Burk v. State

• Decision Date: 06 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 06-0029.,1 CA-CV 06-0029.
• Citation: 156 P.3d 423,215 Ariz. 6
• Parties: Angela BURK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STATE of Arizona; Cathi Culek, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

156 P.3d 423

215 Ariz. 6

Angela BURK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STATE of Arizona; Cathi Culek, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 06-0029.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department E.

March 6, 2007.

Keith M. Knowlton, L.L.C. By Keith M. Knowlton, Mesa, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General By Richard F. Albrecht, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

TIMMER, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 Angela Burk's appeal from the superior court's dismissal of her negligence and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)¹ claims requires us to decide whether a court employee can successfully claim judicial immunity from a damages suit if that employee performs her function in a discriminatory manner. For the reasons that follow, we decide that the superior court correctly ruled that the employee is immune from Burk's suit. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND²

¶ 2 In 2004, while in the process of dissolving her marriage, Angela Burk asked the superior court in Maricopa County to modify the existing parenting schedule concerning the couple's minor daughter, S.L. Under the existing schedule, S.L. spent Sundays with her father and the remainder of the week with Burk, the primary custodial parent. Burk requested a visitation modification allowing S.L. to stay with her father from 6:00 p.m. Thursday through 6:00 p.m. Monday every other week. This proposal would give S.L. more time with her father while allowing her to spend two Sundays each month with Burk.

¶ 3 The superior court referred Burk's request to Cathi Culek, an employee of the court's conciliation services, for evaluation and report. See Ariz. Local R. Prac.Super. Ct. (Maricopa) 6.11(c) (providing court may refer parenting-time issue to Conciliation Services, which will assess issue and make written report of assessment to court with or without recommendations). Culek prepared a report recommending that S.L.'s father become the primary custodial parent and that Burk be allowed only supervised visitation.³ According to Burk, "the report was intentionally designed to assure that S.L. attended the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Further, the report was designed to take visitation and parental control over S.L. from [Burk] because Culek objected to [Burk's] moral choices."

¶ 4 Burk reacted to Culek's report by asking the court for a second evaluation, and the court granted this request. Dr. Ralph Earle then evaluated Burk's request and issued a report opposing Culek's recommendations, advising the court to maintain Burk as the primary custodial parent and grant her modification request. The superior court adopted Dr. Earle's recommendations and rejected Culek's recommendations by modifying the parenting schedule in the manner proposed by Burk.

¶ 5 Burk subsequently sued Culek and the State of Arizona for gross negligence and negligence.⁴ She additionally asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise religion freely. U.S. Const. amend. I & XIV. Culek and the State moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), and, among other arguments, asserted that the doctrine of judicial immunity barred Burk's claims. The court granted the defendants' motions, and this appeal followed.⁵

¶ 6 We review the court's dismissal of Burk's complaint de novo. Fairway Constructors, Inc. v. Ahern, 193 Ariz. 122, 124, ¶ 6, 970 P.2d 954, 956 (App.1998). We will uphold the dismissal only if Burk "could not be entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof under the claims stated." Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 186, 677 P.2d 1292, 1294 (1984), rejected on other grounds by Gipson v. Kasey, 496 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 41, 214 Ariz. 141, 150 P.3d 228 (2007).

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 The doctrine of judicial immunity states that judges are absolutely immune from damages lawsuits for their judicial acts,⁶ "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction or are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 322, 690 P.2d 38, 40, 41 (1984). The primary purpose of the doctrine is to assure that judges will perform their functions independently and without fear of personal consequences. Id. Whether judicial immunity exists is a legal question for the court. Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 99, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144 (App.1992).

¶ 8 Judicial immunity is not limited to judges. Court officers, employees, and agents who perform functions "intimately related to" or that are "an integral part of the judicial process," are also protected by the doctrine. Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40 (citations omitted). Thus, our courts have extended judicial immunity to guardians ad litem, court-appointed psychologists, and probation officers when they perform such functions. Desilva v. Baker, 208 Ariz. 597, 602, ¶¶ 16, 18, 96 P.3d 1084, 1089 (App.2004); compare Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322, 690 P.2d at 41 (holding probation officer not immune from suit for actions taken contrary to court's directive). To determine when a non-judge is cloaked with judicial immunity, we examine the nature of the function entrusted to that person and the relationship of that function to the judicial process. Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40; Desilva, 208 Ariz. at 601-02, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d at 1088-89. "[T]he applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer." Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321, 690 P.2d at 40.

¶ 9 Burk does not dispute that conciliation services personnel are cloaked with judicial immunity when performing evaluations for use by the court in ruling on requests for modification of child custody orders. Indeed, Burk would be hard-pressed to urge this argument. Evaluations ordered by a judge for use in ruling on custody issues are "intimately related to" the judicial process, and application of the doctrine promotes "principled and fearless decision-making" by evaluators. Id.; see also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir.1987) (concluding conciliation court personnel absolutely immune from damages suit alleging biased decision-making because defendants performed judicial function at direction of court); Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 101, 839 P.2d at 1146 (holding psychologist who performed evaluation of child custody issues pursuant to court directive entitled to absolute judicial immunity because report was an "integral part of the judicial process" and immunity served public interest). Rather, Burk contends that Culek and the State cannot enjoy such immunity in this case because (1) Culek acted outside the court's jurisdiction in performing the evaluation, (2) she exceeded the court-ordered directive, and (3) the court rejected her report in making its ruling. We address each contention in turn.

A. Jurisdiction

¶ 10 In Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, the United States Supreme Court stated that absolute judicial immunity for judges is overcome in two circumstances. Specifically, the doctrine is inapplicable when a judge is sued for nonjudicial actions or if contested judicial actions were "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. Burk seizes on the second exception and argues that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to discriminate against her on the basis of religion. It necessarily follows, Burk asserts, that Culek's allegedly discriminatory actions fell outside the court's jurisdiction, thereby overcoming the application of judicial immunity in this case.

¶ 11 In our view, Burk confuses the concepts of absence of jurisdiction and excess of judicial authority. To support the principle that immunity does not apply to judicial actions taken in "the complete absence of all jurisdiction," the Mireles Court cited Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286. In Stump, the Court explained that a judge acts in "absence of jurisdiction" only if that judge knows the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter:

`A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter.⁷ Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.'

435 U.S. at 356 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)). In deciding whether a judge acted in "clear absence of all jurisdiction," the scope of jurisdiction must be broadly construed and assessed at the time of the challenged action. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099. If the judge did not clearly act without subject-matter jurisdiction, judicial immunity applies even if the judge's action was in error, illegal, done maliciously, or was performed in excess of authority.⁸ Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099.

¶ 12 In the present case, the superior court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction over Burk's request to modify parenting time. Ariz.Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") §§ 25-1031, -1032 (Supp.2006); In re Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 301, ¶ 7, 9 P.3d 329, 332 (App.2000). Assuming, as we must, that Culek based her...