Burdeshaw v. Snell, Civil Action No. 2:03cv1220-VPM.
| Decision Date | 25 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:03cv1220-VPM. |
| Citation | 365 F.Supp.2d 1194 |
| Parties | J.C. BURDESHAW, Plaintiff, v. Kip SNELL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
David Kenneth Hogg, and Samuel Lamar Adams of Merrill, Harrison & Adams, Dothan, AL, for plaintiff.
Raymond Todd Derrick and Steadman Stapleton Shealy, Jr. of Cobb Shealy Crum & Derrick P.A., Dothan, AL, for defendant.
This case is before the court on Kip Snell's ["Snell"] Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 18), filed on 6 December 2004. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, the court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
J.C. Burdeshaw ["Burdeshaw"] filed this lawsuit on 15 December 2003 alleging claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Alabama common law. (Doc. # 1). The relevant facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Burdeshaw, are as follows: On 7 December 2002, Snell, while on duty as a police officer in the town of Slocomb, Alabama, stopped Burdeshaw for failing to wear his seatbelt while operating a vehicle. .1 Snell had reason to suspect Burdeshaw was not wearing his seatbelt. .2
The police dispatcher informed Snell that Burdeshaw's license had been suspended in Florida and that he may have warrants outstanding there as well. (Def's Exh. 2, pp. 32-36).3 Burdeshaw claimed to have no knowledge of the suspension or the warrants or any reason therefor. (Def's Exh. 1, pp. 88-89).
During the course of the stop, Snell discovered that Burdeshaw possessed a small, unlabeled glass bottle containing several pills, which are now known to have been nitroglycerine, over-the-counter cold medicine, and Prednisone, a prescription drug. (Def's Exh. 1, p. 49). Burdeshaw informed Snell that he had a prescription for the Prednisone and stated that a bottle located in his vehicle would prove this fact. . Although Snell stated that Burdeshaw provided no information whatsoever regarding the pills, Snell nonetheless called an off-duty paramedic to the scene either to identify or confirm the identity of the pills. (Def's Exh. 2, p. 45, l. 4-p. 46, l. 9). After searching the vehicle (Def's Exh. 1, p. 53, ll. 9-23; p. 54, ll. 5-10; p. 102, ll. 3-11, 19-23; p. 152, ll. 1-6)4 and after determining that Prednisone is a steroid , Snell arrested Burdeshaw and charged him with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. ).5
Shortly after arriving at the police station, Burdeshaw began experiencing chest pains. .6 Snell took Burdeshaw to the hospital and stayed with him until he was released two hours later. . They returned to the jail, where Burdeshaw remained for approximately two hours before being released. .
Burdeshaw retrieved his vehicle from the police impound on the following Monday. . Sometime thereafter, Burdeshaw provided the Geneva County District Attorney with a labeled bottle with a label confirming his prescription for Prednisone. .
On 9 January 2003, Snell testified before the Geneva County grand jury, and on the same day, the grand jury issued an indictment charging Burdeshaw with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, "To Wit: Prednezone" [sic]. . On 10 January 2003, the State Department of Forensic Sciences issued a "Certificate of Analysis" identifying the pills in question as Prednisone and noting that "[n]o controlled substances" were detected. (Pl's Exh. 1).7 Ultimately, the charges against Burdeshaw were dropped. (Doc. # 18, p. 3). Burdeshaw filed this lawsuit on 15 December 2003.
Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.8 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.1996).
Consideration of a summary judgment motion does not lessen the burden on the nonmoving party, i.e., the nonmoving party still bears the burden of coming forth with sufficient evidence on each element that must be proved.9 Earley v. Champion Intern. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
A dispute is genuine if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Green v. Pittsburgh Plate and Glass Co., 224 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1352 (N.D.Ala.2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Furthermore, "[a] judge's guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: `whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law'." Id. at 259, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
As grounds for this motion, Snell argues that the undisputed facts necessitate a finding that he is entitled to immunity under both federal and state law. (Docs. 18, 23). Burdeshaw attempts to raise factual issues that would preclude entry of summary judgment. (Doc. # 22). The undisputed facts and the evidence before the court reveal no genuine disputes, which, when resolved, could alter the outcome in this case.
Burdeshaw contends that Snell, under color of State law, deprived him of his freedom, thereby violating his constitutional rights, when he arrested and pursued a conviction against Burdeshaw without probable cause. (Doc. # 1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). Snell argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 and state law discretionary act immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338 of the Alabama statutes (Docs. 14, 18, 23). The court agrees with Snell.
"Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir.2001)). A police officer acting within the "scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred" is entitled to qualified immunity unless "the plaintiff [can] show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir.1991)); Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1988). An on-duty police officer making an arrest is performing a discretionary function. Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.2004) (). Burdeshaw does not dispute the fact that Snell was performing a discretionary function, therefore the burden is on Burdeshaw to demonstrate that Snell is not entitled to qualified immunity. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
Viewing the facts before the court in the light most favorable to Burdeshaw as true, the court must determine first whether Snell violated Burdeshaw's constitutional rights and, second, whether the constitutional rights violated were clearly established. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). If the first inquiry leads the court to conclude that Snell did not violate Burdeshaw's constitutional rights, "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151). The court concludes that Snell did not violate Burdeshaw's constitutional rights.
Inexplicably, the parties focused their arguments exclusively on whether Snell had probable cause to arrest Burdeshaw on the controlled substances charge. (Docs. 18, 22). Burdeshaw focused much of his argument on the fact that Prednisone was ultimately determined not to have been a controlled substance. He argued that, in any event, the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights because a prescription bottle in his truck at the time of his arrest would have exonerated him. (Doc. # 22, pp. 11-13).10 Snell did not address Prednisone's status as a controlled substance and, instead, focused on evidence supporting his claim that he searched the vehicle for the prescription bottle that was allegedly in the truck (Doc. # 18). Even if he had found the bottle, Snell argued further, it would not have exonerated Burdeshaw. (Doc. # 23).
Although the issues raised in the context of the controlled substance charge present interesting and...
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