Burton Stock-Car Co. v. Traeger

• Decision Date: 19 October 1900
• Citation: 187 Ill. 9,58 N.E. 418
• Parties: BURTON STOCK-CAR CO. v. TRAEGER, Collector, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

187 Ill. 9

58 N.E. 418

BURTON STOCK-CAR CO.

v.TRAEGER, Collector, et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 19, 1900.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; John Gibbons, Judge.

Bill by the Burton Stock-Car Company against John E. Traeger, collector, and others. From a decree sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.M. J. Scrafford and Edward A. Bern, for appellant.

Julius A. Johnson, Co. Atty., and Frank L. Shepard, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellees.

This is a bill filed by the appellant company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Maine, with its principal office at Portland, in that state, against the town collector of the town of Lake, and the county collector of the county of Cook, to enjoin the collection of a tax against the personal property of the appellant in that town, upon the ground that the valuation of the property as fixed by the board of assessors was excessive and fraudulent. It appears from the allegations of the bill that the appellant company is engaged in the business of renting, on a mileage basis, cars adapted to the transportation of all kinds of live stock, and has complied with the laws of Illinois authorizing it to do business in that state, and has a branch office in the city of Chicago, and a shop, in which it repairs cars belonging to it and used in its business, in said town of Lake. The bill was demurred to by the defendants thereto, the appellees here. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill for want of equity, at complainant's costs, and dissolved the injunction which had been issued upon the filing of the bill upon the recommendation of a master in chancery. The present appeal is prosecuted from the decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The main ground upon which it is sought to enjoin the collection of the tax upon the personal property of the appellant company is that the valuation of appellant's property in the town of Lake for the purposes of assessment by the board of assessors of Cook county was largely in excess of its real value. This court has often decided that a court of equity will not entertain jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of a tax upon the ground of the excessive valuation of the property assessed by the assessing officer or officers. Section 1 of article 9 of the constitution of 1870 provides that ‘the general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation; so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise.’ This provision of the constitution has been construed to mean that the valuation of property for the purpose of taxation is to be ascertained by some person or persons elected or appointed by the legislature. The constitution expressly prohibits the ascertainment of such value by any other person than a person elected or appointed by the legislature. Hence the courts have no power to fix the valuationof property for taxation. The determination of the value to be fixed on property liable to be assessed ‘is not, in the absence of fraud, subject to the supervision of the judicial department of the state.’ Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. People, 185 Ill. 276, 56 N. E. 1049;Insurance Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292;Spencer v. People, 68 Ill. 510. So far, therefore, as relief was sought by the bill in this case for the reason that the property assessed was valued at too high a figure, the action of the court below in sustaining the demurrer was proper.

2. It has, however, been held that where the valuation is so grossly out of the way as to show that the assessor could not have been honest in his valuation, and must have known of its excessive character, such valuation will be accepted as proof of a fraud upon his part against the taxpayer, and in such case a court of equity will grant relief. Whether or not there has been fraud in the excessive valuation of property for taxation is a question which will depend largely upon the circumstances of each particular case in which the valuation is made. The excessive valuation by itself does not establish fraud, but the attending circumstances may be looked into, in order to determine whether or not the valuation was honestly made. Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602;Clock Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Ill. 383, 51 N. E. 629;East St. Louis Connecting Ry. Co. v. People, 119 Ill. 182, 10 N. E. 397;Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 157 Ill. 543, 41 N. E. 874. The attendant circumstances in this case which are relied upon, in connection with the alleged excessive valuation, to show that such valuation must have been dishonestly made, are the alleged omissions on the part of the board of assessors of certain requirements of the revenue act. Section 16 of the revenue law of February 25, 1898, requires the assessor or his deputy to ‘call at the office, place of doing business or residence of each person required by this act to list property and list his name,’ and imposes upon such assessor or his deputy the duty of requiring ‘such person to make a correct statement of the taxable property in accordance with the provisions of this act.’ Section 16 further provides that ‘the person listing the property shall enter a true and correct statement of such property owned by him on the first day of April of that year in the form prescribed by law, which shall be signed and sworn to to the extent required by this act by the person listing the property, who shall deliver such statement to the assessor; and the assessor shall thereupon assess the value of such property, and enter the valuation in his books.’ Section 17 of the act of 1893 provides that ‘the assessor shall furnish to each person required to list personal property a printed blank schedule, forms to be furnished by the auditor of public accounts, upon which shall be printed a notice’ set forth fully in the section. Section 17 also provides that ‘every person required to list personal property or money shall fill out, subscribe and swear to, and return to the assessor, in person or by mail, at the time required, such schedule in accordance with law; giving the numbers, amounts, quantity and quality of all the articles enumerated in said schedule by him possessed, or under his control, required to be listed by him for taxation,’ and that ‘the assessor shall determine and fix the fair cash value of all items of personal property, including all grain on hand on the first day of April, and set down the same, as well as the amounts of notes, accounts, bonds and moneys, in a column headed ‘Full Value,’ and ascertain and assess the same at one-fifth part thereof, and set down said one-fifth part thereof in a column headed ‘Assessed Value,’ which last amount shall be the assessed value thereof for all purposes of taxation.' Section 19 of the act provides that ‘the assessor shall require every person to make, sign, and swear to the schedule provided for by this act.’

The bill charges that the assessor did not call at the office of appellant, and list its name, and require it to make a correct statement of its taxable property; that he did not furnish to appellant the printed blank schedule, with the printed notice thereon, so that it could fill out, subscribe and swear to, and return the schedule, as the law directed; that the assessor did not require appellant to make, sign, and swear to the schedule; that he did not appraise the property at its fair cash value, etc.; and that he did not determine and fix the fair cash value of the property by items. Appellant did not make or return any schedule. Appellant claims that the failure of the assessor to call upon it and furnish the blank schedule, and do the other things above mentioned,...