Buckner v. Burnett
| Decision Date | 07 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Parties | Simon B. BUCKNER, Appellant, v. Douglas W. BURNETT and The Honorable William Skaggs, Respondents. 50865. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Deborah G. Buckner, Jefferson City, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Cynthia A. Quetsch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents.
Before SPINDEN, P.J., SMART, J., and TURNAGE, Senior Judge.
On the day that Simon B. Buckner filed his lawsuit to obtain records of the Speaker of the House's long distance telephone calls, state officials produced the records. The circuit court concluded that the dispute was moot and granted summary judgment for the officials. Buckner appeals. He argues that he established that the officials violated the law by not producing the documents immediately, so the circuit court should have denied the officials' motion for summary judgment. He also argues that granting summary judgment was error because the circuit court did not resolve his allegation that the officials purposely refused to produce the records and, therefore, he should have been awarded reasonable attorney fees. We affirm.
This dispute began on July 26, 1994, 1 when Buckner hand-delivered a written request to Douglas Burnett, chief clerk of the House of Representatives, and the Honorable William Skaggs, representative of the 31st Legislative District and chairman of the Accounts Committee, asking for "a list of all telephone numbers assigned to Representative Robert F. Griffin or to the Office of the Speaker of the House, for which the State of Missouri pays[.]" Buckner also asked for records of long distance calls made from those numbers.
Skaggs provided five telephone numbers. He did not provide the record of long distance calls made from those numbers, he said, because he had asked the Attorney General for an opinion as to whether or not such records were open to the public.
The Attorney General answered Skaggs' inquiry:
Telephone records of an individual member of the General Assembly utilized by the House Accounts Committee to reimburse a telephone company for services received are "record[s] ... retained by ... any public governmental body" pursuant to Section 610.010(6). As such, the billing records will remain public records of the General Assembly regardless of whether an individual member later reimburses the House Accounts Committee for specific calls made.
In the meantime, Buckner learned that Skaggs' list did not include a toll-free "800" number paid for by the state and assigned to Griffin's office. On August 30, Buckner sent a letter to Skaggs and Burnett asking for "billing and calling records reflecting charges and calls made to any '800' number telephone service installed for Representative Robert Griffin or the Office of the Speaker of the House." On September 2, Skaggs responded to Buckner's request, "This information has been requested but has not been delivered."
On September 6, Buckner sent another written request to Skaggs and Burnett asking for "[r]ecords reflecting the existence of any credit or expense (by which latter term I mean 'American Express') card accounts the State has established for Representative Griffin or the Office of the Speaker of the House." In a letter dated September 9, Skaggs acknowledged the existence of an "800" number assigned to the Speaker's office. He also said, "The state has not established any credit card accounts for the speaker." Buckner, however, later discovered that Griffin did have an American Express account which listed on its billing statement "Bob F. Griffin, State of Missouri."
On September 12, Skaggs and Burnett provided Buckner access to records of calls to another "800" number operated by the House of Representatives but not to the "800" number in the Speaker's office. On September 16, Burnett told Buckner that the records he had requested concerning the Speaker's "800" number had been ordered but not yet received. Later that same day, Buckner went to the State Records Center and asked for the Speaker's telephone records. Personnel there told him that those records had not been transferred to the center and that he would have to obtain them at the Capitol.
That afternoon, Burnett told Buckner that he had requested the records from the Office of Administration, but they had not been delivered to him. James Schutt, director of the Office of Administration's Division of Data Processing and Telecommunications, told Buckner that he was unaware of any request by the House of Representatives asking for billing and calling records for any "800" number service installed for the Speaker. Schutt, however, later determined that the House of Representatives had requested those records on September 12.
On September 19, Buckner filed suit against Skaggs and Burnett contending that they had violated Chapter 610, RSMo. 2 Buckner requested that the court order Skaggs and Burnett to provide immediate access to the requested telephone records and to respond to future requests accurately as provided by law. Buckner also prayed for costs and attorney's fees. Before filing the suit, Buckner delivered copies of his petition to Skaggs and Burnett. Later that afternoon, before being served with summons, Skaggs notified Buckner by a hand-delivered letter that the records concerning the Speaker's "800" number would be available to Buckner at 3:00 P.M. that day.
Skaggs and Burnett filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court in response to Buckner's lawsuit. Skaggs and Burnett contended that Buckner's suit was moot because they had already turned over the records to Buckner. Supporting their motion was an affidavit by Burnett stating that he was the custodian of certain records of the House of Representatives but not the custodian of "state telephone records or expense invoices or documentation of legislators." Burnett said that, rather than denying Buckner's request for telephone records, he took it upon himself to order these records from the Office of Administration.
On February 3, 1995, the circuit court granted Skaggs' and Burnett's motion stating:
WHEREAS, [Buckner] filed this action on September 19, 1994 pursuant to Chapter 610, RSMo, seeking access to certain records reflecting charges and calls to an "800" number telephone service installed for the Office of the Speaker of the House; and
WHEREAS, [Skaggs and Burnett] fully complied with that request on September 19, 1994 before summons was served in this case
....
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Skaggs' and Burnett's] motion for summary judgment is granted for the reasons stated therein; that [Buckner's] claims for injunctive relief and costs are denied; and that this case is hereby dismissed, each party to bear his own costs.
Buckner argues on appeal that the circuit court's granting summary judgment for Skaggs and Burnett was wrong "because the record demonstrates that a violation of Chapter 610, RSMo, occurred, and, therefore, [Skaggs and Burnett] have no right to judgment as a matter of law." We disagree.
Section 610.027 provides the remedies for violations of Chapter 610. Section 610.027.1 says that "[a]ny aggrieved person ... may seek judicial enforcement of the requirements of sections 610.010 to 610.026[.]"
The circuit court correctly concluded that because Buckner had received the records, the court had nothing to enforce. The matter was moot. "A question is justiciable only where the judgment will declare a fixed right and accomplish a useful purpose." Local Union 1287 v. Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, 848 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Mo. banc 1993). "A cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy." Bank of Washington v. McAuliffe, 676 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1984). "The purpose of summary judgment ... is to identify cases (1) in which there is no genuine dispute as to the facts and (2) the facts as admitted show a legal right to judgment for the...
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