Burns v. Adams

Decision Date02 May 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 12CA3508
Citation2014 Ohio 1917
PartiesMICHELE BURNS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACK ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

ENTRY

APPEARANCES:

James H. Banks, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant.

Stanley C. Bender, Portsmouth, Ohio, Bruce W. MacDonald and Darya Thompson, McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie, & Kirkland, Greenup, Kentucky, for Appellee.

McFarland, J.

{¶1} Jack Adams, (Appellant), appeals the judgment of the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, entered on September 12, 2012, subsequent to a jury trial held on damages only. Pursuant to the jury's verdicts, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Michelle Burns, as administrator of the estate of Bobby Burns, and against defendant Jack Adams in the amounts of one million, two hundred thousand dollars ($1,200,000.00) for compensatory damages and eight million one hundred thousand dollars ($8,100,000.00) for punitive damages. Appellantsubmits the following assignments of error: (1) that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence such to adversely affect the substantial rights of the defendant; (2) that the trial court's rulings at trial denied the defendant a fair trial and deprived him of due process, such as to require reversal of the judgment against him; and (3) that the punitive damage award was excessive and contrary to law. Having reviewed the entire record, we find the trial court did not err with regard to the admission of evidence. We also find Appellant was not denied a fair trial or deprived of due process, such as to require reversal of the judgment against him. Finally, we find the punitive damage award was not excessive and contrary to law. As such, we overrule Appellant's three assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

{¶2} Appellant was convicted after a jury trial in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas of one count of murder, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of kidnapping, all with firearm specifications. The facts underlying his convictions are set forth fully in State v. Adams, 4th Dist. Scioto Nos. 04CA2959, 05CA2986, 2009-Ohio-6491.

{¶3} The shorter version is Plaintiff-Appellee Michelle Burns, ("Appellee"), was a patient of Appellant, a doctor of psychiatry. Appellee had depression problems as early as age 32-33 and, later, some mental health issues ostensiblyassociated with the fact that she was diagnosed with cancer and had subsequent radical surgeries. While Appellant was treating Appellee for her later mental health issues, prescribing her antidepressants and narcotic pain medication, they engaged in a sexual relationship. Sometime after Appellee ended the relationship, Appellant entered the Burns' home by stealth and killed Bobby Burns, Appellee's husband. After pointing a gun at Appellee, he fled the scene and kidnapped two females at gunpoint, forcing them to drive him across the state line into Kentucky. Appellant was apprehended shortly thereafter.

{¶4} Appellant appealed his criminal convictions, raising various issues, and this court remanded Appellant's case for resentencing. Appellant also appealed the new sentence in State v. Adams, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3391, 2012 WL 245893. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was denied in April 2010.

{¶5} Appellee, as administrator of the estate of Bobby Burns, filed a wrongful death action against Appellant in June 2005. The civil case was placed on hold while Appellant appealed his criminal convictions. The wrongful death case was eventually tried to a duly empaneled and sworn jury on August 14, 2012. Appellee testified as to the events preceding her husband's murder, which occurred over a period of several years. Appellee also presented deposition testimony from an economist, David Boyd, on the issue of economic damage as a result of BobbyBurns' death.2 Appellant did not testify nor did he present any evidence in defense of the wrongful death complaint or on his counter-claim.3 As indicated above, at the conclusion of the one-day trial, the jury awarded large verdicts for compensatory damages and punitive damages. This appeal followed.

{¶6} Where relevant, additional facts are set forth below.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SUCH TO ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶7} The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision to admit or exclude such evidence cannot be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Craft, 4th Dist. Athens No. 97 CA 53, 1998 WL 255442, * 7; State v. Combs, 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 581 N.E.2d 1071 (1991); State v. Finnerty, 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 543 N.E.2d 1233 (1989); State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987); Evid.R. 402. We note that the term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary orunconscionable. Craft, supra, citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 584 N.E. 2d 715 (1992); State v. Montgomery, 61 Ohio St.3d 410, 575 N.E.2d 167 (1991). When applying the abuse of discretion standard of review, an appellate court is not free to merely substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court. Craft, supra, citing In re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991).

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶8} Under the first assignment of error, Appellant first sets forth this issue: whether the trial court's refusal to permit Defendant-Appellant Adams to present evidence as to liability constitutes reversible error? Appellant argues the trial court twice denied Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and then refused to permit Appellant to submit any evidence as to liability, finding that the trial was being held only to consider damages. In response to Appellant's first issue, Appellee contends the trial court did not err in its discretion when it determined that the evidence of Appellant's murder conviction was sufficient to meet the liability element in the case at bar based on R.C. 2307.60. R.C. 2307.60, civil action for damages for criminal act, provides in pertinent part:

"(B) A final judgment of a trial court that has not been reversed on appeal or otherwise nullified, set aside, or vacated, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty, but not upon a plea of no contest or the equivalent plea from another jurisdiction, that adjudges an offender guilty of an offense of violence punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, when entered as evidence in any subsequent civil proceeding based on the criminal act, shall preclude the offender from denying in the subsequent civil proceeding any fact essential tosustaining that judgment, unless the offender can demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances prevented the offender from having a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the criminal proceeding, or other extraordinary circumstances justify affording the offender the opportunity to relitigate the issue. The offender may introduce evidence of the offender's pending appeal of the final judgment of the trial court, if applicable, and the court may consider that evidence in determining the liability of the offender."

{¶9} To clearly address Appellant's argument, we must point out the context. The trial transcript reflects defense counsel brought up, just prior to the commencement of trial, these issues: (1) questioning Appellee as to her medical treatment for multiple personality disorder and (2) questioning her as to a settlement received from Marshall University. Eventually in the discussion, the trial court stated: "We're not going to get into retrying the case. So the case has been tried by a jury of his peers and so we're not going to get into the facts." He's not allowed to get up and say "He didn't do it" now. Appellant's counsel responded: "Well, Your Honor, in your entry for summary judgment your ruling was a little different, so I'm just saying - -." The transcript reflects counsel's voice trailed off. Appellant did not lodge and objection to the trial court's implicit ruling that Appellant could not deny liability for Bobby Burns' death during the damages trial.

{¶10} The trial court then read the relevant statute, R.C. 2307.60 and questioned whether the criminal conviction had been appealed. Appellant's counsel responded that it had been appealed all the way to the Supreme Court ofOhio. At this point, the transcript does not reveal further discussion with the trial court or argument or objection by Appellant's counsel as to the issue of the admission of evidence of liability. There are also three instances during voir dire and one instance during opening statement when Appellee's counsel states the trial was only on damages. At no time did Appellant lodge an objection.

{¶11} The transcript further reveals when Appellee rested, counsel offered into evidence the nunc pro tunc sentencing entry, certified by the Scioto County Clerk of Courts, evidencing Appellant's multiple convictions and multiple prison terms. Appellant's counsel objected on the basis that there was no person to testify as to authentication. Appellee argued the entry was self-authenticating and also admissible under R.C. 2307.60. The trial court admitted the entry of conviction. There was no further objection by Appellant as to the issue of presentation of liability evidence. Counsel objected to the admission of the entry of conviction solely on the basis of authentication.4 As such, we will review Appellant's argument that he was not permitted to present evidence as to liability under a plain error standard of review.

{¶12} It is well-established that where no timely objection was made, plain error is recognized in a civil case is not favored and may only be applied in an "extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no...

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