People v. Friederich

• Decision Date: 01 December 1919
• Docket Number: 9265-9267.
• Citation: 67 Colo. 69,185 P. 657
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. FRIEDERICH. SAME v. BARTH. SAME v. JOSLIN.

185 P. 657

67 Colo. 69

PEOPLE v. FRIEDERICH.

SAME v. BARTH.

SAME v. JOSLIN.

Nos. 9265-9267.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 1, 1919

Error to Juvenile Court, City and County of Denver; Royal R Graham, Judge.

Philip P. Friederich, Allan Barth, and John Joslin were charged with contributing to juvenile delinquency. Motion to quash the informations was granted, and the judgments rendered are now before the Supreme Court on writ of error sued out on behalf of the People.

Judgments affirmed.

William E. Foley, Dist. Atty., and T. E. McIntyre, Asst. Dist. Atty both of Denver, for the People.

Edwin H. Park, of Denver, for defendant in error Barth.

Dana Blount & Silverstein, of Denver, for defendant in error Friederich.

BAILEY, J.

The defendants were charged with contributing to juvenile delinquency. They moved to quash the informations, which motion was granted, upon the ground that the Act upon which the prosecutions were based is unconstitutional. These judgments are now here for review on writs of error sued out upon behalf of the People.

The Act on which the prosecutions are based is found at page 298 Session Laws 1911. The title of the Act is as follows:

'An Act for the protection of girls 18 years of age who are, or may become delinquent concerning persons who contribute to their delinquency.'

The body of the Act is in these words:

'Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 'Section 1. From and after the passage of this act, any law of this state defining delinquency or concerning contributory delinquency shall, for the protection of girls, be held to include all girls under the age of eighteen (18) years.'

It is contended by defendants in error that the above Act is in contravention of two sections of the state Constitution; that it is a violation of Section 21 of Article 5, thereof, in that the subject of the Act is not clearly expressed in the title, and that it contains more than one subject; second: that it is obnoxious to Section 24 of Article 5, for the reason that it extends the provisions of one law, amends another by reference only, and fails to re-enact or republish so much of the prior laws as it purports to amend, extend and affect.

In determining the first question: whether the title of the Act fails to clearly express the subject of the statute, we are aware that no legislative act should be nullified upon constitutional grounds unless such legislation is plainly in violation of the Constitution. It is equally true, however, that the authority of the fundamental law of the state must be recognized, approved and enforced.

Section 21 of Article 5 is practically identical with provisions found in most of the state Constitutions, providing that the subject of any act shall be expressed in its title. Our Constitution, however, declares that not only must the subject be expressed in the title, but that such subject must be 'clearly' so expressed. The rule, as announced in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) page 178, is as follows:

'As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in an act which might with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with no dispensing power; the Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall be operative; it is no answer to say that the title might have been more comprehensive--in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so.'

By all authority and precedent it is firmly settled that the purpose of a statute must be ascertained and determined by its title, and that the title is presumed to be the controlling and conclusive index of the legislative intent. In the case at bar it cannot be said that the title of the Act in question indicates, either to lawyer or layman, the general scope and purpose of the Act. The body of the Act shows positively that it is intended for the protection of girls under eighteen years of age; the title limits its application specifically to girls eighteen years of age.

It is by no means sufficient that a general idea of the legislative intent may be gathered from the body of an act. It was declared In re Breene, 14 Colo. 401, 24 P. 3, as follows:

'Moreover, we are bound to assume that the word 'clearly' was not incorporated into the constitutional provision under consideration by mistake. It appears in but few of the corresponding provisions of other state Constitutions--a fact that could hardly have been unobserved by the convention. That this word was advisedly used, and was intended to affect the manner of expressing the subject, we cannot doubt. The matter covered by legislation is to be 'clearly,' not dubiously or obscurely indicated by the title. Its relation to the subject matter must not rest upon a mere possible or doubtful inference. The connection must be so obvious as that ingenious reasoning aided by superior rhetoric will not be necessary to reveal it. Such connection should be within the comprehension of the ordinary intellect as well as the trained legal mind. Nothing unreasonable in this respect is required, however; and a matter is clearly indicated by the title when it is clearly germane to the subject mentioned therein.'

It manifestly cannot be said that girls under eighteen years of age, as expressed in the Act, are of the same age or class as girls eighteen years of age, specified in the title. It was to prevent just such obscurity, confusion and uncertainty that the constitutional provisions were enacted. Edwards v. D. & R. G. Co., 13 Colo. 59, 21 P. 1011. In Turner v. Coffin, 9 Idaho 338, 361, 74 P. 962, 968, it was said:

'The trouble with this act is that the title and the act do not fit each other. The title indicates one thing, while the bill attempts to write an entirely different thing into law.'

The title under consideration here, instead of clearly showing the purpose and meaning of the Act, rather tends to disguise and conceal it; in short, the title indicates one thing, while the body of the act declares another and different thing.

In addition to the authorities already cited and quoted from the following decisions sustain the conclusion that the Act is obnoxious to Section 21, Article 5 of the Constitution; People ex rel. Seely v. Hall, 8 Colo. 485, 9 P. 34; C. & G. Road Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 39; People ex rel. v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230, 3 P. 70; Miller v. Edwards, 8 Colo. 528, 9 P. 632; Wall v. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515, 19 P. 469; Brooks v. People, 14 Colo. 413, 24 P. 553; Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 P. 425, 27 L.R.A. 751; In re Consolidation of School Districts, 23 Colo. 499, 48 P. 647; Lamar Canal Co. v. Amity L. & I. Co., 26 Colo. 370, 58 P. 600, 77 Am.St.Rep. 261; Burcher v. People, 41 Colo. 495, 93 P. 14, 124 Am.St.Rep. 143; Board of Commissioners v. Trowbridge, 42 Colo. 449, 95 P. 554; Board of County Commissioners v. Aspen Mining Co., 3 Colo.App. 223, 32 P. 717; Jackson v. Weis Mfg. Co., 124 Tenn. 421, 137 S.W. 757; Johnson v. Grady...