Hurst, Sr. v. Hurst
| Decision Date | 30 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | 00-00458 |
| Parties | EDDIE JOE HURST, SR. v. SHEILA GAIL WILLIAMS HURSTIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Blount County, No. S-619, William R. Brewer, Judge
This appeal from the Blount County General Sessions Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing the Complaint to Enforce Judgment filed by the Appellant, Sheila Gail Williams Hurst. Ms. Hurst appeals the decision of the General Sessions Court. We reverse the decision of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge cost of the appeal against the Appellee, Eddie Joe Hurst, Sr.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Reversed; Cause Remanded
Houston M. Goddard, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Charles D. Susano, Jr. and D. Michael Swiney, JJ., joined.
Robert M. Cohen, Maryville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Sheila Gail Williams Hurst.
Craig L. Garrett, Maryville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Eddie Joe Hurst, Sr.
This appeal arises from the first and second divorce actions between Sheila Gail Williams Hurst, the Appellant, and Eddie Joe Hurst, Sr., the Appellee. Ms. Hurst appeals the judgment of the Blount County General Sessions Court and presents for our review one issue which we restate: whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ms. Hurst's Complaint to Enforce the Judgment.
We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion.
The parties were married initially in Sevier County on May 6, 1968. They were divorced by the General Sessions Court for Blount County on April 1, 1991. A marital dissolution agreement (hereinafter referred to as MDA #1) was entered into by the parties and incorporated into the final decree for divorce. The parties remarried on March 8, 1992 and were divorced again by final decree on June 30, 1997 in the General Sessions Court for Blount County. A second marital dissolution agreement (hereinafter referred to as MDA #2) was entered into by the parties and incorporated into the final decree for divorce. According to the record, Ms. Hurst was not represented by counsel in the second divorce proceeding.
The marital dissolution agreements are at issue on appeal. The parties divided certain property in MDA #1 as follows:
4. Husband shall pay to wife one-half of the husband's Alcoa Retirement Plan having Alcoa pay same to wife. Said sum shall be paid as soon as possible, and husband shall execute whatever papers are necessary in order for Alcoa to release one-half of the Retirement Fund to wife.
5. Wife shall receive One Hundred Percent (100%) of the stock at Merrill Lynch.
6. Wife shall receive one-half of all sums received by husband as a result of the Alcoa Profit Sharing Program since the parties separated in October 1990.
The aforementioned assets in MDA #1 were never distributed to Ms. Hurst, nor was any action taken by either party to arrange for Ms. Hurst to receive this property. The second Marital Dissolution Agreement divided personal property as follows:
7. The parties have previously divided all other personal property, furniture, and furnishings, and each party shall receive all items which are in their respective possession at the time of entry of the Final Decree in this cause.
Following her second divorce from Mr. Hurst, Ms. Hurst filed a Complaint to Enforce Judgment on April 30, 1998 requesting that the Court enforce the property settlement paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 from MDA #1. Following a hearing on May 4, 1999, the Trial Court issued a memorandum opinion(FN1) which states in pertinent part:
It is the Defendant's position that the Final Decree of Divorce is just like any other judgment and that it can be satisfied just like any other judgment obtained by one party against the other. The Plaintiff's position is that the subsequent remarriage and re-divorce caused the previous divorce decree to become null and void. At first glance it would appear that the Defendant's position should be upheld inasmuch as the judgment is not yet satisfied. However, the Court must look to the uniqueness of the situation before it and fashion a equitable remedy. It seems to the Court that it is almost like the original divorce decree was compromised and settled by the parties' subsequent remarriage and re-divorce. It is almost like novation of a contract. Further, to rule otherwise the Court would almost have to try to get into the parties' heads to figure out what exactly they were trying to accomplish by the second division of property. Finally, it just seems like the equitable thing to do, to rule in favor of the Plaintiff. The Court hereby orders that the relief sought by the Defendent should not be granted and directs the Plaintiff to prepare an Order reflecting the same.
An order was entered on February 3, 2000 dismissing Ms. Hurst's Complaint to Enforce Judgment.
Ms. Hurst's sole issue on appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing the Complaint to Enforce Judgment.
Because the issue on appeal deals directly with two marital dissolution agreements, and their enforcement, we first address the contractual nature of such agreements as found in Gray v. Estate of Gray, 993 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998):
A marital dissolution agreement is essentially a contract between a husband and wife in contemplation of divorce proceedings. See Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1993). "A property settlement agreement between a husband and wife is 'within the category of contracts and is to be looked upon and enforced as an agreement, and is to be construed as other contracts as respects its interpretation, its meaning and effect.'" Bruce v. Bruce, 801 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. App. 1990) (quoting Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 593, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (1940)).
We review the Trial Court's findings of fact de novo upon the record of the proceedings below, with a presumption of correctness "unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). Because contract interpretation involves a legal matter rather than a factual matter, the interpretation of a contract is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The Trial Court's interpretation of the contract did not depend on disputed facts; therefore, it is our job to review the contract and make our own determination of its meaning. Hillsboro Plaza Enterprises v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
Ms. Hurst argues that the Trial Court should have enforced MDA #1 regardless of her remarriage and second divorce from Mr. Hurst, and the language of paragraph 7 in MDA #2. She further argues that according to the decision in Clothier v. Clothier, 232 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950), she is entitled to the property in MDA #1, as that case implies that if a property settlement is not considered alimony, it can not be avoided by a remarriage. Additionally, Ms. Hurst asserts that the property settlement in MDA #1 was final and unchangeable as a contractual agreement according to Vanatta v. Vanatta, 701 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Finally, Ms. Hurst argues that the personal property in MDA #2 does not include the property in MDA #1; as the property in MDA #1 is not marital property, but became separate property upon entry of the decree approving MDA #1.
Mr. Hurst contends that only MDA #2 governs the distrbution of their personal property and that the language in paragraph 7 of MDA #2 is clear and unambiguous. Mr. Hurst argues that because Ms. Hurst never received the property in MDA #1, and remarried and divorced Mr. Hurst a second time, she is no longer entitled to that property per MDA #2. Mr. Hurst argues that Ms. Hurst is attempting to insert parol evidence and is asking the Court to determine the mindset of the parties when they agreed to the provisions in MDA #2.
"A divorce decree which incorporates a marital dissolution agreement is to be construed like other written instruments, with the court seeking to determine the apparent purposes in the minds of the draftsmen and the trial court," Kensinger v. Conlee, an unreported opinion of this Court, filed in Jackson, on July 30, 1999. See Livingston v. Livingston, 429 S.W.2d 452 (1967). In construing both MDA #1 and MDA #2 as contracts, we are compelled to follow the well established laws for the interpretation of contracts as stated in Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 118-119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992):
The cardinal rule for interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention consistent with legal principles. Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578 (Tenn.1975). A primary objective in the construction of a contract is to discover the intention of the parties from a consideration of the whole contract. Mckay v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 874 (1916); Burns v. Temperature Control Co., 52 Tenn.App. 51, 371 S.W.2d 804 (1962). In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties' intentions should be given their usual, natural and ordinary meaning, Taylor v. White Stores, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 514 (Tenn.App.1985), and neither party is to be favored in the construction. Ballard v. North American Life Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn.App.1983).
The court, at arriving at the intention of the parties to a contract, does not attempt to ascertain the parties' state of mind at the time the contract was executed, but rather their intentions as actually embodied and expressed in the contract as written. Petty v. Sloan, 197 Tenn. 630, 277 S.W.2d 355 (1955); Sutton v. First Nat'l Bank of Crossville, ...
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