Burk v. Washington
| Decision Date | 12 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 89829,89829 |
| Citation | 713 So.2d 988 |
| Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly S314 Hon. Warren BURK, Circuit Court Judge, etc., Petitioner, v. Shalonda WASHINGTON, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Anthony J. Hall and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.
Blaise Trettis, Executive Assistant Public Defender, Viera, for Respondent.
We have for review Washington v. Burk, 704 So.2d 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), based upon direct and express conflict with Drost v. Drost, 519 So.2d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the result in Washington but hold that from this date forward the criminal speedy trial rule shall not apply to criminal contempt proceedings initiated by a court on its own motion.
On November 28, 1995, petitioner Shalonda Washington (Washington) was arrested for an alleged violation of section 741.31(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), a first-degree misdemeanor, 2 for violating a court-ordered injunction which barred her from visiting Amy Litchfield's workplace. Thereafter, the State obtained continuances at two docket soundings and subsequently failed to even file an information charging Washington. Washington's counsel filed a motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule in the county court on February 27, 1996, but the motion was rendered moot and the county court prosecution ended after the State filed a nolle prosequi in the case.
However, that was not to be the end of the matter. On March 11, 1996, the State reinitiated the criminal proceedings against Washington by a separate motion in the family division of the circuit court asking the court to direct Washington to show cause why she should not be held in criminal contempt of court. The motion was predicated on the same alleged violation of the injunction enjoining her from contact with Litchfield that had been the subject of the State's previous arrest of Washington. The circuit court granted the State's request and issued an order to show cause, thereby initiating criminal contempt proceedings against Washington based upon the same conduct for which she had previously been arrested. The court subsequently denied Washington's motion for discharge, which claimed that the speedy trial time period for the criminal contempt had commenced when she was arrested on November 28, 1995, and expired ninety days thereafter. The trial judge's denial of Washington's motion for discharge was based on the decision in Mauney v. State, 507 So.2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), which had held that the speedy trial rule 3 did not apply to indirect criminal contempt proceedings.
Subsequently, the district court, in a two-to-one decision, granted prohibition to Washington and barred her prosecution for criminal contempt. The court expressed concern that since criminal contempt prosecutions for protective injunction violations were commonly initiated by the State, not the court, a defendant's speedy trial rights would be subject to abuse if the State were permitted to renew the same charges against a defendant after failing to comply with the speedy trial rule in an initial prosecution. After recognizing the applicability of the rules of criminal procedure to contempt actions per Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.010, the majority concluded that criminal contempt is subject to the limitations of the speedy trial rule. The court expressly receded from its earlier decision in Mauney in holding that the speedy trial rule applies to all indirect criminal contempts, "whether initiated by arrest or service of an order to show cause." 704 So.2d at 543.
At the outset, we recognize that all criminal defendants are guaranteed a speedy trial by both the United States 4 and Florida 5 Constitutions. The existence of that constitutional right and its application is not an issue before us. Instead, this case confronts us with the question of whether our court-authored speedy trial rule applies to indirect criminal contempt proceedings. Put another way, we must determine whether this Court, in adopting the speedy trial rule as a rule of Court, see In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So.2d 33 (Fla.1971), contemplated that this rule be applied to indirect criminal contempt proceedings initiated and conducted by courts.
In Mauney, 6 the defendant was the investigating officer in a vehicular manslaughter case who was served with a subpoena to appear for trial and was eventually found guilty of indirect criminal contempt of court for failure to appear. 507 So.2d at 747. On appeal, he argued that his conviction was barred by the speedy trial rule. The Fifth District concluded that the speedy trial rule was inapplicable:
Rule 3.840 sets out the procedure which a court must follow in prosecuting indirect criminal contempt matters. There is no cross-reference to the Speedy Trial Rule. Such cases commence with an order to show cause issued by the judge. A defendant is notified of a specified time and place for a hearing "with a reasonable time allowed for preparation of the defense after service of the order on the defendant." The judge may issue an order of arrest if it seems the defendant will not appear for the show cause hearing (Rule 3.840(a)(2)). But an arrest is not necessary, and as contemplated by the rule, would only occur in an unusual case.
The language of Speedy Trial Rule 3.191(a)(1) simply does not mesh with rule 3.840. Initially it states it applies to "every person charged with a crime by indictment or information." These are charging documents filed by the prosecution; not a judge. Secondly, the time periods established by the rule start running when a person "is arrested" or served with a notice to appear "in lieu of physical arrest." As noted above, show cause orders in indirect criminal contempt matters are not generally coupled with an arrest, nor are they "in lieu" of a physical arrest.
We do not think that Florida's Speedy Trial Rule 3.191(a)(1) was intended to apply to proceedings under rule 3.840 or rule 3.830.
