Bugg v. Rutter
| Decision Date | 21 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | WD 77690 |
| Citation | 466 S.W.3d 596 |
| Parties | Eldon Bugg, Appellant, v. James L. Rutter, Jean Goldstein, and Christy Blakemore, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Eldon Bugg, Boonville, MO, Appellant, pro se.
Bruce Farmer, Columbia, MO, Attorney for Respondents Rutter and Goldstein.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, and Brandon D. Laird, Assistant Attorney General, Kansas City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent Blakemore.
Before Division III: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Gary D. Witt and Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judges
Eldon Bugg (“Mr. Bugg”) appeals from the Judgment of the Circuit Court of Moniteau County, Missouri (“trial court”), granting summary judgment to James L. Rutter (“Rutter”), the personal representative of the Estate of Laura Downs (“Estate”); Jean E. Goldstein (“Goldstein”), the attorney for Rutter and the Estate; and Christy Blakemore, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Boone County (“Clerk”).
All of Mr. Bugg's present civil tort claims relate to the administration of the Estate from a separate probate court proceeding in the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri, a probate judgment that we have previously declared to be final and not subject to collateral attack. In fact, we have advised Mr. Bugg in numerous previous appeals that his continuing litigation and appeals are improper collateral attacks on the probate judgment, and we have expressly warned him not to continue such frivolous litigation and appeals. Unfortunately, our warnings to Mr. Bugg have fallen upon deaf ears, and we find ourselves repeating our ruling yet again. This time, however, it comes with a price to Mr. Bugg, as we affirm the judgment and order sanctions to be imposed upon Mr. Bugg.
This is the eleventh time the facts of this case have been before us on appeal. Facts in addition to those presented herein may be found in Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 75 S.W.3d 853 (Mo.App.W.D.2002)(“Bugg I ”); Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 242 S.W.3d 729 (Mo.App.W.D.2007)(“Bugg II ”); Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 300 S.W.3d 242 (Mo.App.W.D.2009)( “Bugg III ”); Bugg v. Rutter, 330 S.W.3d 148 (Mo.App.W.D.2010)(“Bugg IV ”); Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 347 S.W.3d 487 (Mo.App.W.D.2011)( “Bugg V ”); Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 348 S.W.3d 848 (Mo.App.W.D.2011)(“Bugg VI ”); State ex rel. Bugg v. Daniels, No. WD74697 (“Bugg VII”) ; Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 400 S.W.3d 360 (Mo.App.W.D.2013)(“Bugg VIII ”); Rutter v. Bugg (Estate of Downs), 437 S.W.3d 814 (Mo.App.W.D.2014)(“Bugg IX ”); Bugg v. Rutter, 451 S.W.3d 776 (Mo.App.W.D.2014)(“Bugg X ”).
In Bugg X , though unpublished, we advised Mr. Bugg in a slip opinion that In so doing, we concluded that “Mr. Bugg's petition [filed in a different court from the probate judgment] was an improper collateral attack on the judgment closing the Estate and was barred by res judicata.” Bugg X at slip op. 5–6.1
This case is virtually identical to the procedural history of the present appeal—an appeal that we are deciding approximately six months after we issued our ruling in Bugg X.
While Mr. Bugg may not necessarily be attempting to relitigate the same causes of action he has previously asserted in the probate case and other collateral litigation, all of his present tort claims arise out of the conduct of Rutter, Goldstein, and the Clerk related to the Estate and the collection and distribution of the same $35,248.84 that was the subject of Bugg X and numerous previous appeals relating to the probate case. Simply put, as we have said on many numerous occasions in the past, Mr. Bugg has already had his opportunity to assert his present tort claims in prior proceedings that have become final and are not subject to collateral attack.
On March 18, 2014, the trial court here entered summary judgment in favor of Rutter and Goldstein on the basis that Mr. Bugg's claims were an improper collateral attack of a final judgment involving these parties; the trial court additionally entered summary judgment in favor of the Clerk on the basis that the Clerk was entitled to immunity.
Mr. Bugg appeals, asserting three points on appeal.
Preliminarily, we note that Rutter and Goldstein filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Bugg's appeal for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04. The motion was taken with the case.
“Compliance with Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory in order to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates by speculating on facts and on arguments that have not been made.” Bugg VI, 348 S.W.3d at 852 (internal quotation omitted). Mr. Bugg's brief fails to comply with Rule 84.04 in several respects. His statement of facts fails to set forth the relevant facts, Rule 84.04(c); his points relied on are inadequate, Rule 84.04(d); and his arguments, Rule 84.04(e), “are almost impossible to decipher.”
Lanham v. Div. of Emp't Sec., 340 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Mo.App.W.D.2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, although Mr. Bugg's brief is deficient, we deny Rutter and Goldstein's motion to dismiss. The principal gist of Mr. Bugg's argument is focused on claiming error in the summary judgment rulings; accordingly, we offer our analysis, ex gratia, to the extent that we may do so without advocating for Mr. Bugg. See Rainey v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) ().
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo as a question of law. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when a party establishes “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 74.04(c)(6).
The right to judgment as a matter of law differs depending on whether the moving party is the claimant or the defending party. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 381. In this case, Rutter, Goldstein, and the Clerk are the defending parties:
[A] ‘defending party’ may establish a right to judgment by showing (1) facts that negate any one of the claimant's elements facts, (2) that the non-movant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able to produce, and will not be able to produce, evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimant's elements, or (3) that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support the movant's properly-pleaded affirmative defense.
Id. We review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered and accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id. at 376.
In Mr. Bugg's second and third points on appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. In Point II, he claims trial court error in granting summary judgment to Rutter and Goldstein; in Point III, he asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Clerk.
Mr. Bugg's fourth amended petition in the case underlying this appeal asserted tort claims arising out of the conduct of Rutter, Goldstein, and the Clerk related to the Estate and to the collection and distribution of $35,248.84, all of which were related to a final probate judgment from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of all defendants on their motions for summary judgment without further elaboration. “[A] trial court's order is presumed to have based its decision on the grounds specified in Respondents' motions if the trial court's order does not set forth its reasoning.” Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jesse James Festival, Inc., 269 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Mo.App.W.D.2008) (internal quotation omitted). “Where, as here, the trial court grants summary judgment without specifying the basis upon which it was granted, we will uphold the summary judgment if it is appropriate under any theory.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Rutter and Goldstein argued as one ground for summary judgment that Mr. Bugg's lawsuit, although a tort action, was an impermissible collateral attack on the probate court's judgment. We agree.
“The final settlement of an estate has the conclusiveness of a final judgment and is impervious to collateral attack as the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction.” Bosworth v. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. banc 1996). “Where a judgment is attacked in other ways than by proceedings in the original action to have it vacated or reversed or modified or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack is a ‘collateral attack.’ ” Reimer v. Hayes, 365 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Mo.App.W.D.2012) (internal quotation omitted). “A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter ... is not open to collateral attack in respect of its validity or conclusiveness of the...
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