Burleson v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 18 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 11–14–00004–CV,11–14–00004–CV
• Citation: 487 S.W.3d 312
• Parties: Don Wayne Burleson, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Patricia Ann Burleson, Deceased, and Heather Dickson, Appellants v. Robert Lawson, M.D., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

487 S.W.3d 312

Don Wayne Burleson, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Patricia Ann Burleson, Deceased, and Heather Dickson, Appellants

v.Robert Lawson, M.D., Appellee.

No. 11–14–00004–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

Opinion filed February 18, 2016

Daniel Sullivan, Stephen C. Maxwell, Fort Worth, for Appellants.

David M. Walsh IV, Kimberly K. Bocell, William H. Chamblee, Dallas, for Appellee.

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson, J., and Bailey, J.

OPINION

JOHN M. BAILEY

, JUSTICE

This appeal concerns the applicable standard of proof in a case involving medical care provided in a hospital emergency department. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.001(7)

(West Supp. 2015), § 74.153 (West 2011). Appellants are the survivors of Patricia Ann Burleson, deceased. They filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Robert Lawson. Appellants appeal the trial court's orders granting Dr. Lawson's traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment and denying their motion for partial summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence grounds. In two issues on appeal, Appellants assert that the trial court erred when it granted Dr. Lawson's motion for summary judgment based upon the willful and wanton standard of proof set out in Section 74.153. We affirm.

Background Facts

On December 10, 2010, Patricia Burleson called her husband, Don Burleson, and asked him to come home quickly. She was complaining of severe chest pain radiating down her left arm. He took her to the emergency room of Hendrick Medical Center. Hospital personnel assigned her to an exam room in the emergency department, and approximately forty minutes later, Dr. Lawson saw her. Prior to Dr. Lawson's arrival, the nurses ordered an EKG, lab work, and a chest X-ray

for Mrs. Burleson. Dr. Lawson interviewed Mrs. Burleson and reviewed the notes taken by the nurses upon Mrs. Burleson's arrival. Mrs. Burleson complained that the chest pain had lasted three hours, “that it was still present, that it was ... sharp and on the left side of her chest, [and] that it was nonradiating.” It was noted that she was overweight and had a family history of coronary artery disease. Dr. Lawson wrote down on her chart: “There was no nausea, vomiting, sweating, shortness of breath. It did hurt to breathe. No palpitations, cough, weakness or dizziness.” Dr. Lawson did not make any diagnosis at the end of this initial interview.

Dr. Lawson ordered another round of tests, including another EKG and blood work, to be conducted ninety minutes after the initial tests. The second blood test came back, and Dr. Lawson observed:

The creatine kinase

that—that one is one of the cardiac enzymes that we look at. Those were identical in both [tests]. The troponin—in our lab values normals go up to 0.6 micrograms per liters as you can see. Both of those were well within the normal range, so as far as being clinically significant, they were not felt to be clinically significant. They were both well within the normal range.

Dr. Lawson read both EKGs and determined that they were “not abnormal.” Based on his assessment of Mrs. Burleson and the test results, Dr. Lawson determined that Mrs. Burleson suffered from atypical chest pain and was “stable.” Dr. Lawson discharged Mrs. Burleson with a prescription for chest pain. However, Mrs. Burleson died approximately fourteen hours later of “probable acute myocardial infarction

.”

Appellants assert that Dr. Lawson's treatment fell below the applicable standard of care. Specifically, they allege that he failed to realize “that [Mrs. Burleson] was in the process of having an acute myocardial infarction

.” Appellants contend that he should have kept her in the emergency department longer for additional testing and observation, that he should have had a cardiac catheterization immediately performed on her, and that he should have requested a cardiovascular consultation. They concluded their allegations by asserting that Dr. Lawson was negligent “[i]n discharging Patricia Ann Burleson from the Hendrick Medical Center Emergency Department in the face of symptoms clearly indicative of the fact that [she] was in the process of a myocardial infarction.”

