Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 59754-5,59754-5
• Citation: 123 Wn.2d 93,864 P.2d 937
• Parties: , 66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165, 128 Lab.Cas. P 57,697, 9 IER Cases 108 A. Deane BURNSIDE, Respondent, v. SIMPSON PAPER COMPANY, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 93

123 Wn.2d 93

864 P.2d 937, 66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165,

128 Lab.Cas. P 57,697, 9 IER Cases 108

A. Deane BURNSIDE, Respondent, v. SIMPSON PAPER COMPANY, Petitioner.

No. 59754-5.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Jan. 6, 1994.

Ryan, Swanson & Cleveland, John P. Mele, Michael R. Rayton, Craig E. Schuman, Seattle, for petitioner

Jeffrey L. Needle, Paul G. Gillingham, Seattle, E. Douglas Pibel, Jr., Monroe, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

Simpson Paper Company appeals from a Court of Appeals decision, affirming a judgment against it in Burnside worked for Simpson Timber and Simpson Paper Companies from 1966 until he was fired in November 1984. He worked out of Seattle for most of these years and received excellent job evaluations. Report of Proceedings, vol. III at 485-92. As pulp marketing manager, Burnside traveled extensively overseas. In 1982 he was transferred from Simpson Timber to its wholly owned subsidiary, Simpson Paper. With this transfer, John Fannon, president of Simpson Paper, became Burnside's immediate supervisor. Burnside was a member of the company's senior management staff. After his transfer, Burnside continued to work out of Seattle, but in 1983, at Fannon's insistence, he moved to San Francisco, where Simpson Paper is headquartered. Burnside's wife, Carol Burnside, remained in Washington, where she worked for a consulting business she owned with Burnside, Evergreen Consulting.

                favor of A. Deane Burnside, a former employee.   Simpson Paper assigns error to the trial court's application of Washington law, its admission of Simpson's management guide to support the breach of implied contract claim, the admission of evidence of other terminations, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict.   Simpson Paper also asserts lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   We affirm the trial court and court of appeals
                

A significant portion of Burnside's work involved the marketing in Japan of pulp from a California mill. Simpson Paper employed Price & Pierce International as agents to help with this marketing. Price & Pierce in turn employed Katsumi Sasaki, a Japanese national, to work on Simpson's behalf in Japan. Burnside traveled to Japan two or three times a year and communicated, through a Price & Pierce agent in the United States, with Sasaki by Telex. In the early 1980's, Price & Pierce hired Carol Burnside and Evergreen Consulting to handle communications between Simpson and Sasaki.

In 1983, Fannon and Burnside traveled together to Japan on a business trip. Fannon would later testify that during this trip he became concerned about Burnside's performance Simpson Paper subsequently worked out a severance package for Burnside. Burnside submitted a letter of resignation, and the company continued his salary and medical benefits for six months, paid his move back to Seattle, and purchased his San Francisco condominium. Exhibits 2 and 3, Deposition of Burnside (April 15, 1987); Clerk's Papers, at 998-99. At the end of the 6-month period, Burnside took early retirement. Exhibits 17-21, Deposition of Burnside (April 15, 1987). At the time of his termination, Burnside was 58 years old and had been earning approximately $7,000 a month.

                and decided to return to Japan without Burnside.   Fannon did so in November 1984.   Fannon testified at trial that Sasaki and others told Fannon that Burnside was hurting Simpson's image and business.   There were also complaints about Carol Burnside's attendance at business meetings.   Fannon returned from the trip to San Francisco on Saturday, November 17, 1984.   He spoke with the chairman of Simpson Paper, Furman Mosley (who was also vice chairman of Simpson Timber) on Sunday.   Report of Proceedings, vol.  III at 494, 497.   When Burnside came to work on November 19, Fannon met with him and summarily terminated his employment.   Burnside testified he had always received excellent evaluations and received no warning that his behavior or skills were lacking
                

Burnside was replaced by Robert Anderson, who was then 33. Anderson had been the company's manager of marketing services and product development. He took on the pulp sales portion of Burnside's job, helping to complete Burnside's work after the dismissal. In his new position, Anderson initially earned $4,900 a month. In 1989 his salary was $90,000, and he received a $59,000 bonus. Report of Proceedings, vol. X at 1622, 1624. Another employee, Robert Millard, vice president of operations, took over the portion of Burnside's duties which involved purchasing pulp for use in Simpson Paper's own mills. Report of Proceedings, vol. VIII at 1288-89. Millard was 53 years old at the time. Report of Proceedings, vol. VIII at 1288-89.

