Burnside v. Warden, Civil Action No.: 4:17-cv-00300-RBH

• Decision Date: 09 March 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 4:17-cv-00300-RBH
• Parties: Andrew Davion Burnside, Petitioner, v. Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Andrew Davion Burnside, Petitioner, v. Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent.

Civil Action No.: 4:17-cv-00300-RBH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

March 9, 2018

ORDER

Petitioner Andrew Davion Burnside, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ECF No. 1. The matter is before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Thomas E. Rogers, III.¹ See ECF Nos. 23 & 25. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Petitioner's § 2254 petition without an evidentiary hearing. R & R at p. 24.

Background

The State of South Carolina indicted and tried Petitioner for trafficking cocaine base, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, distribution of cocaine base, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. See ECF No. 15-1 at pp. 296-303. The jury convicted him of all charges, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences resulting in twenty-five years of actual imprisonment.² See ECF No. 15-1 at pp. 234-35, 288.Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals summarily affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See ECF Nos. 15-2, 15-3, 15-4, & 15-5. Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court. See ECF No. 15-1 at pp. 237-46. After holding a hearing at which Petitioner and his trial counsel testified, the PCR court issued a written order denying and dismissing the PCR application with prejudice. Id. at pp. 253-95. Petitioner filed a Johnson³ petition for a writ of certiorari from the denial of his PCR application, and the South Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied the Johnson petition and remitted the case. See ECF Nos. 15-11, 15-12, 15-13, & 15-14.

Petitioner then filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ECF No. 1. Respondent answered by filing a return and a motion for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 14 & 15. The Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending that the Court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismiss Petitioner's § 2254 petition without an evidentiary hearing. R & R at p. 24. Petitioner filed timely objections to the R & R, and Respondent filed a reply to Petitioner's objections. See ECF Nos. 25 & 27.

Legal Standards

I. Review of the Magistrate Judge's R & R

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct ade novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).

II. Summary Judgment

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see generally Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . , to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules."); Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2011) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 'applies to habeas proceedings.'" (quoting Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 412 (4th Cir. 1991))). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)."The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that party's favor. The court therefore cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. Federal Habeas Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs review of his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a "difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Section 2254(d)(1) describes the standard of review to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts applied federal law, while § 2254(d)(2) describes the standard to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts determined the facts." Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 553 (4th Cir. 2010). "'[A] determination on a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed correct,' and the burden is on the petitioner to rebut this presumption 'by clear and convincing evidence.'" Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Because the South Carolina SupremeCourt summarily denied Petitioner's certiorari petition, the Court directly reviews the PCR court's reasoning. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015) (applying the "look-through" doctrine).

Discussion

Petitioner alleges two grounds for relief in his § 2254 petition, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial and alleging his trial counsel was ineffective. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment on both grounds, see R & R at pp. 7-24, and Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Pet.'s Objs. [ECF No. 25].

I. Ground One

In Ground One of his § 2254 petition, Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. See ECF No. 1 at pp. 7; ECF No. 1-1 at pp. 7-10. The Magistrate Judge correctly notes this claim is exhausted and ripe for review because Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on this issue at trial, the trial court denied the motion, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. See R & R at pp. 11-13.

An insufficient evidence claim is cognizable in a § 2254 action, but federal review is "sharply limited." Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 405 (4th Cir. 1998). In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court recognized "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Jackson, which was decided before the AEDPA, requires a federal court to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319. The Fourth Circuit has explained that "under the AEDPA provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),"a federal habeas court must "inquire whether a state court determination that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction was an 'objectively unreasonable' application of [the standard enunciated in] Jackson." Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478, 489 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original); see also Wilson, 155 F.3d at 405-06 ("Federal review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a state conviction is not meant to consider anew the jury's guilt determination or to replace the state's system of direct appellate review.").

In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge applies the Jackson and AEDPA standards, examines the evidence presented at Petitioner's trial, and concludes he fails to show no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. R & R at pp. 11-18. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly summarizes the trial evidence (with citations to the record), and the Court adopts that summary without repeating it here.⁴ See R & R at pp. 14-17. In brief, the State's evidence showed that police conducted surveillance on a trailer park due to heavy vehicle and foot traffic in the area and...