Id. at 748. As mentioned above, the district court majority opinion here receded from Mauney and concluded that indirect criminal contempt is a criminal proceeding, subject to the speedy trial rule, notwithstanding the type of charging document used or who initiates the proceedings. Washington, 704 So.2d at 543.
In addressing this case we perceive two (2) distinct issues: one, the application of the speedy trial rule to this particular case; and two, the broader question of the applicability of the rule to traditional court-initiated criminal contempt proceedings. The majority in the district court in Washington focused on the prevailing manner of enforcement and prosecution of domestic violence injunction violations. First, the majority noted Washington's contention that "[a]s in all prosecutions for indirect criminal contempt for violation of a protective injunction in Brevard County, the order to show cause in the petitioner's case was initiated, written, and submitted by the State of Florida--not by the court." 704 So.2d at 542. Second, the majority noted Washington's argument that pursuant to SECTION 741.2091(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995)7, each state attorney is required to assign prosecutors to specialize in domestic violence prosecutions. Id. Consequently, the court presumably accepted Washington's assertion that " 'domestic violence' prosecutors now prosecute indirect criminal contempt in the circuit court." Id. The implementation of this statutory prosecutorial scheme for criminal domestic violence prosecutions by the State appears to have been a substantial factor in convincing the majority to recede from Mauney and to hold that the pending criminal contempt prosecution of Washington was subject to the speedy trial rule, "whether initiated by arrest or service of an order to show cause." Id. at 543.
In dissent, Judge Sharp disagreed with the majority's decision to recede from Mauney. Washington, 704 So.2d at 543-45. The dissent voiced four primary objections. First, she found no conflict with Mauney, since that case, unlike Washington, involved a criminal contempt proceeding initiated by the court and did not involve a prior arrest for a crime. Id. at 543. Second, Judge Sharp noted that as a practical matter, the courts handling family law cases will almost certainly have no systematic way of knowing whether the State has arrested or intends to prosecute someone for violation of the court's injunction. Id. at 544. Third, Judge Sharp noted that the procedural protections embodied in the speedy trial rule are usually not implicated in contempt proceedings since, in most cases, the defendant is not arrested and his or her freedom is not impacted as in a purely criminal case. Id. Finally, Judge Sharp believed application of the speedy trial rule to court-initiated contempt proceedings will prove practically "unworkable, and ... will strip the civil courts once more of their inherent powers to enforce their orders in family law cases involving domestic violence." Id.
We conclude, as the majority did here, that under the particular circumstances of this case, and the present language of the rule, that Washington is entitled to discharge. However, we also agree with the dissent of Judge Sharp in her policy analysis, that the policy concerns underlying our enactment of the speedy trial rule are either not present in, or are less compelling in their application to traditional judicial contempt proceedings. Implicit in Judge Sharp's dissent and Mauney is the recognition that the concerns and policies underlying the enactment of the criminal speedy trial rule do not ordinarily apply to judicial contempt proceedings.
The preamble to our Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 3.010,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Woods v. State
...state courts "including proceedings involving direct and indirect criminal contempt." Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.010; see also Burk v. Washington, 713 So.2d 988, 992, 995 (Fla.1998) (recognizing that all of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable to direct and indirect criminal contem......
-
State v. Clifton, 5D03-4110.
...1978); Deloach v. State, 338 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 318 So.2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Burk v. Washington, 713 So.2d 988 (Fla.1998); Gibson. Therefore, if an amended information is filed after the speedy trial time period has expired and the defendant has n......
-
State v. Clifton, 5D03-4110.
...1978); Deloach v. State, 338 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 318 So.2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Burk v. Washington, 713 So.2d 988 (Fla.1998); Gibson. Therefore, if an amended information is filed after the speedy trial time period has expired and the defendant has n......
-
Pezzo v. State, 1D04-1653.
...1978); Deloach v. State, 338 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 318 So.2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Burk v. Washington, 713 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1998); Gibson. Therefore, if an amended information is filed after the speedy trial time period has expired and the defendant has ......
-
Misdemeanor defense
...Cacciatore v . State , 226 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).] The speedy trial guarantee is a fundamental right. [ Burk v. Washington , 713 So. 2d 988, 992 (Fla. 1990).] Its purpose is three-fold: (1) to prevent the oppressive pretrial incarceration of the accused, (2) to minimize the acc......
-
Domestic violence
...to pay for his or her own lawyer or appoint a lawyer for the respondent/defendant as this is a criminal proceeding. [ Burk v. Washington, 713 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1998)(in future, speedy trial rule will not apply to criminal contempt proceedings initiated by court).] The indirect criminal conte......
-
Crimes
...court. (See this case for extensive discussion of policy reasons underlying speedy trial rules and contempt rules.) Burk v. Washington, 713 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1998) Contempt is an extremely important power that should never be abused. It is extremely important that due process rights be obser......