Bugryn v. State, No. 27095.
Decision Date | 05 September 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 27095. |
Citation | 904 A.2d 269,97 Conn.App. 324 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Priscilla BUGRYN et al. v. STATE of Connecticut. |
Ross T. Lessack, Cheshire, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
J. Sarah Posner, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (state).
DiPENTIMA, GRUENDEL and BERDON, Js.
The plaintiffs, Priscilla Bugryn and Serena Bugryn, spouse and daughter, respectively, of the decedent, Dennis Bugryn, appeal from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) affirming the finding and dismissal of their claim by the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner). The plaintiffs' sole claim is that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's determination that the decedent was not an employee pursuant to General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., the Workers' Compensation Act (act). We affirm the decision of the board.
The parties stipulated to the following facts, of which the commissioner took administrative notice. On March 4, 1996, the decedent began the application process for the position of correction officer with the state of Connecticut. In order to be eligible for the position, job applicants were required to complete a six step application process. Applicants who successfully completed all six steps then trained for the correction officer position. The decedent received a letter dated August 25, 1997, from the department of administrative services, notifying him that he was scheduled to take a physical fitness test on October 1, 1997. The letter also provided that the date of this physical fitness test could not be changed under any circumstances, and it gave a detailed description of each component of the test: sit and reach test, sit up test, push up test, and finally, a 1.5 mile run. This physical fitness test was the third step of the six step application process.
On the day of the test, the decedent signed a hold harmless agreement stating that he would not hold the state or any of its employees liable for any injury or damage he may incur as a result of taking the test. Shortly after completing the last component of the physical fitness test,1 the 1.5 mile run, he died of a heart attack. At the time he took the test, he was not being paid by the state and had not received an appointment for an employment position.
The plaintiffs filed a claim for dependency benefits on October 1, 1999, which was considered at a formal hearing before the commissioner on June 8, 2004. In his November 4, 2004 finding and dismissal, the commissioner dismissed the plaintiffs' claim because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden of proof that the decedent was an employee under § 31-275(9)(A)(i).2 The plaintiffs appealed from the commissioner's decision to the board. After reviewing the merits of the plaintiffs' appeal, the board affirmed the commissioner's finding and dismissal on October 24, 2005. This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to benefits under the act as the decedent's dependents. Specifically, they claim that the commissioner should have found that the decedent was an employee of the state at the time he performed the physical fitness test. We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sprague v. Lindon Tree Service, Inc., 80 Conn.App. 670, 673-74, 836 A.2d 1268 (2003).
Because the plaintiffs' claim regarding the applicability of § 31-275 to their situation is a question of law, our review of the board's decision is plenary. See Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 734, 830 A.2d 228 (2003). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 248 Conn. 754, 760, 730 A.2d 630 (1999).
A jurisdictional prerequisite to the applicability of the act is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 433, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). Section 31-275(9)(A)(i) of the act defines an employee as someone who "[h]as entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether the contract contemplated the performance of duties within or without the state. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jalowiec Realty Associates, L.P. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 408, 421-22, 898 A.2d 157 (2006). Because the language of § 31-275(9)(A)(i) is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd and unworkable results, we need go no further.
While the act's applicability to this case is one of first impression in our courts, decisions of the compensation review board are informative as to whether an employer-employee relationship existed in this case. The plaintiffs rely on Lemelin v. New Britain General Hospital, 3978 CRB-06-99-02 (February 1, 2000), to support their argument that prospective employees are entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Specifically, they state that in both Lemelin, as well as in this case, the claimants "were only prospective employees and not actually hired." The plaintiffs' reliance on Lemelin is misplaced. On four separate occasions, the board in Lemelin stressed the fact that the claimant had been offered the job prior to taking the hepatitis B vaccination that caused her injury as part of her physical examination. Id., at pp. 1-2, 4-5. The claimant in that case had received a letter which made repeated references to her starting date. Id., at p. 2. This letter was then followed by a telephone call to the claimant, telling her when she was to "start working." Id. These facts are clear indications that the claimant had in fact been hired.
On the basis of this postoffer status, the Lemelin board determined that the act should be construed liberally to provide compensation benefits to the claimant. Id., at pp. 5-6. The Lemelin board relied on 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (1999) § 26.02[6], which provides that "injury during a try-out period is covered [under the workers' compensation law], when that injury flows directly from employment activities or conditions,"3 and it found that the physical examination was a condition of employment. Lemelin v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, No. 3978 CRB-06-99-02, at p. 4. In Lemelin, the examination alone was insufficient to bring the claimant under the act's protection; the physical examination plus an offer of employment was required.
The plaintiffs also refer to Netto v. Derby, 4535 CRB4-02-6 (July 2, 2003). There, a letter from the Derby police chief indicated that the claimant "had been offered a part-time supernumerary job upon completion of his . . . training." Id., at p. 5. Further, in his deposition, the police chief stated that the claimant "was actually going to be a supernumerary part-time police officer. . . ." Id., at p. 6. The Netto board concluded: (Emphasis added.) Id. The city of Derby, having offered the claimant the position and...
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