Buckmiller v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84SC251,84SC251
• Parties: Jacqueline M. BUCKMILLER, Petitioner, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1112

727 P.2d 1112

Jacqueline M. BUCKMILLER, Petitioner, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Respondent.

No. 84SC251.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Nov. 17, 1986.

Robert Justin Driscoll, Denver, for petitioner.

Anstine and Hill, Ronald C. Hill, Richard M. Kaudy, Denver, for respondent.

QUINN, Chief Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in Buckmiller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 690 P.2d 883 (Colo.App.1984), which affirmed the trial court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion to vacate an earlier order of dismissal for failure to prosecute. The motion to vacate the order of dismissal was filed by Jacqueline M. Buckmiller, who had previously commenced a negligence action against Safeway Stores, Inc. The trial court denied Buckmiller's motion to vacate because, in its view, the prejudice to Safeway resulting from a reinstatement of the case would outweigh any prejudice to Buckmiller from a denial of the motion. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and accordingly affirmed the judgment. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case with directions to return it to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

On August 27, 1975, Buckmiller slipped and fell in a Safeway store in Widefield, Colorado. She filed an action against Safeway in the district court of El Paso county on July 7, 1976, alleging that her fall and resulting injuries were caused by Safeway's negligent maintenance of its premises. A jury trial was originally set for September 27, 1977, but the trial date was vacated at Buckmiller's request on September 16 and no new trial date was ever obtained. After more than four years had elapsed without any progress on the case, the trial court sent notice to the parties on October 20, 1981, that the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute unless Buckmiller showed cause within thirty days why it should not be. After Buckmiller's attorney submitted a letter from an orthopedic surgeon stating that Mrs. Buckmiller had recently undergone a spinal fusion and that the prognosis was still in doubt, the court agreed to continue the case on the docket.

Another year elapsed without progress. On November 26, 1982, the trial court again notified the parties that the case would be dismissed in thirty days unless good cause was shown. When the thirty days passed with no response from Buckmiller's attorney, the court dismissed the case on December 28, 1982. On or about that same date Buckmiller's husband personally delivered to the trial court a letter from her surgeon indicating that she was still under treatment and that a definitive prognosis could not be made for some months. On January 13, 1983, Buckmiller's attorney filed a "motion not to dismiss," in which he stated that his failure to respond to the court's notice was caused by the still unresolved medical condition of his client and by other matters beyond his control. The court entered a written order denying the motion, stating as follows:

The first that was heard from [Buckmiller's attorney] was in early January, and the Court finds this to be dilatory. This case has been the oldest case in the Court's history.

The Court, therefore, finds that due diligence not being used to keep this case open, the previous order of dismissal of December 28th, 1982, stands.

Buckmiller did not learn of the dismissal of the case until May 1983. Since the applicable statute of limitations had run on her negligence claim, Buckmiller did not have the option of simply refiling the case, and therefore retained new counsel to seek reinstatement of the case. On June 22, 1983, Buckmiller's new attorney filed a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b) to vacate the court's order of dismissal. The motion stated that gross negligence on the part of plaintiff's former attorney had been the primary cause for the dismissal, that her claim was meritorious, and that she should not be precluded from having her day in court because of her attorney's negligence.

On August 15, 1983, a hearing was held on Buckmiller's C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. The court denied Buckmiller's request to introduce testimony concerning the attorney-client relationship between her and her former counsel, stating that "the real issue is what prejudice, if any, is suffered by the defense if this case is reinstated...." Buckmiller's attorney thereupon made a long and detailed offer of proof, stating that the testimony would have shown that Buckmiller had been hospitalized numerous times as a result of her fall and that she was in the hospital on November 26, 1982, when the court's notice of dismissal was mailed to her former attorney; that her former attorney was grossly negligent in failing to prosecute the case; that Buckmiller had simply been relying on her former attorney to handle the case in an appropriate manner and had not been informed of the dismissal until May 1983; and that to date she had incurred expenses in the amount of approximately $100,000 as a result of seven surgical procedures which she had undergone since her fall in the Safeway store on August 27, 1975. The court accepted the uncontroverted offer, but denied Buckmiller's 60(b) motion. Although noting that Buckmiller had been wronged by the failure of her attorney to effectively prosecute the case, the court concluded that the prejudice to Safeway in its ability to defend the case outweighed the wrong suffered by Buckmiller from her attorney's ineffective representation.

