Burns v. Huffstetler, 61897
| Decision Date | 12 May 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 61897,61897 |
| Citation | 433 So.2d 964 |
| Parties | T. David BURNS, Petitioner, v. L.R. HUFFSTETLER, Jr., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James G. Mahorner, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Kent A. Zaiser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondents.
This cause is before this Court on a petition for a writ of prohibition asserting that respondent William F. Edwards, a judge of the fifth judicial circuit, had no jurisdiction to suspend petitioner's license to practice law in Florida as an alternative punishment for being found in criminal contempt. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, §§ 3(b)(7) and 15, Fla.Const. We grant prohibition and hold that the circuit judge was without authority to order petitioner to surrender his license to practice law in this state under the procedure utilized in this cause. We find, however, that petitioner, T. David Burns, may be proceeded against in an appropriate disciplinary action, in accordance with either The Florida Bar disciplinary procedure set forth in Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rules 11.02-11.13, or the judicial disciplinary procedure of Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.14.
The facts of this case are uncontroverted. In June, 1981, petitioner was counsel for a defendant charged with first-degree murder. On June 24, 1981, an assistant state attorney for the fifth circuit filed a motion for inquiry on advisability of sanctions for discovery violations against petitioner, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(j)(1) and (2), alleging that petitioner had intentionally failed to provide reciprocal discovery. The motion also alleged that petitioner had attempted to impede trial by requesting continuances upon false grounds and by admitting the criminal defendant into a psychiatric hospital. The presiding judge, Huffstetler, held a hearing on this motion and, at the hearing, removed petitioner as counsel of record in the murder case, appointing a public defender to represent the defendant. He also determined that petitioner's conduct appeared to him to be contemptuous.
Judge Huffstetler disqualified himself from petitioner's case, and Judge Edwards was assigned to consider petitioner's alleged contemptuous conduct. Judge Edwards entered an order to show cause why respondent should not be held in contempt and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Immediately prior to this hearing, the state offered petitioner a consent judgment whereby petitioner could voluntarily surrender his license to practice law in Florida and submit to an alcohol rehabilitation program in lieu of being incarcerated for criminal contempt. Counsel for petitioner accepted the proposed consent judgment. The consent judgment was entered under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840. It adjudicated petitioner in indirect criminal contempt of court and sentenced him to confinement for 179 days, but suspended the term of imprisonment as long as petitioner surrendered to the trial court his license to practice law and submitted to placement in an alcohol and/or drug abuse rehabilitation program. Reinstatement to the practice of law was conditioned on petitioner's proving to the trial court his rehabilitation and competence to practice law.
Petitioner, in seeking a writ of prohibition preventing the trial court from retaining his license to practice law, asserts that the trial court had no constitutional power to discipline him and that we should reinstate his license to practice law and vacate the order removing him as counsel of record in the murder prosecution.
There are three alternative methods for the disciplining of attorneys, and the first two procedures derive directly from this Court's delegation of its power to regulate the practice of law in Florida, as conferred by article V, section 15, Florida Constitution. The first alternative is the traditional grievance committee-referee process in which an attorney is prosecuted by The Florida Bar under the direction of the Board of Governors. Under this procedure, sanctions are imposed by the Supreme Court after the Court considers the referee's recommendations. See Fla.Bar Integr.Rule, art. XI, Rules 11.02-11.13. The second alternative is a procedure initiated by the judiciary with the state attorney prosecuting. Judgment is entered by the trial court and is subject to review by the Supreme Court. See Fla.Bar Integr.Rule, art. XI, Rule 11.14. The third...
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