Bulgin v. State

• Decision Date: 21 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC03-2215.,No. SC03-2271.,No. SC03-2214.,SC03-2214.,SC03-2215.,SC03-2271.
• Citation: 912 So.2d 307
• Parties: William C. BULGIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Kinjal H. Patel, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Brandon P. Pelky, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 307

912 So.2d 307

William C. BULGIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

Kinjal H. Patel, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.

Brandon P. Pelky, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC03-2214.

No. SC03-2215.

No. SC03-2271.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 19, 2005.

Rehearing Denied September 21, 2005.

Fred M. Conrad, Tallahassee, FL, and Edward T. Bauer and Matthew K. Foster of Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett and Foster, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioners.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Thomas D. Winokur, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.

ANSTEAD, J.

We have for review State v. Bulgin, 858 So.2d 1096, 1096-97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), which the First District Court of Appeal consolidated with two other cases, which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Williams v. State, 757 So.2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).¹ We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth herein, we quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and approve Williams. We hold that a criminal defendant's agreement to cooperate with the police, standing alone, does not act as a waiver of the right to a speedy trial or otherwise prevent the running of the time in which a defendant must be brought to trial.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The First District's opinion summarizes the facts of this case as they apply to all three petitioners:

The appellees/defendants were all arrested on December 15, 2000 for the sale of a controlled substance. The three agreed to cooperate with law enforcement in a continuing drug investigation and were released. On or about December 20, 2000, the defendants, accompanied by their attorneys, agreed to provide substantial assistance to law enforcement by conducting controlled drug buys. The law-enforcement officials agreed that no charges would be filed until their assistance was complete. These agreements satisfied the defendants' concern that formal charges and court appearances would jeopardize their covert assistance. The defendants did not sign speedy trial waivers and there was no discussion of the issue. After differing levels of cooperation with law enforcement, the defendants were arrested and charged. The defendants filed motions for discharge based on the speedy trial rule, Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191, which were granted by the trial courts.

State v. Bulgin, 858 So.2d 1096, 1096-97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The First District reversed the trial courts' decisions, ruling that the delays in holding trial were attributable to the petitioners. Id. at 1097 ("Here, the failure to hold trials for the defendants within the speedy trial rule was attributable to the defendants' cooperation agreements because the agreements postponed the charges and court proceedings until their assistance was complete."). The petitioners sought review in this Court, citing conflict with the Fifth District's decision in Williams v. State, 757 So.2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

WILLIAMS

In Williams v. State, 757 So.2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), the defendant was arrested and thereafter entered into an agreement to assist police. Id. at 598. After acting as a drug informant for the police for several weeks, Williams was "re-arrested" by the State for the same offense. Id. However, because the State failed to bring the case to trial within 175 days from his initial arrest, he filed a motion for expiration and discharge under the speedy trial rule, which the trial court denied. Id. On appeal, the Fifth District reversed, and rejected the State's argument that because Williams was assisting the State, he was "unavailable" for trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(k). Id. at 600. Specifically, the Fifth District concluded:

A person is deemed "unavailable" for trial if the person or the person's counsel fails to attend a proceeding where their presence is required or the person or counsel is not ready for trial on the day trial is scheduled.

Here, no proceedings were ever scheduled and the trial was never set. Thus Williams cannot be considered "unavailable."

Id. The court also noted that there was no evidence that Williams had waived his right to a speedy trial or had otherwise engaged in conduct that would estop him from asserting his rights. Id. The court specifically rejected the State's claim that the speedy trial rule should not be followed because Williams was not placed in jail upon his initial arrest:

The state also argues that Williams should be estopped to claim speedy trial protections because he was free following his unarrest. However, a defendant need not remain in custody to have the benefits of the speedy trial rule. The speedy trial rule specifically provides that a person charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of the rule whether the person is in custody or is at liberty on bail or recognizance or other pre-trial release condition. If the state is concerned about speedy trial, it could merely obtain a waiver from the defendant, as part of his substantial assistance agreement.

In addition, the speedy trial rule provides that the intent and effect of the rule shall not be avoided by the state by nolle prossing a crime and then prosecuting a new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode. Just as the state cannot avoid the effect of the rule by the prosecutor's actions in nolle prossing a crime, the state should not be able to avoid the effect of the rule by the actions of the police in "unarresting" the defendant.

Id. The State now asserts that we should hold that the petitioners were responsible for the State not bringing them to trial by virtue of their agreement to cooperate with the police. We decline to do so because we conclude such a holding would be contrary to the provisions and purpose of the speedy trial rule and the underlying constitutional right it protects.

ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance and fundamental nature of a citizen's right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967) ("The history of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this country clearly establish that it is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution."). Further, the Court has held that it is the individual states' responsibility to provide an accused with clear parameters to assure the protection of the right to a speedy trial. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225-26, 87 S.Ct. 988; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ("The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but [the Supreme Court's] approach must be less precise.").

Consistent with this mandate, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a) requires that a defendant who is charged with a felony be brought to trial within 175 days of arrest, absent a more specific demand, and that those charged with a misdemeanor be tried within ninety days. Subdivision (p) outlines the proper remedy, including discharge, when the State fails to try a case within 175 days. However, that subdivision also provides: "No remedy shall be granted to any defendant under this rule until the court has made the required inquiry under subdivision (j)." Subdivision (j), entitled "Delay and Continuances; Effect on Motion" states that there are four circumstances in which a pending motion for discharge is properly denied. Of the four exceptions, the State now relies upon two to deny petitioners relief: "(2) the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a codefendant in the same trial, or their counsel; (3) the accused was unavailable for trial under subdivision (k)...." Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(j). In other words, the State asserts that its failure to bring the petitioners to trial "is attributable to the [fault of] the accused" and the petitioners' "unavailab[ility] for trial." We conclude that cooperation with the police, standing alone, does not constitute conduct contemplated by either of these exceptions to the rule.

Both Bulgin and Williams involve situations where defendants were arrested, cooperated with the police, and were arrested a second time on the same charges, but at no time waived their rights to a speedy trial. See Bulgin, 858 So.2d at 1096-97. In both cases, the State failed to bring the cases to trial within 175 days of the defendants' initial arrests. Compare Bulgin, 858 So.2d at 1096-97, with Williams, 757 So.2d at 598-99. The Bulgin court considered the situation in the context of whether or not the delay was attributable to the defendants under rule 3.191(j)(2), whereas the Williams court considered the situation in the context of whether or not the defendant was "unavailable" under rule 3.191(j)(3). We conclude that neither exception to the rule applies here.

This Court has consistently held that the 175-day speedy trial period begins upon a defendant's initial arrest. See Weed v. State, 411 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla.1982) ("[T]he date of the original arrest is the focal point for speedy trial considerations, irrespective of changes made in charges. Only in specifically delineated circumstances can the time periods be adjusted."); see also State v. Naveira, 873 So.2d 300, 305 (Fla.2004) (citing Genden v. Fuller, 648 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla.1994)) ("The speedy trial period begins when a defendant is first taken into custody, not when charges are first filed.").

In Weed, in an opinion by Justice Adkins, this Court summarized some of the case law in which the courts had concluded that the State's unilateral actions could not delay the running of time for speedy trial:

In [State v.] Thaddies, [364 So.2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)] the court held that when a charge is dropped and another is filed based on the same incident, the date of...