Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard

• Decision Date: 20 April 1931
• Docket Number: 28855
• Citation: 161 Miss. 4,133 So. 669
• Parties: YAZOO & M. V. R. Co. v. SIDEBOARD
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

133 So. 669

161 Miss. 4

YAZOO & M. V. R. Co. v. SIDEBOARD

No. 28855

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 20, 1931

Division B

1. TRADE UNIONS.

Working agreement between labor union and employer is primarily for benefit of individual members, and rights thereunder are enforceable directly by members.

2 CONTRACTS.

Third party may recover directly on contract made expressly for his benefit.

3 CONTRACTS. Circumstances under which third party may recover directly on contract to which he is not party stated.

Third party may recover directly on contract to which he is not party (1) when the terms of the contract are expressly broad enough to include third party either by name as one of a specified class, and (2) the third party was evidently within the intent of the terms so used, the third party will be within its benefits, if (3) the promisee had in fact, a substantial and articulate interest in the welfare of the third party in respect to the subject of the contract.

4 CONTRACTS. Colored brakeman on passenger train had sufficient interest in contract between railroad and labor union composed exclusively of white trainmen, entitling him to maintain action for compensation under agreement.

Trainmen's working and compensation agreement between railroad and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a labor union composed exclusively of white men, provided, in substance, when trainmen should be designated as passenger brakemen, and that, where white brakemen were not employed, compensation should be same for colored brakemen for both passenger and freight service. Agreement further provided that rights contained therein should be understood to apply for both white and colored employees alike. After paying such brakeman compensation in accordance with agreement, railroad determined that, since brakeman was colored, he could not become member of trainmen's union, and therefore could not enforce any rights under working and compensation agreement.

5. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. Compromise and settlement. Brakeman's acceptance of checks, bearing notation "in full for services rendered," constituted accord and satisfaction, precluding recovery of difference between such checks and rate of compensation under working agreement.

Compensation and working agreement between railroad and labor union stipulated rate of compensation to be paid brakemen. Railroad determined that brakeman was not entitled to enforce terms of such contract, and thereupon reduced compensation accordingly. Brakeman, however, accepted and cashed checks at reduced rate of compensation, which checks bore notation "in full for services rendered." Brakeman, however, was at all times asserting and asking for recognition of his rights to brakemen's pay under terms of contract. Railroad was at all times contending that it owed no more, and that checks accepted constituted payment in full.

HON. E. L. BRIEN, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Warren county, HON. E. L. BRIEN, Judge.

Action by Charles E. Sideboard against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and cause remanded, in accordance with opinion.

Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded.

Hirsh, Dent & Landau, of Vicksburg, and Chas. N. Burch, H. D. Minor and C. H. McKay, of Memphis, Tenn., for appellant.

A labor union, in contracting with an employer with respect to wages and conditions of service for a specified period of time, does not establish contracts between its individual members and the employer, a breach of which will sustain actions by the individuals.

Hudson v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 154 S.W. 47, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184; West v. B. & O. R. Co., 137 S.E. 654.

A labor union is the representative of its members only for the limited purpose of securing for him, together with all other members, fair and just wages and good working conditions.

16 R. C. L., sec. 10, p. 425.

An agreement of a member of a labor union to comply with its rules and regulations and with the will of the lawfully constituted majority, does not contemplate the submission by him to that body of any question involving his personal rights.

Piercy v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 33 L. R. A. 323, 248 S.W. 1042.

A contract on the part of an individual that he will perform certain work under the rules of an organization is not to be inferred from the simple fact that he is a member of the organization. Persons work for themselves, and are free and independent. Agreements, imposing conditions can only be enforced when the entire proposition has been stated, and by them freely accepted.

Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 79 S.W. 139; Darrill v. Dodds, 78 Miss. 912; Cooper v. Railroad Co., 82 Miss. 642; Phillips v. Insurance Co., 156 Miss. 41, 125 So. 705; Knight v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 275 S.W. 704; May Bros. v. Doggett, 155 Miss. 849; Greener v. Cain, 137 Miss. 35.