Appellants filed a motion for partial traditional and no-evidence summary judgment in which they argued that the willful and wanton standard of proof set out in Section 74.153 does not apply in this case. Dr. Lawson filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment in which he asserted that the statute did apply and that Appellants had not produced any evidence that Dr. Lawson acted with willful and wanton negligence. Appellants filed a response to Dr. Lawson's motion and reargued the same points from their summary judgment motion. The trial court held a hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment. The day after the hearing, Appellants filed a supplemental response to Dr. Lawson's motion for summary judgment, in which they produced new evidence to rebut his no-evidence motion. The trial court then granted Dr. Lawson's motion for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds and denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment.

Analysis

Appellants assert two issues on appeal. In their first issue, they contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the willful and wanton standard of proof set out in Section 74.153 applies to this case. They premise this issue on their contention that the statute does not apply “[b]ecause Dr. Lawson perceived Patricia Burleson as stable at the time of the acts complained of in the trial court.” In their second issue, Appellants contend that, even if the willful and wanton standard of proof applies, the evidence was sufficient to overcome Dr. Lawson's motion for summary judgment under this standard.

We review a summary judgment de novo. Mid–Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex.2007)

. When cross-motions for summary judgment are filed and the trial court grants one and denies the other, we review all issues presented and enter the judgment that the trial court should have entered. Bradley v. State ex rel. White, 990 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.1999)

; Moon Royalty, LLC v. Boldrick Partners, 244 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.App.–Eastland 2007, no pet.). Dr. Lawson moved for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds, and the trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the basis for its ruling. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c), 166a(i). Under these circumstances, we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knot

t

, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex.2003).

When a party moves for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds, the appellate court should ordinarily address the no-evidence grounds first. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.2013)

. Both parties' no-evidence summary judgment grounds concern the evidence regarding Dr. Lawson's conduct under the willful and wanton standard. Dr. Lawson asserted that Appellants had no evidence that his alleged acts and omissions rose to the level of willful and wanton conduct, while Appellants asserted that Dr. Lawson had no evidence that he provided emergency medical services in order to invoke the willful and wanton standard of proof. Additionally, both parties addressed the applicability of the emergency care statute in their motions for traditional summary judgment. Accordingly, we must address the legal question of whether the willful and wanton standard applies under Section 74.153 in order to resolve Appellants' first issue.

Section 74.153 governs health care liability claims for injuries or death arising from the provision of “emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department or obstetrical unit or in a surgical suite immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital emergency department.” The statute provides that the claimant:

[M]ay prove that the treatment or lack of treatment by the physician or health care provider departed from accepted standards of medical care or health care only if the claimant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician or health care provider, with wilfull and wanton negligence, deviated from the degree of care and skill that is reasonably expected of an ordinarily prudent physician or health care provider in the same or similar circumstances.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 74.153

. “Emergency medical care” is defined as:

[B]ona fide emergency services provided after the sudden onset of a medical or traumatic condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, including severe pain, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.

Id. § 74.001(7)

. The definition continues: “The term does not include medical care or treatment that occurs after the patient is stabilized and is capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient or that is unrelated to the original medical emergency.” Id.

In their motion for summary judgment, Appellants argued that Section 74.153

does not apply to their claims because Dr. Lawson did not provide “emergency medical care.” As noted previously, they base this assertion on the contention that Dr. Lawson cannot invoke the heightened standard set out in Section 74.153 because he perceived Mrs. Burleson to be stable.

Appellants rely on Guzman v. Memorial Hermann Hospital System

in support of their arguments. Guzman v. Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., No. H–07–3973, 2009 WL 780889, at *7–8 (S.D.Tex. March 23, 2009). In Guzman, a young boy who was feeling ill was taken to the emergency room. Id. at *1. The emergency room doctor obtained the child's medical history and did a physical examination. Id. The...