Burdick v. Independent School Dist. No. 52 of Oklahoma County

• Decision Date: 25 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 60914,60914
• Parties: 26 Ed. Law Rep. 486, 1985 OK 49 Kenneth Dewayne BURDICK, Kim Deann Burdick, and Misty Dawn Burdick, all minors, By and Through their father, Michael M. Burdick, as next friend, Plaintiffs- appellees, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 52 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, Midwest City-Del City School Board, Melvin Decker, Louise Moore, Dr. Anthony C. Thomas, and Billy Crouch, Defendants, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, Oklahoma, Intervenor- appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 48

702 P.2d 48

26 Ed. Law Rep. 486, 1985 OK 49

Kenneth Dewayne BURDICK, Kim Deann Burdick, and Misty Dawn

Burdick, all minors, By and Through their father, Michael M. Burdick, as next friend, Plaintiffs- appellees, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 52 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, Midwest City-Del City School Board, Melvin Decker, Louise Moore, Dr. Anthony C. Thomas, and Billy Crouch, Defendants, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, Oklahoma, Intervenor- appellant.

No. 60914.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 25, 1985.

As Corrected June 27, 1985.

Ronald L. Day, Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City, for intervenor-appellant.

Jack B. Fried, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs-appellees.

OPALA, Justice.

The appeal presents three primary questions: Did the trial court lack subject-matter jurisdiction? May the doctrine of estoppel be applied against a school district under the facts of this case? and if so, Is the application of estoppel clearly contrary to the principles of equity jurisprudence or to the weight of the evidence? To the first and third questions we answer in the negative; to the second in the affirmative.

Early in 1975 the Burdick family [hereafter the Burdicks] considered purchasing a new home at 417 King Avenue, Midwest City, Oklahoma. Desiring that her children [also referred to as students] attend Midwest City-Del City Schools, Mrs. Burdick telephoned the offices of Independent School District No. 52 (Midwest City-Del City School District) [hereinafter Mid-Del] and Independent School District No. 89 (Oklahoma City School District) [hereinafter District 89] to find out in which district their future home was situated. She was told by officials of both districts that 417 King Avenue was within the Mid-Del school district. Relying upon this information the Burdicks purchased the house on King Avenue in April of 1975. Their children were enrolled in Mid-Del schools and continually attended those schools without objection from either Mid-Del or Oklahoma City school districts until August of 1980. The Burdicks were then informed by Mid-Del that the boundary lines "had been changed", and that because they reside within the Oklahoma City school district their children could no longer attend Mid-Del schools. ¹ Through their father the minor children brought this suit. They obtained a temporary restraining order that kept Mid-Del from effecting the threatened transfer. District 89 intervened. The trial court found that (1) the Burdicks' residence lies within District 89, (2) Mid-Del represented to the Burdicks, in April of 1975, that their residence was in the Mid-Del district, and (3) not until August of 1980 did Mid-Del learn that the Burdicks' residence was in fact within District 89 and so informed them. The unmistakable effect of the court's decree was that both Mid-Del and District 89 were estopped from preventing the Burdick children from continuing in the Mid-Del schools. Only District 89 appealed from this decision.

I

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS VESTED WITH SUBJECT-MATTER

JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED

Based upon the general rule that exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial review, ² District 89 contends the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. As suggested by District 89, the remedies the Burdicks failed to seek are: (1) an agency "residency determination" under 70 O.S.1981 § 1-113; ³ and (2) a transfer under 70 O.S.1981 §§ 8-101 et seq.

A

The relevant provisions of § 1-113 state that "[t]he residence of any child for school purposes shall be the legal residence of the parents ...," and that "... [a]ny question as to the place of residence ... shall be decided by the county superintendent...." Since no one has questioned that the Burdick children live with their parents, and District 89 has stipulated that the children's legal residence is 417 King Avenue, Midwest City, Oklahoma, invocation of a so-called "residency determination" proceeding would have been a vain, useless and ineffectual remedy. For these reasons, § 1-113 constituted here no jurisdictional impediment to a direct district court action for determination of the students' status.