On July 18, 1986, Burnside filed suit against Simpson Paper and Simpson Timber, ¹ alleging wrongful termination and age discrimination. Clerk's Papers, at 1. Simpson Paper moved for summary judgment on the basis that Burnside had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in California. Clerk's Papers, at 15. Burnside filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. Clerk's Papers, at 1000, 1506. Simpson made various other motions for partial summary judgment, some of which were granted by the trial court. The court denied the company's motion to dismiss the age discrimination and implied contract claims, however. Clerk's Papers, at 1617-20.

After a month-long trial, the jury found for Burnside on both of his alternate theories at trial, age discrimination and breach of implied contract. Clerk's Papers, at 1008. He was awarded a verdict of $993,627. On Burnside's motion, the court also awarded him $158,393 in prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and costs of $152,922. Clerk's Papers, at 2426, 2430. On June 18, 1990, the court entered a $1,752,781 judgment against Simpson Paper. Clerk's Papers, at 2449. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 66 Wash.App. 510, 832 P.2d 537 (1992), and Simpson now seeks review in this court.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Simpson Paper maintains that Washington's age discrimination statute, RCW 49.60, provides no subject matter jurisdiction in this case. More specifically, it maintains the Legislature's use of the word "inhabitant" in the purpose section of RCW 49.60.010 denies Washington courts subject matter jurisdiction over persons who are not Washington residents.

Simpson cites no authority for the proposition RCW 49.60 is a jurisdictional statute. As the Court of Appeals indicated, the Washington State Constitution confers on the superior courts broad original jurisdiction. Const. art. 4, § 6.

Exceptions to that jurisdictional grant are narrowly construed. Orwick v. Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 251, 692 P.2d 793 (1984); Burnside, 66 Wash.App. at 517, 692 P.2d 793.

The Court of Appeals also reasoned, soundly, that limiting the statute's application to Washington inhabitants would effectively allow Washington employers to discriminate freely against non-Washington inhabitants, thus undermining the fundamental purpose of the act, deterring discrimination. See Burnside, 66 Wash.App. at 519, 692 P.2d 793. The court therefore interpreted the Legislature's use of the term "inhabitants" as a general reference not intended to impose a residency requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit. Burnside, at 518, 692 P.2d 793.

We affirm the Court of Appeals' disposition of this issue because it comports with the purpose underlying the statute, to deter discrimination. Statutes should be interpreted to further, not frustrate, their intended purpose. See Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 151, 812 P.2d 858 (1991). The declaration section of Washington's law against discrimination emphasizes the statute is to be liberally construed. RCW 49.60.020. See also Phillips v. Seattle, 111 Wash.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989). Similarly, RCW 49.60.030(2) provides "any" person injured by any act in violation of the chapter shall have a civil cause of action. Simpson Paper's assertion there was no subject matter jurisdiction is thus without merit.

II. Governing Law

Simpson Paper also challenges the trial court's choice of Washington over California law on the employment discrimination claim. ² Our examination of pertinent case law and the respective policies underlying California and Washington law persuade us the application of Washington law was proper in this case.

A. The Presumptive Law

A scholar in the field of conflict of laws, Professor Currie, suggests several principles that serve as a useful starting point in choice of law analysis:

1. The normal business of courts being the adjudication of domestic cases, and the normal tendency of lawyers and judges being to think in terms of domestic law, the normal expectation should be that the rule of decision will be supplied by the domestic law as a matter of course.

2. The court should ordinarily depart from this procedure only at the instance of a party wishing to obtain the advantage of a foreign law.

3. The law of the forum, as the source of the rule of decision, should normally be displaced only by the interested party's timely invocation of the foreign law. The interested party invokes foreign law by calling attention to its relevance and its superior claim to be applied, and by informing the court of its tenor.

(Italics ours.) B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflicts of Laws 75 (1963).

B.

Washington's Approach to Choice of Law Questions: The "Most

Significant Relationship" Standard

In an ordinary conflict of laws case, the applicable law is decided by determining which jurisdiction has the "most significant relationship" to a given issue. Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash.2d 577, 580, 555 P.2d 997 (1976); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wash.2d 692, 697, 635 P.2d 441, 649 P.2d 827 (1981). Southwell v. Widing Transp., Inc., 101 Wash.2d 200, 204, 676 P.2d 477 (1984). See generally ...