Buff v. Columbia Baking Co.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1949
• Docket Number: 16229.
• Parties: BUFF v. COLUMBIA BAKING CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

53 S.E.2d 879

215 S.C. 41

BUFF v. COLUMBIA BAKING CO. et al.

No. 16229.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 10, 1949

Norbert A. Theodore, H. H. Edens, and Henry Hammer Columbia, for appellant.

Joseph L. Nettles, Columbia, for respondents.

TAYLOR Justice.

This is an action for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1942, § 7035-1 et seq., instituted by Mary Allie Buff as the widow of Sexton Jerome Buff, the deceased employee, against Columbia Baking Company, employer, and American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., the insurance carrier, it being contended that the death of Sexton Jerome Buff was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on the 21st day of October, 1946. Both the employer and carrier denying liability, hearings were had before Commissioner W. L DePass, Jr., who rendered an award dated February 14, 1947 in favor of the claimant. Appeal was duly taken therefrom to the full commission, which issued its opinion and award dated April 9, 1947, affirming the hearing commission. Thereafter an appeal was duly taken to the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County and heard by the Honorable M. M. Mann, presiding judge, who on the 19th day of January, 1948, passed an order reversing and setting aside the award. Within due time appeal was taken to this court and now comes before us on exceptions which in our opinion raise the single question of whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the fact-finding body that the deceased died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

'In reviewing this case on appeal, this Court is of course cognizant of the well founded rule of law that the Industrial Commission being the fact-finding body and this Court and the Circuit Court both being appellate Courts in workmen's compensation matters, this and the Circuit Courts can only review the facts to determine whether or not there is any competent evidence to support the findings of the fact-finding body. If there is, the Courts are without power to pass upon the force and effect of such evidence. An award may of course be reversed if there is an absence of any competent evidence to support it, but in Workmen's Compensation cases the Courts are not the triers of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them by the Industrial Commission its findings are conclusive in the absence of fraud and neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. Anderson v. Campbell Tile Co., 202 S.C. 54, 24 S.E.2d 104; Crawford et al. v. Town of Winnsboro et al., 205 S.C. 72, 30 S.E.2d 841; Lanford v. Clinton Cotton Mills, 204 S.C. 423, 30 S.E.2d 36; Strawhorn v. J. A. Chapman Const. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d 116; Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 14 S.E.2d 889; Shehane v. Springs Cotton Mills, 206 S.C. 334, 34 S.E.2d 180.' Green v. Grinnell Co., 213 S.C. 116, 48 S.E.2d 644, 647.

The deceased was employed on the date of his death, October 21, 1946, by the Columbia Baking Company and was at that time engaged in the operation of a machine called a divider. On the afternoon of this date Buff was found in an unconscious state lying in front of the dividing machine where he was working. To the left of it was a hoist consisting of a steel frame about four feet wide, six to eight feet long and approximately fifteen feet high. To the right of and attached to this frame was a feeding vat, the opening and closing of which was controlled by a steel wheel resembling the steering wheel of a car. At the top of the hoist was an electrical motor operating under a 550 to 575 volt current with a capacity of 30 amperes. This motor was attached to the frame of the hoist and that in turn to the vat or hopper to which the steel control wheel was attached. The motor was controlled by a double switch, which in turn was controlled by a length of chain on either side. One chain when pulled would carry the conveyor, which was used to hoist dough to the vat, up and the other, when pulled, would cause it to descend. If no pressure was exerted on either of the chains the switch remained in a neutral position automatically stopping the motor. At the time the employee was found in front of the machine the conveyor with a load of dough was approximately halfway up the hoist. Mr. Perry, another employee, was ordered to take over the operation of the machine who, upon finding the vat halfway up the hoist and not knowing whether it was a full vat on the way up or an empty one on the way down, pulled the 'down' chain running the vat down to a position where he could see over the side. Upon perceiving that it was full of dough he in turn pulled the 'up' chain lifting the vat and dumping its dough into the hopper where it was processed through the divider without incident. Approximately twenty minutes later when another vat of dough arrived at the divider, Perry pulled the down chain to the hoist motor which lowered the empty vat, the motor started but before reaching the floor stopped and failed to operate; whereupon he called for Mr. Dye, the maintenance man. It being desirous of processing the newly arrived vat of dough, Perry began loading the hopper of the divider by hand, the maintenance man at the same time trying to find the trouble with the hoist motor. While placing the moist dough into the divider, Mr. Perry touched his forearm against the hopper control wheel; whereupon he received an electrical shock which burned his forearm and knocked him forcibly from the machine at which time the fuse to the hoist motor apparently burned out.

It is well settled that circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to settle questions of fact in workmen's compensation cases as in other cases, see Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation 151; Ferguson v. State Highway Department, 197 S.C. 520, 15 S.E.2d 775; Holly v. Spartan Grain & Mill, 210 S.C. 183, 42 S.E.2d 59; and in 71 C.J. 1085-86 we find the following:

'Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a finding of fact or an award, and a finding or award may be based on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence; the evidence need not, although it may, be direct or positive. Circumstantial evidence, to establish a claim, need not reach such a degree of certainty as to exclude every reasonable or possible conclusion other than that reached.'

In Owens v. Ocean Forest Club, 196 S.C. 97, 12 S.E.2d 839, 841, this Court quoted with approval from 71 C.J. 1060 to the effect that:

'There is a natural presumption, or a presumption of fact, that one charged with the performance of a duty and injured while performing such duty, or found injured at a place where his duty may have required him to be, is injured in the course of, and as a consequence of, the employment.'

The Circuit Judge, in reversing the award, relied principally upon the testimony of the witness Dye to the effect that if a burned wire did exist in the motor it would continue to run until stopped but would not start again and since the motor did start after the deceased was found lying by the machine this condition did not exist. The testimony of the witness Dye relative to this question appears as follows:

'Q. Now go back to the motor, if this wire burned out, would that motor run again * * * would it keep running? A. No, sir. It would run while it was in motion, but after it stopped, it wouldn't start again.

'Q. It couldn't start again? A. It couldn't start again. As long as it was in motion, it would run, but you can't start it again.

'Q. So that, if that motor ran, after Mr. Buff was found lying there, you couldn't have had this burnt wire in there? A. No, sir, because it would have stopped.

'Q. It would have stopped.'

However, the witness Dye, who is not an expert, apparently made conflicting statements as to the condition of the motor as on one occasion he said he found a ground in the motor and on another he said he found the wire burned in two. Witness H. K. Walker, an electrical engineer, testifying relative to the apparently conflicting statements of the witness Dye testified as follows:

'Q. Well, let me ask you this before you answer that: The other day, did you hear the testimony as to the condition they found in the motor, and that they took the motor off and put it to one side? A. I heard what appeared to me to be some conflicting testimony. It was either that, or else it was two different cases of trouble. As I recall it, one gentleman said that, when this accident happened, they found the motor grounded, and then another time it was stated that the motor wouldn't run, which would indicate that there must have been a short, or a condition of the ground. Whether it was at that state or not, I wasn't clear on that, but you might straighten me out on that.'

'Q. Mr. Walker, going back to the way that machine was found after the man was found lying on the floor, if someone had gone on, or if someone went on and operated that machinery in the normal manner and felt no shock until sometime later on when the person handling wet dough which was further grounded to another machine, and with his hand in the dough, came in contact with this wheel, and he received a shock. Up until that time * * *. Well, let's assume that up until that time the person operating the machine in...