Burlington Transp. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission
Decision Date | 17 June 1941 |
Docket Number | 45626. |
Citation | 298 N.W. 631,230 Iowa 570 |
Parties | BURLINGTON TRANSP. CO. v. IOWA STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. (ROCK ISLAND MOTOR TRANSIT CO., Intervener). |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Wapello County; Heinrich C. Taylor Judge.
Proceedings by appeal from an order of the Iowa State Commerce Commission granting a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a motor carrier of freight. The successful applicant intervened. The court set aside the order of the commission. The commission and the intervener appeal.
Reversed.
Harry E. Boe, of Chicago, Ill., and J. G. Gamble and A. B. Howland both of Des Moines, for intervener-appellant.
Harold E. Davidson, of Clarinda, for appellants.
Russell B. James, of Chicago, Ill., and J. C. Pryor and John Hale, both of Burlington, for appellee.
The record herein includes a certified transcript of proceedings before the Iowa State Commerce Commission pursuant to which the commission, on May 14, 1940, granted to the Rock Island Motor Transit Company certificates of convenience and necessity to operate as a motor carrier of freight over two routes, one from Des Moines through Oskaloosa and Ottumwa to Eldon, and the other from Eldon through Fairfield, Washington and Muscatine to Davenport.
The Burlington Transportation Company objected to the granting of such certificates of convenience and necessity, participated in a hearing before the commission and, being aggrieved by the decision, appealed to the district court. In seeking reversal of such decision, it asserted a number of propositions, among them the following: The record shows on its face that, in making its decision, the commission exceeded its powers by considering facts and information outside the record made at the hearing and evidence which was improperly admitted over the objections of the Burlington Transportation Company, as a result of which such company was deprived of its constitutional and statutory rights to a fair public hearing on the issues to be decided, in violation of Section 9, Article I, and Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution of Iowa and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; there was no substantial evidence that the granting of the certificate would promote the public convenience and necessity, but instead the evidence showed conclusively that existing transportation agencies, including the Burlington Transportation Company, were furnishing adequate facilities and service; the applicant failed to make satisfactory showing of financial ability; the commission did not make proper and adequate findings of fact; the decision is arbitrary and capricious, not based upon lawfully admitted evidence and is wholly void.
The court determined that, in making a finding that proposed service will promote the public convenience and necessity, the commission acts as a quasi-judicial body and, in the exercise of such judicial powers, must be governed by the same rules applicable to the exercise of any judicial power; in a hearing of this nature the commission must consider only the evidence that reaches it through the lawful channels of the hearing; its consideration of any evidence or information secured from any other sources is contrary to law; since the record shows that the decision and order of the commission is based, at least partly, on evidence which it could not lawfully consider, the order cannot be sustained. The court also determined that the record shows that the commission undertook to exercise equitable jurisdiction which it does not possess. The order of the commission was, therefore, reversed. The commission and the Rock Island Motor Transit Company, intervener, appeal to this court.
In its decision and judgment, the court refers to the decisions of this court in the cases of In re Appeal of Beasley Bros., 206 Iowa 229, 220 N.W. 306; In re Application of Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 206 Iowa 238, 220 N.W. 310; Campbell v. Eldridge, 206 Iowa 224, 220 N.W. 304. All three of those cases involved appeals to the district court from orders and decisions of the state board of railroad commissioners (now State Commerce Commission), on applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity. We do not think that the court correctly interpreted these decisions. The court's holding that, in determining whether proposed service will promote the public convenience and necessity, the commission acts in a judicial capacity and must follow strictly the rules applicable to a judicial inquiry, is directly opposed to our holding in the Beasley case, wherein we state (206 Iowa 235, 220 N.W. 309) as follows: ."
Again, at page 238 of 206 Iowa, at page 310 of 220 N.W., we state:
For us to affirm the decision of the trial court herein would require us to overrule the foregoing pronouncements of this court. We see no occasion for so doing.
The statutes involved herein are contained in Chapter 252.1 of the Code, 1939. Section 5100.06 makes it unlawful for any motor carrier to operate within this state without first having obtained from the commission a certificate declaring that public convenience and necessity require such operation. Section 5100.07 provides: Section 5100.13 provides: " Upon the filing of the application, the commission shall fix a date for hearing thereon and cause a notice addressed to the citizens of each county through or in which the proposed service will be rendered, to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in each county, once each week for two consecutive weeks." Section 5100.15 provides: " Any person, firm, corporation, city, town, or county whose rights or interests may be affected shall have the right to make written objections to the proposed application." Section 5100.16 provides: Section 5100.17 provides: " It shall consider the application and any objections filed thereto and may hear testimony to aid it in determining the propriety of granting the application."
The effect of the decision of the trial court herein is to construe Section 5100.17 so that the clause, " may hear testimony to aid it in determining the propriety of granting the application," means that the commission must hear testimony, as in open court, and, in making its decision, is bound by the rules applicable to a judicial inquiry. We cannot so construe the statute.
The argument of appellee asserts that the constitution requires us to so interpret the statute. There is no merit in the contention. The rules of constitutional law, applicable to notice and hearing on legislative acts, are illustrated in drastic fashion by the case of Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 619, 621, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 752, 755, 109 Am.St.Rep. 630, wherein, in holding that the operator of a sawmill was subject to a regulation of the fish and game commissioners which prohibited the discharge of sawdust into a stream, the court states:
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