Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1999
• Docket Number: (SC 15968)
• Citation: 730 A.2d 630,248 Conn. 754
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BRIAN STICKNEY v. SUNLIGHT CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

248 Conn. 754

730 A.2d 630

BRIAN STICKNEY v. SUNLIGHT CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

(SC 15968)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 21, 1999.

Officially released May 25, 1999.

Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and McDonald, Js. Jason M. Dodge, for the appellant (defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company).

John T. Scully, for the appellee (defendant Commercial Union Insurance Companies).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the workers' compensation commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open and modify a voluntary agreement filed by the defendant compensation insurance provider.¹ Because we conclude that the commissioner did not have jurisdiction to open and modify the voluntary agreement, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna), filed a motion with the workers' compensation commission (commission) to open and modify a voluntary agreement in order to have itself replaced by the defendant Commercial Union Insurance Companies (Commercial Union), as the insurer responsible for payment of workers' compensation benefits under the voluntary agreement. The workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) denied the motion, and Aetna appealed the decision to the workers' compensation review board (board), which reversed the commissioner's decision. On remand, the commissioner granted Aetna's motion to open the voluntary agreement. The board affirmed the decision, and Commercial Union appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concluded that the commissioner had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open and modify the voluntary agreement and reversed the decision of the board. Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 48 Conn. App. 609, 618, 711 A.2d 1193 (1998). We granted Aetna's petition for certification on this issue. Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 245 Conn. 919, 717 A.2d 236 (1998).

The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal. "On February 7, 1985, [the plaintiff, Brian Stickney] was injured during the course of his employment when he slipped and fell on a patch of ice. Thereafter, [his employer, the defendant Sunlight Construction, Inc. (Sunlight)] filed through its insurance agent an injury report with Aetna. Aetna had issued a workers' compensation insurance policy to Sunlight for the period of April 11, 1984, through April 11, 1985, but canceled the policy for nonpayment of premium in December, 1984, prior to the date of Stickney's injury. Aetna failed to verify its coverage for this claim, however, and issued a voluntary agreement for payment of benefits to Stickney, which agreement was approved by the commission on June 2, 1986. It is undisputed that Aetna did not notify the board of commissioners of its cancellation of Sunlight's policy as required by General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 31-348.

"Subsequent to Aetna's cancellation, Sunlight procured workers' compensation insurance from Commercial Union. The Commercial Union policy covered the period from January 17, 1985 through January 17, 1986, and, therefore, was effective at the time of Stickney's injury. It is undisputed, however, that Commercial Union never filed proof of coverage with the board of commissioners as required by [General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] § 31-348.

"In 1991, when Stickney's claim was reactivated because of recurring symptoms, Aetna discovered that its policy with Sunlight had been canceled prior to the date of Stickney's injury. Consequently, Aetna filed with the commission a motion to open and modify the voluntary agreement on the ground that Aetna was not Sunlight's insurer at the time of Stickney's injury, and to substitute Commercial Union for Aetna in the voluntary agreement. In that motion, Aetna sought a determination of which insurer was responsible for Stickney's workers' compensation benefits and, if Commercial Union was adjudged responsible, Aetna sought reimbursement from Commercial Union of the benefits Aetna paid to Stickney.

"A formal hearing was held on December 15, 1992. On May 13, 1993, the commissioner denied Aetna's motion on the ground that the commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide which insurer was liable to pay the claim because that issue involved a determination of rights under contract law. Aetna appealed the commissioner's decision to the board and, on August 2, 1994, the board reversed the commissioner's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of the remaining issues. On remand, the commissioner granted Aetna's motion to open the voluntary agreement and substituted Commercial Union in lieu of Aetna as the insurer of Stickney's claim. The board affirmed the commissioner's decision on April 25, 1997, and this appeal followed." Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., supra, 48 Conn. App. 612-13.

The Appellate Court rejected Aetna's argument in defense of the commissioner's decision, that "the commissioner had jurisdiction to consider Aetna's motion to open under the broad equitable powers provided to the commissioner in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] §§ 31-315 and 31-278." Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., supra, 48 Conn. App. 614. In its opinion, the Appellate Court began by recognizing that the commission's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to that which is expressly granted by statute, and that the Workers' Compensation Act (act) "involves the legal relationship between employers and employees." Id., 616. In contrast, the issue to be decided were the commissioner to open the voluntary agreement, is one of contract law. As such, that issue was "independent of the rights of the injured employee and his employer," and, accordingly, beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioner. Id., 617. As support for this conclusion, the Appellate Court relied on our early case of Witchekowski v. Falls Co., 105 Conn. 737, 740, 136 A. 565 (1927), for the proposition that the commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine which of two insurers was liable for payments already made by the employer, where the question of "[w]hich of the two insurers would be obligated to make the payments consequent upon an injury would have to be determined by the provisions of the policies." Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to open and modify the voluntary agreement in the present case. Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., supra, 618.

Before this court, Aetna repeats its equitable powers claim, citing General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) §§ 31-278, 31-298 and 31-315 for support. Aetna also argues that the commissioner has specific statutory authority to open the voluntary agreement pursuant to General Statutes § 31-342 and General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 31-275 (5) (C) and (E). Because we conclude that the commissioner did not have jurisdiction to determine the legal questions central to the motion to open, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.² We begin by setting forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals. "`It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board.... A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny.' ... Duni v. United Technologies Corp./Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, 239 Conn. 19, 24-25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996); Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). `Where ... [a workers' compensation] appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision.' Doe v. Stamford, [241 Conn. 692, 697, 699 A.2d 52 (1997)]...." (Citation omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick, 244 Conn. 781, 798, 712 A.2d 396, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S. Ct. 542, 142 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1998). Accordingly, our review in this appeal is de novo.

In addressing Aetna's claim, we are mindful of the jurisdictional limitations placed on administrative agencies such as the commission. "Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes vesting them with power and they cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves." Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 428, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). "Long ago, we said that the jurisdiction of the [workers' compensation] commissioners is confined by the [a]ct and limited by its provisions. Unless the [a]ct gives the [c]ommissioner the right to take jurisdiction over a claim, it cannot be conferred upon [the commissioner] by the parties either by agreement, waiver or conduct.... While it is correct that the act provides for proceedings that were designed to facilitate a speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of matters covered by the act ... the charter for doing so is the act itself. The authority given by the legislature is carefully circumscribed and jurisdiction under the act is clearly defined and limited to what are clearly the legislative concerns in this remedial statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 426-27. "`A commissioner may exercise jurisdiction to hear a claim only under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.' ... Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 576, 698 A.2d 873 (1997); see also Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 60, 566 A.2d 670 (1989); Gagnon v. United Aircraft Corp., 159 Conn. 302, 305, 268 A.2d 660 (1970). `Because of the statutory nature of our workers' compensation system, policy determinations as to what injuries are compensable and what...