Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.
| Citation | 259 S.E.2d 248,298 N.C. 520 |
| Decision Date | 06 November 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 21,21 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 21 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 379, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,541, 1 A.D. Cases 121 Raymond BURGESS, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, v. JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY. |
Pfefferkorn & Cooley, P. A., by William G. Pfefferkorn, J. Wilson Parker and Jim D. Cooley, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellee.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by Charles F. Vance, Jr., and W. Andrew Copenhaver, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.
In Chapter 168 of the General Statutes the General Assembly has granted a number of rights to "handicapped persons." Among these rights is the right to employment. This right is granted by G.S. 168-6, which provides, in pertinent part, that "(h)andicapped persons shall be employed . . . on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated G.S. 168-6 by refusing to hire him upon discovering that plaintiff suffered from a case of simple glaucoma which did not interfere with plaintiff's job performance. Defendant had been "informed by competent medical authority" that plaintiff's glaucoma "would in no way interfere with plaintiff's job performance and that in fact plaintiff had 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses." Nonetheless, plaintiff was told by defendant that it was against company policy to hire an individual afflicted with glaucoma.
In order to state a cause of action for violation of the right to employment granted in G.S. 168-6, plaintiff must establish that he is a " handicapped person" to whom such rights are granted. The central issue in this appeal is whether a person who suffers from "simple glaucoma," but has 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses, is a "handicapped person" as defined in Chapter 168.
Resolution of this issue requires consideration of G.S. 168-1, which states the purpose of Chapter 168 and defines the term "handicapped person":
The definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 referred to in G.S. 168-1 reads as follows:
"(V)isually handicapped persons are those persons who are totally blind or whose vision with glasses is so defective as to prevent the performance of ordinary activity for which eyesight is essential."
From the above summary it is evident that "(t)he definition of 'handicapped persons' Shall include those individuals with . . . Visual disabilities." G.S. 168-1. (Emphasis added.) However, G.S. 168-1 further provides that "(f) or the purposes of (Article 1 in Chapter 168) the definition of 'visually handicapped' in G.S. 111-11 shall apply."
Defendant contends that the definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 limits the meaning of "visual disabilities" in G.S. 168-1. According to defendant, the only form of "visual disability" covered by G.S. 168-1 is blindness or functional blindness as defined in G.S. 111-11. Defendant points to plaintiff's allegation that he has "20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses" and concludes that plaintiff is not a "handicapped person" within the meaning of G.S. 168-1.
Plaintiff contends that the sole purpose of the reference to G.S. 111-11 is to indicate that whenever the specific phrase "visually handicapped" is used in the statute, then the definition given in G.S. 111-11 shall apply. Whenever that specific phrase is not used, then the broader term "visual disabilities," unrestricted by reference to G.S. 111-11, shall apply to define a "handicapped person."
Literally read, the statement in G.S. 168-1 making the definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 applicable "(f)or the purposes of this Article" can be interpreted in either the manner suggested by plaintiff or defendant. To resolve this ambiguity, we must therefore construe the statutory language in question in light of the applicable canons of statutory construction.
The intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. Realty Co. v. Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979); Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979). "A construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language." State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E.2d 291 (1975). To this end, the words and phrases of a statute must be interpreted contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the other provisions of the statute and which gives effect to the reason and purpose of the statute. In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); Underwood v. Howland, Commr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968). Finally, this statute, being remedial, should be construed liberally, in a manner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals, for which it is enacted and which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1973); Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E. 800 (1912).
Application of the above principles leads us to conclude that the restrictive definition of "visually handicapped" in G.S. 111-11 should not be applied in a manner which limits the meaning of "visual disability" in G.S. 168-1. Significantly, the opening sentence in G.S. 168-1 announces in the broadest possible terms the legislative purpose in granting certain rights to the handicapped: "The State shall encourage and enable Handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment." (Emphasis added.) In the same vein, the second sentence indicates that the term Handicapped person is to be defined expansively: "The definition of 'handicapped persons' Shall include those individuals with physical, mental and Visual disabilities." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, when we focus attention on those sections of the statute which enumerate the various rights of the handicapped, it becomes apparent that the narrowly defined term "visually handicapped," which refers only to persons who are blind or functionally blind, See G.S. 111-11, is used Solely in connection with those sections of the statute dealing exclusively with problems unique to the type of handicap identified by that term:
" § 168-4. May be accompanied by guide dog.--Every Visually handicapped person shall have the right to be accompanied by a guide dog, especially trained for the purpose, in any of the places listed in G.S. 168-3 provided that he shall be liable for any damage done to the premises or facilities by such dog.
§ 168-5. Traffic and other rights of persons using certain canes.--The driver of a vehicle approaching a Visually handicapped pedestrian who is carrying a cane predominantly white or silver in color (with or without a red tip) or using a guide dog shall take all necessary precautions to avoid injury to such pedestrian.
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§ 168-7. Guide dogs.--Every Visually handicapped person who has a guide dog, or who obtains a guide dog, shall be entitled to keep the guide dog on the premises leased, rented or used by such handicapped person. He shall not be required to pay extra compensation for such guide dog but shall be liable for any damage done to the premises by such a guide dog. No person, firm or corporation shall refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise disallow a Visually handicapped person to use any premises for the reason that said Visually handicapped person has or will obtain a guide dog for mobility purposes." (1977 Cum.Supp.) (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, those sections of the statute which address problems common top all handicapped citizens utilize the broadly defined term "handicapped person," which encompasses all persons "with physical, mental and visual disabilities":
" § 168-2. Right of access to and use of public places.--Handicapped persons have the same right as the ablebodied to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, public facilities, and all other buildings and facilities, both publicly and privately owned, which serve the public.
§ 168-3. Right to use of public conveyances, accommodations, etc.--The Handicapped and Physically disabled are entitled to accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor buses, streetcars, boats, or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation; hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
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§ 168-6. Right to employment.--Handicapped persons shall be employed in the State service, the service of the political subdivisions of the State, in the public schools, and in all other employment, both public and private, on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved.
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§ 168-8. Right to habilitation and rehabilitation services.-- Handicapped...
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