Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1904
• Citation: 180 Mo. 241,79 S.W. 136
• Parties: BURNETTA v. MARCELINE COAL CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

79 S.W. 136

180 Mo. 241

BURNETTA v. MARCELINE COAL CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

March 1, 1904.

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT—CONSTRUCTION—TERMS—MINERS' UNION—REGULATIONS AS ELEMENT OF CONTRACT.

1. The fact that one employed to work in a mine was asked, on applying for the employment, if he understood the rules under which the mine was working, the days of payment, etc., and responded that he did, did not amount to an adoption by the parties, as a part of their contract, of an understanding between the mine owner and the Miners' Union, of which the servant was a member, governing the time and manner of payment of wages.

2. The Miners' Union, which is an organization for the protection of labor from the exactions of capital, and not an organization for conducting any business enterprise, cannot bind its individual members by any agreement with mine operators in respect to the performance of work, and the time and manner of payment for it.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Linn County; Jno. P. Butler, Judge.

Action by George Burnetta against the Marceline Coal Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

H.K. & H.J. West, for appellant. C. M. Kendrick, for respondent.

Statement.

FOX, J.

This suit was begun on June 16, 1900, before J. T. Laird, a justice of the peace of Marceline township, Linn County, Mo., upon the following account, which was filed with the justice:

                George Burnetta
                  Amt. due per bill rendered........   $21 57
                  Wages at $2.00 per day, 7 days....    14 00
                                                       ______
                                                       $35 57
                

Plaintiff, in his suit before the justice of the peace, filed a statement of his cause of action in two separate counts. Upon appeal to the circuit court, his claim upon the second count was stricken out by the court; hence it is only necessary to a full comprehension of the cause of action involved in this suit to quote the statement in the first count, which is as follows: "Plaintiff states for his cause of action that on the 24th day of March, 1900, he entered the employ of the defendant as a miner of coal in its shaft at Marceline, Mo., and remained in said employment until the 9th day of June, 1900; that on said 9th day of June, 1900, defendant was indebted to plaintiff for service rendered as such miner in the sum of $21.57; and that said amount remains due and unpaid, although plaintiff has demanded payment repeatedly. Wherefore he prays judgment for the said sum of $21.57, with costs."

There is practically no dispute about the facts in this case. "Respondent entered the service of appellant as a miner of coal in the appellant's shaft at Marceline, Mo., on March 24, 1900, and continued in such employment until June 9th of that year, when he voluntarily left the employ of appellant, performing all the requirements of the appellant in such cases, `securing' his place—that is, trimming and brushing it up, in order to leave it in good condition—securing his `clearance card' thereby from the pit boss." It is conceded that defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $21.57. The only dispute is in respect to the time when said indebtedness was due and payable. There was $16.22 due respondent for work performed in May, and $5.35 for work performed in June. As before stated, respondent on the 9th of June voluntarily quit the employment of appellant. The 16th of June was one of the pay days fixed by appellant. On that day, respondent's contract of employment having ended, he demanded the amount due him for labor done both in May and June. Appellant was willing to pay the amount due for the work performed in May, but refused to pay the $5.35 for services rendered in June. It is claimed by appellant that the amount sued for by plaintiff, for labor performed in June, was not due and payable until the 30th day of June. The testimony upon which this defense is predicated is as follows: "Joseph Hemmings, for defendant, testified: `I am superintendent of the defendant company. It is my duty to employ miners. I employed the plaintiff in the latter part of March, 1900. When he came to me, I asked him if he understood the rules under which the mine was working, the days of payment, and so on. He said, "Yes." I had no special talk with him further. The rules of the company were and are to pay its employés twice per month, on the nearest Saturday to the 15th and last—the nearest Saturday to the 15th, and the nearest Saturday to the last of the month. We were always practically two weeks behind. For instance, if the plaintiff had earned any money from the 1st to the 15th of April it would be paid on the Saturday nearest to the last of April. It might or might not be two weeks behind.' Defendant's counsel offered to show by this witness that in the operation of this mine, and other mines, the coal operators in this mining district had a contract with the Miners' Union, of which this plaintiff is a member, by which the miners were to be paid in the way in which the defendant offered to pay the plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel objects. Court sustained the objection, and declined the offer of evidence, to which ruling of the court the defendant then and there excepted at the time."

At the close of the evidence, the court, at the request of the plaintiff, declared the law as follows:

"(1) The court construes the law to require that, when the servant quits the employ of the master voluntarily, the master is entitled to a reasonable time in which to pay the servant or employé the amount of wages due the servant or employé, and that in this case, if, by reason of defendant's custom, its regular day and time for the payment of employés and servants came on June 16, 1900, and plaintiff left the service of defendant on June 9, 1900, then the intervening time between said dates was such a reasonable time as defendant was entitled to, in contemplation of law; and, the contract of employment and service between plaintiff and defendant having been terminated on said 9th day of June, then all wages due plaintiff from defendant were due and payable to plaintiff on said 16th day of June, 1900, and plaintiff had a right to sue for and recover the entire amount of wages due him from defendant.

"(2) The court declares the law in this case to be as follows: When the plaintiff voluntarily left the service of the defendant company, and defendant company accepted plaintiff's action, and issued to him its memorandum slip or duebill, showing the amount due plaintiff to date of his quitting service, and further accepted plaintiff's room or place in the mine, and issued to him its clearance, then the contract of employment, express or implied, existing between plaintiff and defendant, ceased by mutual consent and action of the parties.

"(3) The court declares the law to be that the rule, custom, or contract under which defendant company refused to pay plaintiff for wages earned in the month of May (viz., $16.22) until the 15th of June, 1900, and as well, also, the same rule, custom, or contract under which defendant company refused to pay plaintiff for wages earned in the first half of June until the last Saturday in June, 1900, are contrary and repugnant to the provisions of section 8791 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, and are therefore null and void; and the court therefore further declares the law to be that if it finds from the evidence that on and prior to the 1st day of June, 1900, the plaintiff had earned wages to the amount of $16.22, and thereafter, between the 1st and 9th of June, 1900, the plaintiff earned further wages to the amount of $5.35, and thereupon quit defendant's employ, the defendant became bound to pay plaintiff said $16.22 on or before June 1, and said $5.35 on or about the 15th day of June, 1900; and if the court further finds from the evidence that on the 16th day of June, 1900, the plaintiff demanded payment of said respective sums so earned in wages by him, and the defendant refused to pay plaintiff, then and in that event the finding and judgment of the court will be for the plaintiff, to wit, the sum of $21.57, together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from June 16, 1900, until the present time."

The defendant then prayed the...