Burdick v. People
Decision Date | 02 April 1894 |
Docket Number | No. 4.,4. |
Citation | 36 N.E. 948,149 Ill. 600 |
Parties | BURDICK v. PEOPLE. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to circuit court, Jackson county; J. P. Roberts, Judge.
Indictment of George Burdick for selling railroad tickets contrary to law. Defendant was convicted, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Hill & Martin, for plaintiff in error.
Maurice T. Maloney, Atty. Gen., and J. M. Herbert, State's Atty. (W. S. Forrest and M. Rosenthal, of counsel), for the People.
This was an indictment against plaintiff in error for wrongfully and unlawfully selling to one L. H. Myers one certain railroad ticket, entitling the holder thereof to travel upon the Illinois Central Railroad from Cairo, in Illinois, to Chicago, in the same state, in violation of the following statute of Illinois:
The defendant, before pleading to the indictment, moved to quash it, upon the alleged ground that said act was in contravention of the constitutions of the United States and of the state of Illinois; but said motion was overruled, and exception taken. The court refused to give for the defendant an instruction to the effect that said act was in contravention of said constitutions, and therefore void, to which refusal defendant excepted. The jury found the defendant guilty. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, to which exception was taken; and judgment was entered upon the verdict, finding defendant $500, to which, also, exception was taken. The subject presented for consideration is the constitutionality of the above act, and we will consider the objections to its validity in the order in which they are presented by the counsel for the plaintiff in error in their brief.
[149 Ill. 605]1. It is contended that the act violates section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of Illinois, which provides that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,’ and that it also violates the provisions of a similar character in the federal constitution. Const. U. S. arts. 5, 14, Amend. (1 Starr & C. St. pp. 36, 38, 39). The position of counsel is that, when a man purchases tickets or other certificates entitling the holder to travel upon any railroad, etc., as stated in the act, such tickets are his property, and that the legislature has no authority to pass an act depriving the holder of such property of the right to sell it to whom he pleases. The constitution does not say that the disposition of property may not be limited or regulated when the interests of the public so require, but that no person shall be ‘deprived’ of his property without due process of law. The phrase ‘due process of law’ is the equivalent of the words ‘law of the land,’ as used in Magna Charta, and means ‘in the due course of legal proceedings according to those rules and forms which have been established for the protection of private rights.’ Board of Ed. v. Bakewell, 122 Ill. 339, 10 N. E. 378;Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 2 Gilman, 473;Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) marg. p. 356, top. p. 435. An act of the legislature is not necessarily the ‘law of the land.’ A state cannot make anything ‘due process of law’ which, by its own legislation, it declares to be such. An act of the legislature which transfers the property of one man to another without his consent is not a constitutional exercise of legislative power, because, if effectual, it operates to deprive a man of his property without ‘due process of law.’ Davidson v. New Orleans, supra; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140;Rohn v. Harris, 130 Ill. 525, 22 N. E. 587; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 256; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 1. If, therefore, the above act of 1875 operates to deprive the holder of a legally purchased ticket of his property rights therein, it must be declared to be void. But, upon turning to section 5 of the act, we find that it authorizes the original purchaser of a ticket from an authorized agent to resell the whole or any unused part of such ticket to the owner of the railroad or steamboat who sold it to him, or to sell any part of it to any other person, if the original purchase of it from the agent was with the bona fide intention of traveling upon it. The purchaser is entitled to have his ticket redeemed by the railroad or steamboat owner at a rate fixed by the terms of section 5, but his right of sale is not even limited to such owner, provided, only, his purchase was made in the mode and for the purpose stated in the proviso to the section. In view of the provisions contained in sections 5 and 6, we fail to see how the owner of the ticket is deprived of his property in it. His ticket is not destroyed, nor is there any serious limitation upon his use of it. The design of the act, as stated in its title, is to prevent frauds upon travelers and owners of railroads, steamboats, and other conveyances for the transportation of passengers. The business of a common carrier is a public employment. The franchises of railroads acting under charters or acts of incorporation are of a public nature, so far as the safety, convenience, and comfort of passengers are concerned. Reasonable regulations affecting the conduct of such public employments are fit subjects for legislative action. The lawmaking power may provide means for remedying such evils as, in its opinion, may exist in the management of these public agencies of transportation; and in doing so it may sometimes impose restrictions, which are deemed to be necessary, upon the use and enjoyment of property. A man is not deprived of his property unless it is taken away from him, so that he is divested of his title and possession. To limit the use and emjoyment of property by legislative action is not to take it away from the owner, when the property whose use and enjoyment are so limited is invested in a business affected with a public use, or is used as an accessory in carrying on such business. Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80; Com. v. Wilson, 14 Phila. 384. We are therefore of the opinion that the act under consideration does not violate section 2 of the bill of rights.
2. The act is alleged to contravene the provisions of the federal and state constitutions which forbid the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10; Const. Ill. art. 2, § 14 (1 Starr & C. St. pp. 31, 105). The tickets proven to have been sold by the plaintiff in error contain only the name of the railroad company, the words ‘Cairo to Chicago,’ the signature of the general ticket agent, and certain figures or numbers. It has been held...
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