Buell v. Hughes
Decision Date | 31 July 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 3:07CV0468 (DJS).,3:07CV0468 (DJS). |
Citation | 568 F.Supp.2d 235 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Maureen K. BUELL and Gregory P. Forte, Plaintiffs, v. Abigail L. HUGHES, Nancy Pugliese and Julie Gottlieb, Defendants. |
John R. Williams, Katrena K. Engstrom, John R. Williams And Associates, LLP, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiffs.
Margaret Q. Chapple, Maria A. Santos, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
This is a motion for summary judgment involving alleged equal protection and due process violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs, Maureen Buell ("Buell") and Gregory Forte ("Forte") bring two counts against Defendants, Abigail Hughes ("Hughes"), Nancy Pugliese ("Pugliese") and Julie Gottlieb ("Gottlieb"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process through differential treatment and threats to Plaintiffs' property interests in their jobs. Plaintiffs sued Defendants in their individual and official capacities for injunctive relief and attorney's fees, and in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages. Now pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (dkt.# 42). For the hereafter stated reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (dkt.# 42) is GRANTED on all counts.
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 56(a) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Connecticut ("D.Conn.L.Civ. R."). Local Rule 56(a) requires that the moving party "annex[ ] to a motion for summary judgment a document ... which sets forth in separately numbered paragraphs ... a concise statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(1). Following this, the non-moving party is required to file an answering document, D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(2).
In a Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement, it is assumed that "[a]ll material facts set forth in said statement and supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement [of] ... the opposing party." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(1). In denying the facts set forth by the moving party, the non-moving party must include in their Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement "a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3). "When a party fails to appropriately deny material facts set forth in the movant's Rule 56(a)(1) statement, those facts are deemed admitted." SEC v. Global Telecom Servs. L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn. 2004).
Many of Plaintiffs' responses to Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement fail to meet the requirements of the rule. Paragraphs 52-55, 59, 61, 62, 75, 76, 86, 88, 102, 104, 110 and 124 of Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement all contain the same phrasing, "Plaintiffs lack sufficient information to agree or disagree." (Dkt.# 46, ¶ 52). This response does not comply with Local Rule 56(a)(2), as it neither agrees with nor denies the statements made by the moving party in their Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(2). Also, these paragraphs fail to cite any affidavits or evidence, as required in Local Rule 56(a)(3). As a result of these violations of Local Rule 56(a), the Court considers ¶¶ 52-55, 59, 61, 62, 75, 76, 86, 88, 102, 104, 110 and 124 to be admitted.
In response to ¶ 60 of Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement, Plaintiffs objected to the phrasing of the statement, and stated so in their response rather than stating whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement put forth. Similarly, in response to ¶ 98, Plaintiffs objected to the formatting and the inclusion of the statement, rather than answering the fact as required by Local Rule 56(a)(2). See (Dkt.# 42, Ex. # 1). As a result, ¶¶ 60 and 98 are also considered admitted.
In light of the foregoing statements, the following are the undisputed material facts of the action presently before the Court.
Plaintiffs are mathematics teachers in the Connecticut Technical High School System (CTHSS). Buell was hired by CTHSS as a part-time typing teacher in September 1979. She was hired full time on September 1, 1981, to work at Kaynor Technical High School ("Kaynor") in Waterbury, CT. She obtained tenure on September 1, 1984. During her employment with CTHSS, Buell taught math in addition to typing. Forte was initially employed by CTHSS as a substitute and part-time trade math teacher at various Connecticut Technical High Schools, starting on November 13, 1998. On October 29, 1999, Forte was hired full time by CTHSS to work at Wilcox Technical High School ("Wilcox"). Forte obtained tenure on October 29, 2003. Both Plaintiffs possessed a 091 teaching certification when they were hired, which certified them to teach trade-related math, trade-related science and/or blueprint reading. Forte also possesses certifications as an Intermediate Administrator and Supervisor (092) and a Vocational Technical School Administrator (082), as well as a coaching permit, effective through 2010. Connecticut regulations require that a teacher possess a 029 certification (core mathematics) in order to teach standard classroom math. However, prior to the January 2002 enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the CTHSS permitted instructors who possessed a 091 endorsement to teach math and science as core academic subjects. Plaintiffs were assigned to teach classroom math under this allowance.
Once NCLB came into effect in January of 2002, the State Department of Education (SDE) determined that instructors were required to hold a 029 certificate in order to teach math, science or art as a core academic subject at any of the seventeen Connecticut Technical High Schools. The core certifications all require that the applicant:
... present evidence of meeting the following requirements in addition to meeting the assessment requirements ...:
(a) Holds a bachelor's degree from an approved institution;
(b) Has a ... survey course in United States history comprised of not fewer than three semester hours of credit ...;
(c) Has completed a subject-area major consisting of one of the following:
(1) A major awarded by an approved institution in the subject area for which the certification is sought ...; or
(2) A minimum of 30 semester hours of credit in the subject for which endorsement is sought and a minimum of nine semester credits in a related subject or subjects related to the subject for which the endorsement is sought ...;
(d) Has a minimum of 18 credit hours in professional education in a planned program of study and experience ...
The Regulations of the Connecticut State Board of Education § 10-145d-451(a-d). The assessment requirements referred to in the above regulation are defined as, "Praxis I-CBT, [and] Praxis II, CONNECT OR BEST." Id. at § 10-145d-400(i).
As of July 1, 2003, a total of seventy-four teachers held the 091 endorsement and were teaching math, science or art; within this group, sixty-three of the instructors possessed a bachelor's degree and eleven did not. The SDE arranged for these seventy-four teachers to be given the time to pursue their core academic certification. The SDE decided to waive the requirement that existing teachers take the Praxis I exam, as all seventy-four instructors had teaching experience that they considered to be the equivalent of the examination. However, they were required to meet all other standards to obtain their certification.
When reviewing the CTHSS faculty to ensure that they met the NCLB's "highly qualified" standard for educators, the SDE separated those who failed to meet all certification requirements into three categories: (1) instructors possessing a full core academic certification who obtained their endorsement prior to the implementation of either the CONNTENT or Praxis II exams; (2) instructors possessing a 091 certification and a bachelor's degree; (3) instructors possessing a 091 certification who had not obtained a bachelor's degree. The teachers in category one were permitted to waive the Praxis II requirements to obtain the "highly qualified" status, as they already held the 029 certification, and were permitted to demonstrate their competency through holding a major or master's degree in their core subject area or by passing the district's High Objective Uniform State Standard of Evaluation (HOUSSE). However, teachers in categories two and three were required to complete the requirements for a 029 certification, including the Praxis II exam. Those teachers already in possession of a bachelor's degree and at least 12 credits in their core subject area were issued durational shortage area permits ("DSAP"), which allowed teachers meeting some but not all of the requirements for certification to teach in their core area while pursuing the completion of the requirements. A DSAP can be reissued no more than two times, resulting in a maximum of three years. The instructors from category three, as well as those from category two who did not meet the requirements to be issued a DSAP, were placed in positions for which they held the appropriate certification for the 2003-2004 school year. These teachers were sent an email by Superintendent Dominic Spera, who was later replaced in...
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