Burke v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 08 June 1938
• Docket Number: No. 24332.,24332.
• Citation: 368 Ill. 554,15 N.E.2d 305
• Parties: BURKE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

368 Ill. 554

15 N.E.2d 305

BURKE

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 24332.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 15, 1938.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1938.

Error to Superior Court, Cook County; John P. McGoorty, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Anna D. Burke, claimant, for adjustment of claim for compensation for an accidental injury resulting in death of her husband, Fred Burke, an employee, opposed by the Ward Baking Company, employer, and another. To review a decision of the superior court confirming the decision of the Industrial Commission denying the claimant's application, the claimant brings error.

Order reversed and cause remanded, with directions.

SHAW, J., dissenting.Owens & Owens, of Chicago (Thomas L. Owens and Sebastian Rivers R., both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error

Peregrine & Bruegger and Robert P. Tobin, all of Chicago, for defendants in error.

WILSON, Justice.

Fred Burke, an employee of the Ward Baking Company, suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on August 29, 1932. A surgical operation disclosed that he was suffering from a malignant sarcoma. Subsequently, on April 6, 1933, Burke and his employer entered into a settlement contract by which the former agreed to accept $500 as full compensation for his injuries. The Industrial Commission, by an order entered the next day, approved the lump-sum settlement. After the settlement had been made, the employee's health continued to decline and he died on January 14, 1934. Anna D. Burke, his widow, on December 3, 1934, filed her application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commission asking compensation for her husband's death resulting from the accident to him. The commission denied compensation on the ground that it is without jurisdiction because she had not filed her application within one year after the day of the injury to her husband or the date of the last payment of compensation to him. The superior court of Cook county, on review, confirmed the decision of the commission. We have granted a writ of error for a further review.

The single question presented for determination is whether the application for adjustment of compensation for the death of Fred Burke was filed by his widow, the plaintiff in error, within the authorized period. The fact that the employee accepted a lump-sum settlement of an adjudicated award for an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment does not preclude a claim by his widow after his death, which follows as a result of the accidental injury, provided, of course, that the widow's claim is filed within the required time. Her action for compensation under paragraph (g) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended in 1921, Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48, § 145(g), is an independent right of recovery created by the statute for the exclusive benefit of the employee's dependents and over which the employee, her late husband, had no control and which he was powerless to release, waive, or extinguish. American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm., 361 Ill. 582, 198 N.E. 687, 101 A.L.R. 1405. The plaintiff in error did not file her application with the Industrial Commission within one year after the last payment of compensation, namely, the payment of the amount specified in the lump-sum settlement as compensation to her husband, the injured employee, nor within one year after the date of his accident. She contends, however, that since she filed her application within one year after her husband's death it was filed within one year after the injury to her-the day on which her cause of action originated. Defendant in error maintains, on the contrary, that the present action is barred because plaintiff in error did not file her application within one year after the day on which her husband's accident occurred. If the claim for adjustment of compensation was filed by plaintiff in error ‘within one year after the date of the injury,’ within the contemplation of the applicable statutory provision, she is entitled to compensation; if not, the decision of the Industrial Commission that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain her application was correct.

Section 24 of the Compensation Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 48, § 161, p. 1581, declares that no proceeding for compensation shall be maintained unless notice of the accidentis given to the employer as soon as practicable, but not later than thirty days after the accident, except in cases of hernia, where notice must be given the employer within fifteen days after the accident. Notice of the accident, oral or written, the section prescribes, shall give the approximate date and place of the accident, if known. It is further provided that no proceeding shall be maintained unless claim has been made within six months after the accident. After using the word ‘accident’ six times the section concludes with the proviso that, in any case, ‘unless application for compensation is filed with the industrial commission within one year after the date of the injury or within one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to file such application shall be barred.’

A primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. In seeking the intent of the legislature courts consider the language used, the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained. People v. Hughes, 357 Ill. 524, 192 N.E. 551;Bowman v. Industrial Comm., 289 Ill. 126, 124 N.E. 373. If the language employed admits of two constructions, one of which makes the enactment absurd, if not mischievous, while the other renders it reasonable and wholesome, the construction which leads to an absurd result should be avoided. People v. West Side Trust & Savings Bank, 362 Ill. 607, 1 N.E.2d 81;Patterson Pure Food Pie Co. v. Industrial Comm., 335 Ill. 476, 167 N.E. 86. Notice of the accident within thirty days and the making of a claim for compensation within six months after the accident are each jurisdictional and conditions precedent to the right to maintain a proceeding under the statute. Lewis v. Industrial Comm., 357 Ill. 309, 192 N.E. 212;Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm., 293 Ill. 461, 127 N.E. 743. The command of the statute in these respects is unequivocal and does not admit of construction. In the present case neither of the first two statutory conditions precedent to a recovery, namely, the giving of notice of the accident within thirty days or the making of a claim for compensation within six months after the accident, is before us owing to the stipulation of the parties that notice was given and claim made within the required time. The statute ordains that the application for compensation, the third jurisdictional prerequisite, must be filed (1) within one year after the date of the injury, or (2) within one year after the date of the last payment of compensation. The question remains as to when the time within which the application may be filed with the Industrial Commission commences.

One of the principal objects of section 24 is to afford an injured employee or his dependents a reasonable time within which to file the requisite application for compensation with the Industrial Commission. For the employee this time extends one year after the date of his accidental injury or, in the alternative, one year after the date of the last payment of compensation to him. The time granted for the purpose of filing his application is ample to accomplish the objective of the statute. It does not follow that the dependents, whose cause of action does not come into existence until the death of the employee from the accident sustained (American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm., supra), must file the prescribed application within one year from the date of his accidental injury. Such a construction would tend to destroy, and in many instances actually nullify, the very rights of the widow and the dependents which the legislature has created and conferred upon them. Manifestly, no action can be brought by the widow or other dependent beneficiaries until the employee's death has occurred. We are not warranted in imputing to the legislature the intent to bar the claim of an employee's dependents before that claim arises and may be prosecuted. The construction of section 24 urged by the defendant in error is an interpretation of the statute repugnant to its humanitarian purpose and spirit. Legislative intent to create a stillborn right of action is wanting. Statutes are to be construed according to their intent and meaning. A situation which is within the object, spirit, and the meaning of a statute is...