Bulgo v. Maui County

• Decision Date: 19 July 1967
• Docket Number: No. 4673,4673
• Parties: Joseph E. BULGO v. The COUNTY OF MAUI, a Municipal Corporation.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 321

430 P.2d 321

50 Haw. 51

Joseph E. BULGO v. The COUNTY OF MAUI, a Municipal Corporation.

No. 4673.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

July 19, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

A taxpayer whose tax payment goes into the county general fund out of which election expenses are payable and who alleges he will be irreparably damaged by illegal expenditure of funds raised by taxation in holding elections under an invalid statutory provision has a standing to sue for injunctive relief.

Under the prevailing rule, courts will not enjoin the holding of elections for public offices.

Where a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum.

Article VII, Section 1 of the State constitution requires the legislature to confer powers upon the counties only by general laws.

In its broadest sense, the term 'general laws' denotes laws which apply uniformly throughout all political subdivisions.

A general law may apply to less than all of the political subdivisions, if it applies uniformly to a class of political subdivisions, which, considering the purpose of the legislation, are distinguished by sufficiently significant characteristics to make a class by themselves.

Where a statute applicable to every county in a class confers the power to hold special primary and general elections for county chairman in a contingency where the chairman-elect dies before taking office and the statute contains, in addition, a provision for the scheduling of such elections couched in general terms but presently applicable only to one county, such provision may not be taken out of its context and be considered a special law.

Kase Higa, County Atty., County of Maui (Richard R. Komo and Arthur T. Ueoka, Deputy County Attys., with him on the briefs), for defendant-appellant.

Frank D. Padgett, Honolulu (Padgett & Greeley, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Bertram T. Kanbara, Deputy Atty. Gen., (Bert T. Kobayashi, Atty. Gen., with him on the briefs), for amicus curiae.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MIZUHA MARUMOTO, ABE and LEVINSON, JJ.

MARUMOTO, Justice.

Eddie Tam of Maui died on December 13, 1966. At that time Tam was chairman and executive officer of the board of supervisors of that county, and was serving out his current tow-year term expiring on January 3, 1967. He had also been reelected to the same office at the general election held on November 8, and was looking forward to serving another two-year term upon the expiration of the current term.

This case is before us as an aftermath of a controversy generated by the appointment of Tam's successor before the expiration of the term which Tam was serving at the time of his death and the insistence of the successor chairman that his appointment entitled him not only to serve out Tam's current term but also to continue in office throughout the two-year term to which Tam had been reelected.

On December 19, six days after Tam died, the Maui board of supervisors appointed Manuel S. Molina as chairman. At that time the board consisted of eight members, including Molina. The board took this action under R.L.H.1955, § 144-31, which provides that 'Any vacancy occurring in any county office shall be filled by appointment by the board of supervisors * * *.'

On January 3, 1967, an induction ceremony was held to swear in the successful candidates for supervisors at the November 8 election as members of the new board. Molina was one of such successful candidates, but refused to take his oath as a supervisor on the ground that he was a holdover chairman. Thus, only seven supervisors were sworn in. Of these, five had served on the outgoing board and two were new.

The new board felt that it should decide by majority action who should be the chairman for the ensuing two years. However, it did not take any action to appoint a new chairman because it was advised by the county attorney that the statute applicable to the situation was not clear.

On February 3, 1967, the board adopted a resolution requesting the legislature to provide legislation for a special election for cunty chairman when the chairman-elect dies before taking office or is otherwise unable to take office.

The Fourth State Legislature convened in its general session on February 15. One of the bills introduced in the session was House Bill No. 4, which provided for the type of legislation desired by the Maui board. As originally drafted, the bill contemplated the election of a county chairman from candidates nominated by political parties. This was amended to provide for special elections consisting of a special primary election and a special general election, in compliance with another resolution which the Maui board adopted on April 21.

The amended bill passed the Senate unanimously. In the House it had the affirmative votes of 50 of the 51 members.

The bill was approved by the Governor on May 5, and became law as Act 47 of the Session Laws of 1967.

Act 47 provides at the outset that if the chairman-elect of a county dies before January 2 following his election, the Governor shall, within 10 days after such chairman-elect's death, issue a proclamation requiring the holding of special elections to fill the vacancy, such special elections consist of a primary election to be held within 60 days, but no sooner than 45 days, after the chairman-elect's death, and a general election to be held 30 days after the primary election.

This is followed by a provision, hereafter referred to as the challenged provision, which reads:

'* * * The governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the approval of this Act requiring special elections to be held if any person elected in the general election of 1966 to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county died before January 2, 1967, and such proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the approval of this Act to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. * * *'

The Act next provides that the tenure of any holdover or temporary chairman then serving shall terminate when the successor chairman shall be so elected and qualified, and that if any special election is held in the county within 120 days, but no sooner than 45 days, after the occurrence of the death or approval of the Act then such special election shall be held in conjunction with the general election under the Act.

The Act also provides that it shall be applicable to every county other than a county which adopts a charter providing for succession to the office of county chairman in the same contingency, and that expenses of the special elections shall be paid by the county in which they are held.

At the time of approval of the Act, the county of Maui was the only county in which the person elected as county chairman in the 1966 general election had died before January 2, 1967.

So, on May 9, the Governor issued a proclamation for the holding of special elections for Maui county chairman, setting June 24 as the date for the primary election and July 24 as the date for the general election.

On May 19, plaintiff filed a complaint in the second circuit court against the county, seeking an injunction to restrain it from holding the special elections mentioned in the Governor's proclamation, together with a motion for preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff bases his standing to sue on the fact that he pays real property tax to the county of Maui, which tax goes into the county general fund out of which the expenses of the special elections are payable. He claims the requested relief on the ground that the challenged provision is a special law, violative of Article VII, Section 1, of the State constitution, and, unless restrained by the court, defendant will irreparably damage plaintiff by illegally expending funds raised by taxation in holding elections under an invalid statutory provision.

Article VII, Section 1, of the State constitution reads as follows: 'Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general laws.'

Upon the filing of the complaint, the attorney general requested leave to participate as amicus curiae. This request was granted.

The circuit court held a hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on May 23. At the conclusion of this hearing the court announced that it would enjoin defendant, until further order, from expending public funds for the special elections, other than to retain any temporary clerks who might have been hired. A preliminary injunction to this effect was filed on the morning of May 31. Thereafter, on the same day, the court held a hearing on the complaint, at which the sole issue brought to its attention was the validity of the challenged provision.

The court ruled in plaintiff's favor, holding the challenged provision to be a special law. But before an injunction was issued in accordance with the ruling, defendant requested a rehearing on the grounds that plaintiff had no standing to sue and that the court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of an election for political office.

The court denied the requested rehearing, and issued its injunction on June 13. This appeal is from that injunction.

In seeking reversal, defendant has urged upon this court the same three contentions which it presented to the circuit court, namely, that plaintiff lacks standing to sue; that the court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of an election for public office; and that the challenged provision does not violate the State constitution.

We hold that plaintiff has a standing to sue in this case. We base this holding on Castle v. Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769. Although defendant urges that Castle, as a controlling authority on the point at issue, has been eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67;...