Cady v. Broome County

• Decision Date: 29 April 1982
• Citation: 87 A.D.2d 964,451 N.Y.S.2d 206
• Parties: In the Matter of Gerald CADY, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF BROOME et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 206

451 N.Y.S.2d 206

87 A.D.2d 964

In the Matter of Gerald CADY, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF BROOME et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

April 29, 1982.

John E. Murray, Broome County Atty., Binghamton (Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Endicott, of counsel), for appellants.

Earl D. Butler, Vestal, for respondent.

Before MAIN, J. P., and CASEY, YESAWICH, WEISS and LEVINE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered May 20, 1981 in Broome County, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to compel respondents to pay benefits to petitioner pursuant to section 207-c of the General Municipal Law.

Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law, originally enacted in 1961 (L.1961, ch. 920), provided certain benefits for "member of a police force of any county, city of less than one million population, town or village * * * who is injured in the performance of his duties * * *". In 1980, section 207-c was amended to specifically include Deputy Sheriffs and certain other peace officers among those entitled to the benefits of the statute (L.1980, ch. 727). Petitioner, a Deputy Sheriff employed by respondents, was injured in the performance of his duties prior to the effective date of the amendment and remains disabled from such injuries. Special Term held that petitioner was entitled to the benefits of section 207-c, as amended, and this appeal ensued.

The issue framed by petitioner is not whether Deputy Sheriffs were entitled to the benefits of section 207-c as originally enacted ¹, but rather, the sole issue is whether petitioner is entitled to the benefits of section 207-c by virtue of the amendment to that statute effected by chapter 727 of the Laws of 1980, which would require a retroactive application of the statute. Legislation is generally construed as prospective only unless the language of the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, requires retroactive application (Matter of Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 51 A.D.2d 277, 281, 381 N.Y.S.2d 230, affd. 41 N.Y.2d 987, 395 N.Y.S.2d 162, 363 N.E.2d 712). There is an exception to this general rule for remedial statutes, which can be given retrospective application to the extent that it does not impair vested rights (Cook v. City of Binghamton, 67 A.D.2d 469, 471, 472, 416 N.Y.S.2d 349, mod. on other grounds 48 N.Y.2d 323, 422 N.Y.S.2d 919, 398 N.E.2d 525). "Remedial statutes are those 'designed to correct imperfections in prior law, by generally giving relief to the aggrieved party' * * * " (Coffman v. Coffman, 60 A.D.2d 181, 188, 400 N.Y.S.2d 833). While this exception does not apply to statutes creating new rights and remedies where none previously existed (Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 111 N.E. 837), where, as here, the amendment is enacted to rectify an inequity by extending existing benefits to a class of persons...