A contract for employment fixing the amount to be paid at stated intervals, but with no time limit for its ending, is a contract terminable at the end of any month by either party at their pleasure.

Wood, Master & Servant, 272; Cleveland v. Towle, 106 So. 58; Rape v. M. & O. R. Co., 136 Miss. 38.

T. G. Ewing, of Memphis, Tenn., and W. W. Ramsey, Thames & Thames and Brunini & Hirsch, all of Vicksburg, for appellee.

The mere fact that the contract was negotiated between the railroad company and an organization representing a part of its trainmen cannot exclude other trainmen, not members of the organization, from its benefits, when the nonmember trainman and the railroad company recognized and treated it as a contract under which the services of such trainmen were rendered and accepted.

Regg v. Starks, 224 S.W. 459; Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss. 613, 91 So. 346; H. Blum & Co. v. Landau (Ohio), 155 N.E. 154; Gulla v. Barton, 149 N.Y.S. 952; Dick v. Davis, 288, F. 445.

A contract between an employer and employees, members of a labor union, fixing a wage scale until a specified date, must be construed precisely the same as between individuals.

Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers Union, 113 A. 320.

The old English doctrine was that a third person could not maintain an action where the promise was to another for his benefit. The prevailing doctrine in the United States, however, is to the contrary.

13 C. J. 705, sec. 815.

The prevailing doctrine in the United States is in force in Mississippi.

Moore v. Kirkland, 112 Miss. 55, 72 So. 855; Canada v. Yazoo R. Co., 101 Miss. 274, 57 So. 913; Sweatman v. Parker, 49 Miss. 19; Vigniau v. Ruffins, 1 Miss. 312.

By the weight of authority the action cannot be maintained merely because the third person will be incidentally benefited by performance of the contract; he must be a party to the consideration or the contract must have been entered into for his benefit, and he must have some legal or equitable interest in its performance.

13 C. J., sec. 817, p. 709.

If the person for whose benefit a contract is made has either a legal or an equitable interest in the performance of the contract, he need not necessarily be privy to the consideration. The name of the person to be benefited by the contract need not be given if he is otherwise sufficiently described or designated. The fact that the particular person who is to be benefited from the promise is not known when the promise is made is immaterial. He may be one of a class of persons if the class is sufficiently described or designated.

13 C. J., sec. 817, p. 714.

The name of the person, however, to be benefited by the contract need not be given if he is otherwise sufficiently described or designated. He may be one of a class of persons if the class is sufficiently described or designated. In any case where the person to be benefited is in any manner sufficiently described or designated, he may sue upon the contract.

Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246, 13 P. 398; Lenz v. Chicago R. Co., 111 Wis. 198, 86 N.W. 607.

The acceptance of part payment does not per se waive the right to demand the balance.

Rhodes v. N. O. G. N. R. R. Co., 129 Miss. 78.

In order to constitute accord and satisfaction there must, it would seem, be a distinct meeting of the minds of the parties, or the circumstances must be such as to show that the party to whom the money is offered, is bound to understand therefrom, that if he takes it he takes it subject to the condition that it is accepted in full of his demand.

Andrews v. Waller Wall Paper Co., 32 Appellate Court, B. C. 392, 395, 396; Preston v. Grant, 24 Vt. 203.

To constitute a valid accord and satisfaction it is also essential that what is given or agreed to be performed shall be offered as a satisfaction and extinction of the original demand; that the debtor shall intend it as a, satisfaction of such obligation, and that such intention shall be made known to the creditor in some unmistakable manner. It is equally essential that the creditor shall have accepted it with the intention that it should operate as a satisfaction. Both the giving and the acceptance in satisfaction are essential elements, and if they be lacking there can be no accord and satisfaction. The intention of the parties, which is of course controlling, must be determined from all the circumstances attending the transaction.

1 C. J. 529, sec. 16.

If there be a bona-fide dispute as to the amount due, such dispute may be the subject of compromise and payment of a certain sum as a satisfaction of the entire claim, but where the larger sum is admitted to be due, or the circumstances of the case show that there was no good reason to doubt that it was due, the release of the whole upon the payment of the part will not be considered...