Buckmiller appealed to the court of appeals. Addressing Buckmiller's claim that her attorney's gross negligence constituted excusable neglect under C.R.C.P. 60(b), the court of appeals reasoned that an attorney's gross negligence does not constitute excusable neglect if the client herself was negligent and then concluded:

Here, in considering [Buckmiller's] motion for relief, the trial court had before it stipulated facts regarding the circumstances of the dismissal. The trial court could fairly infer that [Buckmiller] was negligent in failing to prosecute her case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [Buckmiller's] motion for reinstatement of her case.

690 P.2d at 886. We granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Buckmiller's rule 60(b) motion.

II.

C.R.C.P. 60(b) states that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order on grounds of excusable neglect. ¹ See, e.g., Tyler v. Adams County Department of Social Services, 697 P.2d 29, 32 (Colo.1985); Coerber v. Rath, 164 Colo. 294, 302, 435 P.2d 228, 231 (1967). In this case, although the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Buckmiller's rule 60(b) motion, it failed to explicate the precise legal criteria by which it reached this conclusion. We hold that the trial court should have resolved Buckmiller's rule 60(b) motion in accordance with clearly-defined legal criteria applicable to such a motion and that its failure to do so constituted reversible error.

A.

It is appropriate to clarify at the outset the distinction between abuse of discretion and application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a particular issue. In its abstract sense, judicial discretion implies the absence of any settled legal standard that controls the controversy at hand. State v. Biggs, 198 Or. 413, 255 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1953); see Kujich v. Lillie, 127 Mont. 125, 260 P.2d 383, 389-90 (1953); Yundt v. D. & D. Bowl, Inc., 259 Or. 247, 486 P.2d 553, 558 (1971). To say that a court has discretion, therefore, means that the court is not bound to decide an issue one way or another, but, instead, has the power to choose between two or more courses of action, each of which is considered a permissible resolution of the question. R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 743, 745 (1976). When there does exist a controlling legal standard, however, a court may not disregard that standard in favor of some other legal rule. The fact that the legal standard requires the consideration and application of several elements to the facts of a case does not alter in the least the court's obligation to decide the controversy in accordance with that standard. Thus, while a court may retain discretion in determining the weight to be given certain evidence relevant to the controlling legal criteria or in assessing the relative significance to be accorded various factors encompassed within those criteria, it must exercise that discretion within the framework of, rather than in disregard of, the controlling legal norm. With these preliminary comments aside, we turn to the legal standard applicable to the resolution of a rule 60(b) motion based on an allegation of excusable neglect.

B.

In Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397 (Colo.1982), we reviewed certain basic considerations which apply to the resolution of a motion to set aside an order admitting a will to probate. After noting that the underlying goal in ruling on such a motion is to promote substantial justice and that the burden is on the movant to establish the grounds for relief by clear, strong and satisfactory proof, 651 P.2d at 401-02, we extracted from our prior case law the particular legal criteria that a trial court should apply in granting or denying a motion to set aside a default judgment. Where the motion for relief is predicated on a claim of excusable neglect, Craig holds that the trial court should base its decision on the following three criteria: (1) whether the neglect that resulted in entry of judgment by default was excusable; (2) whether the moving party has alleged a meritorious claim or defense; and (3) whether relief from the challenged order would be consistent with considerations of equity. 651 P.2d at 402. Although we stated in Craig that a trial court is not required to engage in a balancing test in which...