Burkhead v. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Independence

• Decision Date: 16 December 1898
• Citation: 77 N.W. 491,107 Iowa 29
• Parties: BURKHEAD v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF INDEPENDENCE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

107 Iowa 29

77 N.W. 491

BURKHEAD

v.INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF INDEPENDENCE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 16, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Buchanan county; A. S. Blair, Judge.

The petition alleged that the plaintiff entered into a written contract with the defendant April 5, 1893, by the terms of which he agreed to render services as superintendent and teacher of its schools for the period of five years at an annual salary of $1,500 per year, payable in monthly installments. The contract did not provide the length of time he was to teach further than that he was “to perform all the duties of superintendent and teacher required of him by law, and the rules and regulations of the board, established for the government of said schools,” which were made a part of the contract. By these rules the schools opened the 1st of September of each year, and closed in June. The plaintiff rendered services as such superintendent for three years, and alleges that at the beginning of the school year in September, 1896, he was ready and willing to perform the duties of superintendent and teacher in pursuance of the contract, but that the defendant, though no charges had been made against him, refused to allow him so to do, excluded him from the buildings, and notified him that the contract was null and void. No part of the salary for the year ending in June, 1897, was paid, and recovery thereon is prayed. The grounds of the defendant's demurrer are: (1) The plaintiff's remedy was by appeal; (2) the contract is void, because it does not specify the number of weeks to be taught; (3) the board of directors was without authority to employ a teacher for a period of five years. The district court sustained the demurrer, and, as the plaintiff elected to stand on the ruling, entered judgment dismissing the petition. The plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.E. E. Hasner, for appellant.

Lake & Harmon, Ransier & Everett, and F. Jennings, for appellee.

LADD, J.

The remedy was not by appeal to the county superintendent. Had the defendantconceded a legal contract, and sought to discharge the plaintiff, then it must have proceeded under section 2782 of the Code. In such event the only remedy would have been by appeal, as the acts of the board under that section are judicial in character. Smith v. District Tp., 42 Iowa, 522;Kirkpatrick v. School Dist., 53 Iowa, 585, 5 N. W. 750;Park v. School Dist., 65 Iowa, 209, 21 N. W. 567. But when a teacher is discharged without the hearing contemplated, the act is wrongful, and resort may be had to the courts; in other words, in order to discharge a teacher, the board of directors must pursue the method prescribed by the statute. Park v. School Dist., supra; Jackson v. School Dist. (decided at the present term) 77 N. W. 860. Where, without such hearing, there is simply a refusal to allow the teacher to render services because of the alleged illegality of the contract, there is nothing from which to appeal. The act of the board of directors in such a case is wrongful, and suit for breach of contract may be maintained. Hull v. School Dist., 82 Iowa, 686, 46 N. W. 1053, and 48 N. W. 82;Benson v. District Tp., 100 Iowa, 331, 69 N. W. 419.

2. The point is made that the contract was invalid, because it did not state the time the school was to be taught, as required by section 2778 of the Code. The rules and regulations of the district fixed the time the schools were to be open, and these are to be made a part of the contract. This determined the time with reasonable certainty.

3. The important question, however, is whether the board of directors had the authority to employ a teacher or superintendent for a period of five years. Our statutes are silent as to the duration of such contracts, and a limitation of the length of time a teacher may be engaged to teach in the public schools, if it exists, is the result of inference to be drawn from other provisions of the law, or because of public policy. By section 2743 of the Code the school district is a body politic, and as such may sue and be sued. The board of directors represents the district,--from a legal standpoint, is the district. It is a continuous body. The officers change, but the corporation continues unchanged. The contracts are of the corporation, and not of the members of the board individually. It is not essential, then, that contracts be limited to the terms of office of the individuals making up the board. Rewbelt v. School Town of Noblesville, 106 Ind. 478, 7 N. E. 206;Tappan v. School Dist., 44 Mich. 500, 7 N. W. 73;Farrell v. School...