Burcher v. People

• Decision Date: 02 December 1907
• Citation: 93 P. 14,41 Colo. 495
• Parties: BURCHER et al. v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

93 P. 14

41 Colo. 495

BURCHER et al. v. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 2, 1907

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; John F Mullins, Judge.

Frank Burcher and others were convicted of violating the 'women and children labor act,' and they bring error. Reversed.

Steele C.J., dissenting.

Fred W. Parks, for plaintiffs in error.

Wm. H Dickson, Atty. Gen., and Samuel Huston Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (W. F. Hynes, of counsel), for the People.

CAMPBELL J.

Defendants were tried and convicted under an information charging them with violating the provisions of section 3 of the so-called 'Women and Children Labor Act' of 1903. Sess. Laws 1903, p. 310, c. 138; 3 Mills' Ann.St. Rev. Supp. p. 757. It reads: 'No woman of sixteen years of age or more shall be required to work or labor for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day, in any mill, factory, manufacturing establishment, shop, or store for any person, agent, firm, company, copartnership or corporation, where such labor, work or occupation, by its nature, requires the woman to stand or be upon her feet, in order to satisfactorily perform her labors, work or duty in such occupation or employment.' The title of the act is: 'An act to prescribe and regulate the hours of employment for women and children in mills, factories, manufacturing establishments, shops, stores, and any other occupation which may be deemed unhealthful or dangerous, and to repeal all acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith.' After defendants' motion to quash the information was overruled, they waived a jury, and submitted the case to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, and the court found them guilty of a misdemeanor, and sentenced them to pay a fine. The salient facts are that defendants were engaged in operating a steam laundry in the city of Denver, in which they had a number of machines, and employed a large number of men and women; that the building in which the business was carried on consisted of a ground floor and basement, well lighted by windows from side and rear, well ventilated and heated, connected with which were good sewerage and drainage, and no escaping gases or other unhealthy conditions surrounded the work, and the water and soap used were pure; that Belle Johnson, a woman over the age of 16 years, was employed in this laundry by them, and her work consisted in operating a shirt body ironer, which necessitated her to stand upon her feet; that under the contract of employment she was required to, and did, thus work more than 8 hours a day, to wit, about 55 hours a week, and averaging about 9 hours per day in the 24-hour day. On this review, as below, the facts being agreed upon, the only disputed question reserved and argued is one of law, whether foregoing section 3 is valid. Defendants challenge its validity upon a number of grounds, only two of which we shall consider, as our decision on them makes the section void, and compels us to reverse the judgment with instructions to discharge the defendants from custody.

The two grounds may thus be stated: (1) The subject-matter of the section is not clearly, or at all, expressed in the title of the act, as section 21 of article 5 of our Constitution requires. (2) The General Assembly has not in this act, or elsewhere, declared or considered the laundry business an occupation, or labor therein, injurious or dangerous to health, life, or limb, which is an essential condition precedent to the validity of an enactment of this character, whether it is based upon the eight-hour amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1902, and now known as section 25a of article 5 of the Constitution, or upon the general unwritten police power that resides in the legislative branch of our state government. As the Attorney General in his brief and oral argument gave, as the authority of the General Assembly to enact this statute, the so-called eight-hour constitutional amendment, we here insert the same: 'The General Assembly shall provide by law, and shall prescribe suitable penalties for the violation thereof, for a period of employment not to exceed eight (8) hours within any twenty-four (24) hours (except in case of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger), for persons employed in underground mines or other underground workings, blast furnaces, smelters; and any ore reduction works or other branch of industry or labor that the General Assembly may consider injurious or dangerous to health, life or limb.' Laws 1901, p. 109, c. 48.

As affecting the first assignment, it makes no difference whether authority for this act is the foregoing constitutional amendment or the unwritten police power if, in essential character, they differ. Whether the subject-matter of section 3 is clearly expressed in the title must be determined by their own contents, and without regard to the source of the power of which the act itself is an expression. This title has to do with a regulation of the hours of employment for women and children in certain enumerated, and other indefinite and unnamed, occupations, which occupations in and of themselves may be deemed unhealthful or dangerous. This the Attorney General concedes, but contends that the words of the amendment, 'or other branch of industry or labor,' make it competent for the General Assembly to regulate the hours of employment, not only where the occupation or branch of industry itself is injurious or dangerous, but also where the 'labor' is of that character; that is to say, even though the particular occupation or place of work is perfectly safe and healthful yet, if the labor therein or thereat is injurious or unhealthful, the General Assembly may nevertheless limit the number of hours persons shall be employed in that labor. And the Attorney General says that it is under the authority conferred by section 25a of article 5 thus to regulate hours of employment where 'labor,' as contradistinguished from 'branch of industry,' is dangerous or unhealthful, that section 3 was enacted. If such be the authority for this section, and if such interpretation thereof be correct (and concerning this and the applicability of the amendment to this...