to [a] history and pattern of unequal treatment." Lane, 541 U.S. at 530, 124 S.Ct. 1978; see Fla. Prepaid Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999).

i. The Constitutional Right or Rights Congress Sought to Enforce

As Magistrate Judge Kravchuk pointed out in her Recommended Decision, "the nature and constitutional stature of Michael's right is not ... easy to peg."⁵ Rec. Dec. for State Def.'s at 5 n. 4 (Docket No. 43). Lane is of assistance. Lane concluded that Title II of the ADA seeks to enforce "a number of constitutional rights and that a history of unconstitutional disability discrimination supported Congress's enactment of prophylactic legislation." Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2004); Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-29, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (applying the first two steps in the Boerne analysis). Lane's overriding concern was the "unequal treatment" disabled individuals have historically experienced. Lane, 541 U.S. at 524, 124 S.Ct. 1978 ("pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs"), at 525 ("a pattern of unequal treatment"), at 526 ("hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions."), at 530 ("this history and pattern of unequal treatment."). Lane states that Garrett identified Title I's purpose as the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment's command that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike," an analysis that evokes the Equal Protection Clause.⁶ Id. at 522-23, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-66, 121 S.Ct. 955) ("Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce this prohibition on irrational disability discrimination."); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

ii. History of Unconstitutional Discrimination

Analyzing the second prong of the Boerne congruence and proportionality test, Lane discussed two aspects: (1) the "sheer volume" of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities; and, (2) the backdrop of "pervasive unequal treatment in the provision of state services and programs...." Lane, 541 U.S. at 525, 528, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (emphasis added)("a pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs and activities."). Under this prong, the Supreme Court considered the record supporting Title II as a whole, and held that Congress had documented a sufficient historical predicate of unconstitutional disability discrimination in the provision of public services to justify enactment of a prophylactic remedy pursuant to Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 529. Lane ruled that the second Boerne inquiry was satisfied generally as applied to the ADA, and is satisfied here. Id.; see also Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc....