Burrows v. Board of Assessors for Town of Chatham

• Decision Date: 29 December 1983
• Citation: 471 N.Y.S.2d 345,98 A.D.2d 250
• Parties: In the Matter of Mortimer T. BURROWS, Jr., et al., Respondents, v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS FOR the TOWN OF CHATHAM, New York, Appellant, et al., Respondents, and Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Appellant. (And Another Proceeding.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 345

471 N.Y.S.2d 345

98 A.D.2d 250

In the Matter of Mortimer T. BURROWS, Jr., et al., Respondents, v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS FOR the TOWN OF CHATHAM, New York, Appellant et al., Respondents and Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York Intervenor-Appellant (And Another Proceeding.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Dec. 29, 1983.

[98 A.D.2d 251] Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany (Nancy A. Spiegel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, of counsel), for intervenor-appellant.

Connor, Curran, Connor & Schram, Hudson (Theodore Guterman, II, Hudson, of counsel), for Mortimer T. Burrows, Jr. and others, respondents.

Before SWEENEY, J.P., and KANE, CASEY, WEISS and LEVINE, JJ.

OPINION FOR AFFIRMANCE

CASEY, Justice.

Section 458 (subd. 5) of the Real Property Tax Law was applicable to the assessments challenged in these proceedings, and since the different treatment of similarly situated veterans resulting from the classification created by that statute lacks a rational basis and conflicts with the objective of the legislation, Special Term's judgments, 116 Misc.2d 133, 455 N.Y.S.2d 196, ordering an increase in petitioners' veterans' exemptions for the tax year under review must be affirmed.

Subsequent to the decision in Matter of Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388, 332 N.E.2d 279, which held that all real property must be assessed at full value pursuant to the requirements of section 306 of the Real Property Tax Law, many local taxing jurisdictions throughout the State that were using fractional assessments converted to full value assessment, either voluntarily or by court order. Since there was no provision for any proportionate increase in the veterans' exemption created by section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law, conversion from a system of fractional assessment to full value assessment had a substantial impact on the value of those exemptions ¹. Subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law, added by chapter 134 of the Laws of 1979, provided for an increase (or decrease) in the veterans' exemption proportionate to the increase (or decrease) in the property's total assessment caused by a change in the manner of assessing. Pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision 5, the proportionate increase (or decrease) in the veterans' exemption was mandatory if the change in the manner of assessing was caused by court-ordered full value assessment. Pursuant to paragraph (b), however, the local taxing jurisdiction had the option of providing by local law for such a proportionate increase (or decrease) in the veterans' exemption where the change in the manner of assessing was caused by other than court-ordered full value assessment.

In each of the proceedings at bar, petitioners are owners of real property, for which veterans' exemptions had been granted, located in taxing jurisdictions that voluntarily converted to full value assessment but did not adopt local laws pursuant to the authority granted by section 458 (subd. 5, par. [b] ) of the Real Property Tax Law. Petitioners have asserted a number of challenges to their assessments, including the claim that the classification created by section 458 (subd. 5, pars. [a], [b] ) violates the Equal Protection Clause and results in a denial of due process. Special Term agreed, finding no rational basis for treating holders of veterans' exemptions in taxing jurisdictions that voluntarily adopted full value assessment different from those in taxing jurisdictions that adopted full value assessment pursuant to court order.

The Attorney-General contends that subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law, as added by chapter 134 of the Laws of 1979, was not applicable to taxing jurisdictions, such as those herein, that converted to full value assessment prior to the effective date of the statute, based upon the theory that the statute should not be applied retroactively. We note, however, that application of the statute to tax years prior to its effective date is not at issue. Rather, we are concerned only with the question of whether the statute should be applied uniformly in tax years subsequent to its effective date (and prior to its expiration) irrespective of the date when the taxing jurisdiction converted to full value assessment. In our view, such uniform application was plainly intended by the Legislature.