B

Throughout the five-year period of the Burdick children's unquestioned attendance of Mid-Del schools, and up to the time it was discovered that they did reside within District 89, all officials concerned in this case doubtless entertained the view that the students did reside within the Mid-Del school district. It was after Mid-Del informed the Burdicks that their children could no longer attend its schools--because the boundary line "had been changed"--that the Burdicks sought to enjoin Mid-Del from transferring their children from Mid-Del to District 89. The Burdicks' position was that they reside within the Mid-Del school district or, in the alternative, that both Mid-Del and District 89 are estopped from compelling the threatened transfer. The Burdicks' claim was tendered to the court, and the case tried as, a controversy over a clouded school district boundary line. The trial court resolved the dispute in favor of District 89, finding that the Burdicks' residence does in fact lie within District 89.

Transfers stricto sensu are legislatively regulated. The statutes address themselves to changes in schools from the district in which a student resides to another school district. ⁴ Until the boundary dispute was resolved and the exact line ascertained, no one could have known, with reasonable certainty, whether a transfer from one district to another would have been a practicable or even possible remedy. Transfers within the same district are neither necessary nor available. The gravamen of the Burdicks' suit was not a quest for transfer but rather their claim that the children are entitled to remain in Mid-Del schools. No administrative remedy then in effect was suitable or effective to accomplish this goal. We hence hold that under the facts of this case the students need not have sought a transfer before commencing the instant action in the district court. ⁵

II UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL WAS INVOCABLE

Generally, Oklahoma jurisprudence does not allow the application of estoppel against the state, the political subdivisions or agencies, unless its interposition would further some principle of public policy or interest. ⁶ The rationale for recognizing a governmental shield from estoppel is to enable the state to protect public policies and interests from being jeopardized by judicial orders preventing full performance of legally-imposed duties. ⁷ Hence, some stronger, more compelling policy or interest must be advanced before estoppel could be invoked against either the state or a public agency. ⁸

District 89 urges that application of estoppel against it would thwart Oklahoma's public policy--as articulated by the statutes governing schools and school districts--that students generally must attend schools maintained by the school district in which they reside. While we agree with District 89, the pivotal question here is whether the facts and circumstances of the instant case implicate some prevailing public interest which will except it from the general rule precluding the use of estoppel against the government. We hold that they do.

The Burdick children were formally enrolled in Mid-Del schools in 1975 and continued to attend those schools without a challenge until 1980. They were taken to school by Mid-Del school buses that ran in front of their home, while District 89 vehicles completely by-passed the Burdick neighborhood. The bus routes so followed have been in place for over twenty years. The Burdicks voted in Mid-Del school district elections, and their names were entered on that district's official computer printout list of eligible voters. In short, (1) the Burdicks, after full and truthful disclosure, entertained an honest belief, kindled and acquiesced in by Mid-Del and District 89 officials, that they lived in the Mid-Del school district; and (2) their children continually attended Mid-Del schools for a considerable period of time without objection from either school district. These factors, viewed in combination, impel us to conclude that the students occupied the status of de facto Mid-Del students. ⁹ The quintessential objective of the Burdick lawsuit was to enforce the maintenance of the status quo by obtaining recognition for their children's de jure or de facto status as Mid-Del students. District 89, on the other hand, sought to establish that the Burdick children should be placed in the status of de jure students in the Oklahoma City school district.

The Burdicks' attainment of a de facto status serves here to overcome any general aim of the law in placing students in schools of the district in which they reside. The public interest clearly favoring the position of the Burdicks is that of promoting continuity of attendance once a residential status has been honestly established and openly maintained in a given school system, and there has been no intervening change in its legal boundaries. We hence hold that protection of such a de facto status implicates sufficient public polity considerations to afford here a basis for interposing estoppel against a public agency. ¹⁰

III

THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL IS NOT CLEARLY

CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

The trial court determined that both Mid-Del and District 89 were estopped from asserting that the Burdick children must now attend schools in District 89 as de jure students of that district. District 89, the sole appellant, urges that it should not be held estopped because (1) it made no representation that the students' residence is located within the Mid-Del school district; (2) it was without knowledge that the students were attending Mid-Del schools while residing in District 89; ¹¹ (3) school district boundaries are a matter of public...