Burnham v. Dowd
| Decision Date | 31 March 1914 |
| Citation | 217 Mass. 351,104 N.E. 841 |
| Parties | BURNHAM et al. v. DOWD et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Nathan P. Avery, of Holyoke, for plaintiffs.
J. B Carroll, W. H. McClintock, and J. F. Jennings, all of Springfield, for defendants.
If it appeared from this record that the defendants' exceptions to the admission of evidence by the master had been taken at the hearing before the master, and that the objections made to the report by the defendants upon this ground and the exceptions filed by them in pursuance thereof had thus been based upon a evidence to the admission of which objection easy to justify the refusal to recommit the master's report in order that the rulings made upon these points and excepted to by the defendants might be reviewed. But this is not the case. So far as appears, all the evidence to he admission of which objection afterwards was made was received originally without any objection. Nor does it appear that a motion afterwards was made to strike out any part of this evidence if that would have been sufficient. Undoubtedly, if seasonable objections had been made by the defendant and overruled by the master, and this fact had been shown to the superior court, the motion to recommit would have been granted. As the case stands, the motion was addressed merely to the discretion of the justice who heard it, and there is no reason to suppose that his discretion was exercised wrongly. Cook v. Scheffreen, 215 Mass. 444, 447, 102 N.E. 715; Lee v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 193 Mass. 47, 78 N.E. 646.
We see no ground on which any of the exceptions to the master's report can be sustained. Most of them relate to findings of fact, as to which the evidence is not before us. Others refer to the admission of evidence, and cannot be considered for the reasons already stated. The defendants have not argued separately any of these exceptions, although they have not been waived, and accordingly each one of them has been considered. But it is not necessary to discuss them in detail.
The leading meterial facts found by the master may be summarized as follows: The plaintiffs carry on a business which includes the selling at wholesale and retail of masons' supplies. The defendants are members of a voluntary unincorporated association or labor union in Holyoke, hereinafter called the union. It is the object and purpose of all the members of this union to make themselves and the union as powerful as possible in Holyoke and its immediate environment, and to exert their power for the purpose of bettering the labor conditions of members of the union, especially with reference to rates of wages and periods of labor. It is a part of their principles which all the members of the union are under obligation to respect and uphold, that all men of their craft or trade working in Holyoke or its immediate vicinity, that is, within the jurisdiction of their union, must be members thereof that all their members should refuse to work with men of their craft who were not members of the union or had not declared their intention to join it; should refuse to work for employers who were declared 'unfair' by the union; and should refuse to use in their work any materials that had been sold or furnished by any merchant who was declared unfair by the union. They aimed to accomplish their purpose, of bettering the labor conditions of their members, primarily by persuasion coupled with the fear of consequences if the party addressed should not yield, and secondarily, if necessary, by troubles and loss to the business of contractors or merchants. This union was connected with the Building Trades Council of Holyoke, which represented the various building trades unions (some 14 in number) of Holyoke and vicinity, and was composed of delegates sent from these unions. In July, 1911, one Gauthier employed nonunion masons in certain construction work in Holyoke, against the protest of this union; and the plaintiffs furnished to him mason materials. In August, 1911, the union voted to refuse to handle any building material of any firm that furnished stock to Gauthier or to any 'unfair' contractor. Soon after this, the delegates from the union to the Building Trades Council reported these facts to that body; and the agent of the council sent a written notice to the plaintiff that Gauthier was 'doing work contrary to laws of Building Trades Council,' and was 'therefore recognized by us as being unfair,' and expressing the hope of 'co-operation in this matter.' The plaintiffs continued to furnish material to Gauthier. Thereupon, by successive votes, the union declared that the plaintiffs were 'unfair.' This was for the reason that the plaintiffs continued to furnish masons' supplies to Gauthier, and refused to promise not to sell to any party who should not be in good standing with the union. All the members of the union would have refused since August, 1911, and would refuse now and in the future (so long as the plaintiffs were held by the union to be unfair) to work with materials purchased from the plaintiffs. It has not been and in the future it will not be practicable, without the labor of members of the union, to perform building contracts of any size or importance in Holyoke or its immediate vicinity, without serious inconvenience, trouble and loss to the contractors, and the defendants have intended that owners and contractors should fear this result if they purchased masons' supplies from the plaintiffs. The union and its officers and members, including some of the defendants, have notified various owners and contractors, who either were buying or were intending to buy masons' supplies from the plaintiffs for construction work upon which members of the union necessarily were employed, that the plaintiffs were upon the 'unfair' list of the union, and that its members would not use or work upon material furnished by the plaintiffs, and in substance threatened to strike if masons' supplies were purchased from the plaintiffs. These contractors and owners feared, and it was intended that they should fear and they were justified in fearing, that these threats would be carried out; and in consequence thereof they ceased or refrained from buying supplies of the plaintiff, as otherwise they would have done, and the plaintiffs' sales of masons' supplies were considerably diminished and their profits lessened in consequence of these facts. This state of affairs will continue, to the serious loss and damage of the plaintiffs, unless they shall promise not to sell to any one considered unfair by the union.
The defendants did not act from actual personal malice towards the plaintiffs; but their acts were done in pursuance of their union principles and purposes, as above stateed, and without caring for the injurious consequences to the plaintiffs. Indeed these injurious consequences were anticipated and contemplated by the defendants. They did not attempt to declare or enforce any boycott against the plaintiffs, except as this is included in the acts that have been mentioned. During the period involved in this case, some of the defendants have bought for their own use small quantities of masons' supplies from the plaintiffs, and others of the defendants during the same time have made purchases from the plaintiffs in other branches of the plaintiffs' business.
Although there has been a little contrariety of decisions in other jurisdictions, we do not consider that there is any doubt as to the rule of law to be applied in this case. The defendants have no real trade dispute with the plaintiffs. No one of the members of the union is, or so far as appears ever has been employed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have not interfered or sought to interfere with the employment of any of those members, or with the rates of pay, the periods of labor, or any of the conditions of such employment. There is no competition between these parties, as there was in Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499. The matter that lies at the foundation of these proceedings is a dispute between the union and Gauthier. He employs or has employed nonunion labor; the defendants (including under this term all the members of the union) object to this. They have a right to say that they will do no work for him unless he will give to them all the work of their trade, that they will do all or none of his work. That was settled by our decision in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 7 Ann. Cas. 638. If they were employed by Gauthier, and if he employed also nonunion men of their craft, they would have a right, unless they were bound by some term of their contract of employment, to strike unless all of this work should be given to them or to their associates. But it was pointed out in the same case that not all strikes are lawful; and it now is settled in this commonwealth that it is a question of law whether any particular strike is a lawful one. Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N.E. 457, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162; De Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N.E. 317, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1048. But the second point decided in Pickett v. Walsh, supra, is in our opinion decisive of the principal question raised in this case. It was there held that the members of a labor union who are employed by a contractor to do work upon a building, and who have no dispute with that contractor as to work which they or their fellows are doing for him, cannot lawfully strike against him for the mere reason that he is doing work and employing some of their fellows upon another building upon which nonunion men are employed to do like work, not by him, but by the owner, of that building. The language and reasoning...
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