Burns v. Temperature Control Co.

Decision Date04 December 1962
Citation371 S.W.2d 804,52 Tenn.App. 51
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals
PartiesJames P. BURNS, d/b/a Climate Control Company, v. TEMPERATURE CONTROL COMPANY, Inc., et al.

Bryant, Brandt, & Price, Johnson City, for plaintiff in error.

Dan Laws, Jr., Elizabethton, Cecil Branstetter, Nashville, for defendant in error.

COOPER, Judge.

This suit was brought to recover monies allegedly due for heating and air conditioning work performed by the plaintiff, James P. Burns, d/b/a Climate Control Company, in the construction of the Green Valley Homes, a state mental institution located in Greeneville, Tennessee. The plaintiff also sought, in the same suit, a declaration of its rights and those of its employees (now defendants in error) under the Prevailing Wage Act (T.C.A. § 12-406 et seq.).

The State of Tennessee, through its Department of Mental Health, awarded the contract for the construction of the mental institution to the Trammell Construction Company. Trammell sub-contracted the plumbing, heating and air conditioning work to Paul Howard d/b/a Howard and Howard Plumbing and Heating Company. Howard, in turn, sub-contracted the heating and air conditioning work to the Temperature Control Company, Inc., and it sub-contracted the work to the plaintiff. The prime contract and the sub-contracts, in accordance with the provisions of the Prevailing Wage Act, set forth minimum wages to be paid the various craftsmen that would be employed in constructing the Green Valley Homes. The State Department of Labor, in checking conditions on the job site during the course of construction, determined that the plaintiff and Paul Howard had failed to classify and pay their employees according to the work they performed on the project and, consequently, refused to pay the prime contractor, Trammell Construction Company, for the work done by the plaintiff and by Howard. It followed that the prime contractor refused to pay the subcontractors, and they, in turn, refused to pay the plaintiff. Plaintiff then brought the present suit naming as defendants, the employees involved, certain key State officials, the prime contractor, and the sub-contractors through whom the plaintiff had been awarded his contract.

Four employees of the sub-contractor Paul Howard, d/b/a Howard and Howard Plumbing and Heating Company, filed intervening petitions insisting that they had been classified and paid as plumber's helpers, when, in fact, they had performed work as plumbers, and asked that they be awarded a judgment against Howard for the differential in the wages as set out in the construction contracts.

Necessary and proper answers were filed by the employees of the plaintiff and by the sub-contractor Paul Howard. A number of other pleadings were filed, but they are not material in that it developed in the course of the hearing that there was no dispute as to the contracts, the work done, or the amount due either the plaintiff or Paul Howard for the work performed. It further developed that the claims of the employees of the plaintiff, if allowed, would not exceed $8,000.00, and the claims of the employees of Howard would not exceed $6,000.00. By agreement of all parties, the State of Tennessee paid $14,000.00 into the registry of the Court from monies owing in payment of the work performed by plaintiff and by Paul Howard to be disbursed to the plaintiff, the defendant Howard and/or their employees as their interest should be finally determined. This action reduced the issues to a determination of whether the employees of the two sub-contractors, the plaintiff and Howard, had been classified and paid in accordance with the classifications and wage scales prescribed by the contract between the State of Tennessee and the prime contractor and subcontractors.

The trial court, sitting without the intervention of a jury, found that the employees of Howard had been properly classified and paid, and dismissed their intervening petition.

The trial court further found that the plaintiff Burns had incorrectly classified his employees as laborers when, in fact, they did sheetmetal work. The trial judge awarded these employees judgments for the difference between the contractual pay for laborers and the contractual pay for sheetmetal workers.

Both the plaintiff and the employees of the subcontractor Paul Howard appealed. Howard's employees have since abandoned their appeal, so the only questions before this Court are the ones raised by the plaintiff Burns in his assignments of error.

In assignments I and II, plaintiff insists that the court erred in failing to find that he had the right to classify his own employees in accordance with their experience, skill and ability. In support of the insistence, plaintiff contends that there is nothing in the contract, under which he performed the work for the State of Tennessee, or in the Prevailing Wage Act (T.C.A. § 12-406 et seq.) which limited the well-recognized and fundamental right of management to determine job duties of its employees.

In construing contracts, the Court must ascertain, if possible, the intention of the parties from the entire context of the agreement. Real Estate Management v. Giles, 41 Tenn.App. 347, 293 S.W.2d 596; Scott v. Reynolds, 36 Tenn.App. 289, 255 S.W.2d 401; Couch v. Couch, 35 Tenn.App. 464, 248 S.W.2d 327. And where an executed agreement refers to other documents and makes the conditions of the other documents part of the executed agreement, they will be interpreted together as the agreement of the parties. Somerville v. Gullett Gin Co., 137 Tenn. 509, 194 S.W. 576, 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 299, page 136, 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, Section 246.

The subcontract agreement between the plaintiff and the Temperature Control Inc., provided that:

'The Subcontractor [Burns, d/b/a Climate Control Company] shall comply with...

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8 cases
  • Hurst, Sr. v. Hurst
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • April 30, 2001
    ...a consideration of the whole contract. Mckay v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 874 (1916); Burns v. Temperature Control Co., 52 Tenn.App. 51, 371 S.W.2d 804 (1962). In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties' intentions should be given their usual, natural and......
  • Thorton v. Countrywide Home Loans
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • October 23, 2000
    ...a consideration of the whole contract. Mckay v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 874 (1916); Burns v. Temperature Control Co., 52 Tenn.App. 51, 371 S.W.2d 804 (1962). In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties' intentions should be given their usual, natural and......
  • Union Planters Nat. Bank v. American Home Assur. Co.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 1993
    ...a consideration of the whole contract. McKay v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 874 (1916); Burns v. Temperature Control Co., 52 Tenn.App. 51, 371 S.W.2d 804 (1962). In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties' intentions should be given their usual, natural and......
  • Rainey v. Stansell
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • January 16, 1992
    ...a consideration of the whole contract. Mckay v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 874 (1916); Burns v. Temperature Control Co., 52 Tenn.App. 51, 371 S.W.2d 804 (1962). In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties' intentions should be given their usual, natural and......
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