Burden v. Snowden

• Decision Date: 30 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. S021885,S021885
• Citation: 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531,2 Cal.4th 556,828 P.2d 672
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 828 P.2d 672 Elizabeth BURDEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David SNOWDEN as Chief of Police, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 531

7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531

2 Cal.4th 556, 828 P.2d 672

Elizabeth BURDEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David SNOWDEN as Chief of Police, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S021885.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 30, 1992.

As Modified May 28, 1992.

Thomas Kathe, City Atty., Filarsky & Watt, Steve A. Filarsky, Ventura, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Amy D. Hogue and Kevin M. Fong, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

Mayer & Reeves, Thomas M. Reeves, Irving Berger, Martin J. Mayer, Long Beach, Whitmore, Johnson & Bolanos, Richard S. Whitmore, Craig W. Patenaude and Helene L. Leichter, Mountain View, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

John K. York and Celinda Tabucchi, Orange, for plaintiff and respondent.

BAXTER, Justice.

We granted review in this case to determine the narrow issue whether a person hired by a city police department as a "police recruit" is entitled to coverage under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (hereafter the Bill of Rights Act or the Act) (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.) ¹ Our examination of the legislative scheme, its history and extrinsic aids leads us to conclude that the Act was not intended to apply to the recruit classification; therefore, a recruit is not entitled to coverage under the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the order of the trial court granting a writ of mandate and to remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

In February 1988, the Costa Mesa Police Department (hereafter the Department) Burden was directed to report to the Orange County Sheriff's Academy for 19 weeks of training on a full-time basis. During the time she attended the academy she was paid a flat hourly rate of $10.02 by the Department. Although Burden was not issued a police identification number or badge, she was issued a uniform with a hat piece identifying her as a recruit, a gun, ammunition, a baton and handcuffs.

                hired Elizabeth Burden (hereafter Burden) as a police recruit.  From the outset, the Department made clear it was hiring Burden as a civilian, not as a police officer.  The Department's job recruitment flyer specifically provided:  "The Police Recruit position is a non-sworn position performing civilian police training work while attending a P.O.S.T.  [Peace Officers Standards and Training] certified basic academy.  Upon successful completion of the basic academy, Police Recruits are sworn in as full-time Police Officers." 2  Burden also signed a "Police Officer Trainee Advisement Form" which reflected her acknowledgement that she would not represent herself as a peace officer at any time, that she would not be a peace officer until she successfully completed the police academy, and that she would take no action as a peace officer or "in any other way attempt to use Peace Officer powers."   The form further provided:  "Due to the untimely starting of the police academy we were not able to complete your background, therefore your background will be completed while you are attending the academy.  If for some reason you fail to pass your background and or medical, you will be terminated immediately."
                

As part of its standard screening process, the Department conducted a background investigation of Burden. Burden signed a "Release and Waiver" which authorized the Department to obtain any information in the files of her former employers and physicians. The release and waiver additionally provided: "I further understand that I waive any right or opportunity to read or review any background investigation report prepared by the Costa Mesa Police Department." Burden also signed an "Authorization Form" directed to her previous employer, the Honolulu Police Department, authorizing the release of any and all information for the limited purpose of aiding the Department in evaluating Burden's qualifications as a police recruit. Among other things, the form contained the following statement of understanding: "I understand that I will not receive and am not entitled to know the contents of confidential reports received from these agencies and I further understand that these reports are privileged."

Following receipt of the information from the Honolulu investigation, the Department terminated Burden for "failure to meet standards of a police officer." ³ This occurred during her 15th week at the training academy. Burden finished the remaining four weeks of the academy at her own expense, and subsequently applied without success to four other police departments. These other departments apparently also required Burden to sign release and waiver forms as part of their background investigations.

Through counsel, Burden eventually asked the Department for more specific Burden ultimately filed a claim against the City of Costa Mesa (hereafter the City). Thereafter she filed a mandamus petition in the superior court against the City, the Department and the police chief. Claiming that she was hired as a "public safety officer," Burden contended that the Department breached duties owed to her under the Bill of Rights Act (§ 3300 et seq.), and that her dismissal without notice and a pretermination hearing resulted in a deprivation of a liberty interest under the due process clause of the federal Constitution. The petition sought reinstatement, notice of the specific allegations which caused Burden's termination, an opportunity to respond, a hearing and a redetermination of the decision to terminate her.

                information concerning the stated grounds for her termination.  According to Burden's counsel, Chief of Police David Snowden informed him that Burden had committed "acts, while employed as a Honolulu Police Officer, which preclude her from ever working in law enforcement."   No further information was provided
                

The trial court determined that Burden was a public safety officer within the meaning of the Bill of Rights Act and that the Department's attempt to draw a distinction between police officers and recruits was not a valid one. The court further found that Burden's purported waivers of the right to see the results of her background investigation were unenforceable. Believing Burden was entitled to the Act's protections, the trial court granted her petition. ⁴

The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the Department's argument that police recruits are not public safety officers within the meaning of the Act. It also agreed that Burden's waivers were unenforceable. Finally, the court determined that because Burden's termination stigmatized her reputation and affected her ability to earn a living, it was punitive in nature and entitled Burden to an administrative appeal under provisions of the Act.

DISCUSSION

I. The Bill of Rights Act.

The Bill of Rights Act establishes certain procedural rights and protections for public safety officers. Among other things, the Act assures a public safety officer the right to an administrative appeal when any punitive action is taken against the officer. (§ 3304, subd. (b).) ⁵ The Act also affords a public safety officer the opportunity to review and sign any instrument containing any adverse comment before the instrument is entered in the officer's personnel file. (§ 3305.) ⁶ It further gives the affected officer 30 days to respond in writing to any adverse comment placed in the file. (§ 3306.) ⁷

The central issue is whether Burden is a "public safety officer" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights Act. The Department contends that because it hired Burden as a "police recruit" (referring to a candidate for a police officer position who has not yet completed a training academy and who is not authorized to use peace officer powers), and not as a "police officer," she is not a public safety officer as defined by the Act. Burden, on the other hand, contends that police recruits are encompassed by the Act's definition of "public safety officer," and that local agencies may not defeat application of the Act by classifying new hires as "recruits" instead of "police officers." Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal below held that the Act was intended to cover police recruits. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude otherwise.

In determining the scope of coverage under the Act, we independently determine the proper interpretation of the statute. As the matter is a question of law, we are not bound by evidence on the question presented below or by the lower court's interpretation. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; Los Angeles County Safety Police Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1384, 237 Cal.Rptr. 920.)

The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 208, 271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524; California Teachers Ass'n. v. San Diego Community College Dist., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.) "In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its 'plain meaning.' " (Kimmel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 208-209, 271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524, citing Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 218-219, 188 Cal.Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317; California Teachers Assn., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.) Although we may properly rely on extrinsic aids, we should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. (California Teachers Assn., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.) Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its...