The Attorney-General argues that the Legislature's use of words in the present tense renders the statute unambiguous and compels adherence to the general rule that statutes are to be applied only prospectively unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed (see McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 51, subds. b, c). The absence of facial ambiguity, however, is rarely if ever conclusive (Zappone v. Home Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 131, 137, 447 N.Y.S.2d 911, 432 N.E.2d 783). Indeed, it has been said that the rules of statutory construction "do not constrain a court to defeat the evident intention of the lawmaker" (Abrams v. Esposito, 75 A.D.2d 528, 529, 426 N.Y.S.2d 770, affd. 54 N.Y.2d 886, 444 N.Y.S.2d 918, 429 N.E.2d 425, app. dsmd. 455 U.S. 996, 102 S.Ct. 1626, 71 L.Ed.2d 858), and insofar as remedial statutes are concerned, "the court should consider the mischief sought to be remedied and should favor the construction which will suppress the evil and advance the remedy" (Matter of New York Life Ins. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 80 A.D.2d 675, 677, 436 N.Y.S.2d 380, affd. 55 N.Y.2d 758, 447 N.Y.S.2d 245, 431 N.E.2d 970). "Remedial statutes are those 'designed to correct imperfections in prior law, by generally giving relief to the aggrieved party' " (Coffman v. Coffman, 60 A.D.2d 181, 188, 400 N.Y.S.2d 833). Section 458 (subd. 5) of the Real Property Tax Law is clearly a remedial statute, designed to preserve the value of veterans' exemptions which would otherwise be reduced substantially by the local taxing jurisdiction's conversion to full value assessment (Matter of Archer v. Town of North Greenbush, 80 A.D.2d 361, 362, 439 N.Y.S.2d 729; see, also, N.Y.Legis.Ann., 1979, p. 103).

Construing the statute as applying to all local taxing jurisdictions that converted to full value assessment, irrespective of the date of conversion, promotes the remedy and suppresses the mischief to a much greater degree than the severely restrictive construction advanced by the Attorney-General. The limited retrospective effect resulting from such a construction does not impair any vested rights, and it should be noted that this remedial statute was made effective immediately (L.1979, ch. 134, § 2). Under these circumstances the rule requiring prospective application only does not apply (Matter of Cady v. County of Broome, 87 A.D.2d 964, 451 N.Y.S.2d 206, mot. for lv. to app. den. 57 N.Y.2d 602, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 440 N.E.2d 798). Finally, there is no merit in the Attorney-General's suggestion that the introduction of subsequent bills stating that the statute is applicable to taxing jurisdictions that converted to full value assessment prior to its effective date constitutes legislative recognition that the statute, as originally enacted, did not so provide (see Matter of Eastern Milk Producers Coop. Assn. v. State of New York Dept. of Agric. & Markets, 58 N.Y.2d 1097, 1101, 462 N.Y.S.2d 814, 449 N.E.2d 708).

Having concluded that section 458 (subd. 5) of the Real Property Tax Law is applicable to the assessments under review in these proceedings, we turn to the question of whether the classification created by the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. Despite claims that the statute, on its face, classifies local taxing jurisdictions and/or real property, not veterans, the plain and unambiguous effect of the statute is to treat similarly situated veterans, i.e., those who hold real property tax exemptions on property located in taxing jurisdictions that have converted to full value assessment, differently by effectively granting an increase in the exemption to some veterans while denying an increase to certain other veterans. In short, the statute is directed at the class of veterans described above and only members of that class are harmed by the statute. These factors, derived from the impact of the statutory classification rather than its wording alone, compel the appropriate judicial scrutiny of the discriminatory treatment under the Equal Protection Clause (see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-9, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124-2125, 53 L.Ed.2d 63).

In passing upon claims that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated by discriminatory treatment in the area of taxation, the United States Supreme Court has long held that, "States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation" (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1003, 35 L.Ed.2d 351). The terms "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious" have been used to define the limits placed on this leeway by the Equal Protection Clause (Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530, 79 S.Ct. 437, 443, 3 L.Ed.2d 480). Application of these principles has led to the rejection of an equal protection challenge to a Florida statute which granted real property tax exemptions to widows but not widowers, based upon a finding that the distinction rested " 'upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation' ", which was to help cushion the financial impact of the loss of a spouse upon the sex for which that loss imposed the heaviest burden (Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 1737, 40 L.Ed.2d 189). We find no such "fair and substantial relation" here.

This court has previously acknowledged that "the obvious intent of [section 458 (subd. 5) of the Real Property Tax Law] * * * was to lessen the immediate impact of increased taxes on eligible veterans caused by a shift to...