Burgos v. City of Phila.

Decision Date11 February 2020
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 13-4894
Citation439 F.Supp.3d 470
Parties David BURGOS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Daniel Gross, Raymond J. Hunter, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Andrew Pomager, Michael R. Miller, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Louis Giorla, John Delaney, City of Philadelphia, M. Farrell.

Alan S. Gold, Gold & Robins, Jenkintown, PA, for Defendant Prison Health Services/Corizon.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, District Judge Plaintiff David Burgos, who initially proceeded pro se but is now represented by counsel, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law to recover damages for injuries he suffered at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility ("CFCF"). Burgos alleges Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims against Defendants City of Philadelphia, former Philadelphia Prison System Commissioner Louis Giorla, Warden John Delaney, and Warden Michele Farrell ("City Defendants"); a Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Delaney and Farrell; a state-law conversion claim against Delaney; and Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claims against Defendant Corizon Health, Inc. Both the City Defendants and Corizon have filed motions for summary judgment. Burgos has filed a motion for sanctions based on Corizon's 30(b)(6) witnesses' inability to provide information on Burgos's medical records and treatment while in detention. For the following reasons, the City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, Corizon's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and Burgos's Motion for Sanctions will be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

In 2012, Burgos injured his knees

, back, and neck in a car accident. From the time of his accident until July 1, 2013, Burgos went to physical therapy for his injuries.2 On July 4, 2013, Burgos began a six month period of incarceration at CFCF.3

Burgos alleges claims based on two separate issues with his confinement. First, he asserts that overcrowding and poor sanitization at CFCF caused him to contract scabies. While at CFCF, "a large portion of" his time was spent in a triple cell4 (a cell meant for two prisoners but housing three due to overcrowding) where he "was only ever given the boat" which was a plastic mattress frame on the floor.5 Burgos further contends that there were daily lockdowns which prevented his cells from being cleaned and did not allow him to shower.6 Sleeping in the boat on the floor, near feces and urine, caused Burgos to contract scabies.7 Second, he asserts that his prior injuries were not accommodated, causing him further injury. When he was not in a triple cell he was only assigned to a "top bunk."8 Burgos alleges that he "re-injured [his] back and neck lifting [himself] up to, and descending from, a top bunk and sleeping in the plastic boat" and that he "reinjured [his] wrist pushing [himself] up from the plastic boat."9

Burgos also asserts claims against Corizon Health, which contracted with the Philadelphia Prison System to provide medical services to inmates incarcerated at CFCF, asserting that he was not properly treated by Corizon. With regard to Burgos's back, wrist, and neck injuries, he asserts that he was only given Tylenol

but that, although the Tylenol did not work, Corizon refused to have a doctor examine him or assign him to a bottom bunk.10 According to Burgos, he still has "considerable pain in [his] back, wrist and neck from [his] injuries at CFCF" and he "currently walk[s] with a cane, wear[s] a wrist brace, and sleep[s] with a neck brace."11

With regard to his scabies, Corizon gave Burgos Motrin

and cream, but refused to decontaminate his cell and bedding.12 Burgos asserts that he only received appropriate treatment for his scabies during his temporary transfers to a state facility Cumberland County.13 However, while he was at Cumberland, Burgos asserts that his property was twice lost or misplaced by prison officials at CFCF. Moreover, Burgos avers that he filed grievances complaining about the conditions of his confinement, the medical care he received, and the disappearance of his property but that prison officials retaliated against him by placing him back in triple cells.14 Defendants assert that Burgos only filed two grievances and that those grievances were procedurally deficient.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"The underlying purpose of summary judgment is to avoid a pointless trial in cases where it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense."15 A court will award summary judgment on a claim or part of a claim where there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."16 A fact is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the suit, given the applicable substantive law.17 A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence presented "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."18

In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and make every reasonable inference in that party's favor.19 Further, a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.20 Nevertheless, the party opposing summary judgment must support each essential element of the opposition with concrete evidence in the record.21 "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."22 Therefore, if, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court determines that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment is appropriate.23

III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") requires that prisoners exhaust all prison grievance procedures before suing in court.24 The "exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is a question of law to be determined by the judge."25 The Third Circuit has explained that exhaustion requires "substantial compliance with the prison's grievance procedures."26 "If there is no genuine dispute of material fact, then the exhaustion defense may be evaluated as a matter of law at summary judgment. If there is a genuine dispute of material fact related to exhaustion, then summary judgment is inappropriate[.]"27

The City Defendants assert that Burgos's purported grievances concerning the conditions of his confinement were defective because he grieved more than one issue at a time, which was not in compliance with the relevant policy; because his grievances do not address his back, neck, or wrist injuries

and do not reference his request for bottom bunk status; and because he did not appeal them. Corizon also argues that Burgos's grievances were deficient because they did not explicitly name "Corizon."

The Third Circuit has explained that a "conflict between the Prison's records and [the prisoner's] deposition testimony" creates "a genuine issue of material fact" when the prisoner "sets forth specific facts" regarding whether they exhausted their claim.28 Moreover, a prison "render[s] its administrative remedies unavailable...when it fail[s] to timely (by its own procedural rules) respond to [the prisoner's] grievance[.]"29

In Burgos's sworn affidavit, he asserts that he filed "approximately 12 or 13 grievances."30 In his deposition, Burgos testified that he filed grievances "based on subhuman living conditions" in his cell,31 based on being forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor,32 based on contracting scabies,33 and based on sleeping in a top bunk and aggravating his neck and back injuries.34 Therefore, according to Burgos's sworn testimony, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Burgos filed grievances based on the claims he is now pursuing.

Burgos further testified that he only appealed one of the grievances "because that was the only response that I ever got from all the grievances I filed."35 He also testified that after not hearing back about his appeal he spoke to lieutenants and wrote request slips, but "they never responded back to nothing."36 A prisoner cannot be expected to file appeals to grievances which were never ruled on.37 Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether CFCF's appeal remedy was "available" to Burgos.38

Furthermore, although CFCF had a policy stating that "[a]n inmate may file multiple grievances, each on a different issue/problem, but only one issue/problem per grievance," fact issues remain as to whether all of Burgos's grievances contained multiple issues.39 Burgos alleges that officials at CFCF threw out three carbon copy receipts of grievances that he filed.40 Therefore, because of CFCF's policy to only retain grievances for three years, the Court is unable to conclude that those grievances contained multiple issues. CFCF does argue that the record contains some of Burgos's carbon copies of the grievances he filed41 ; however, the photocopies of the carbon copies are not legible, and the Court is unable to determine with certainty that they contain multiple issues. Therefore, this issue cannot be resolved before trial.

Moreover, Burgos's failure to name Corizon in his grievances does not defeat his claims. "The PLRA itself does not have a ‘name all defendants' requirement."42 "However, prisoners are required to complete the administrative review process in accordance with rules that are defined by the prison grievance process."43 The cases Corizon cites for its argument are all based on a rule governing the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections grievance procedure which requires prisoners to name individuals involved in the events; there is no evidence in the record that CFCF, a City of Philadelphia facility, also had this requirement as part of its...

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