Burton v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1885
• Citation: 33 Minn. 189
• Parties: DAVID BURTON <I>vs.</I> ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & MANITOBA RAILWAY COMPANY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

33 Minn. 189

DAVID BURTON vs. ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & MANITOBA RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 5, 1885.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county, to recover damages for malicious institution and prosecution of a civil action. The complaint alleges that in July, 1882, the plaintiff was the sole owner of a large and flourishing business at Fergus Falls, and had a stock of goods of the value of $15,000, the same being the whole of his property. That the defendant at this time commenced an action by attachment against the plaintiff and one Louis Brin, Jr., jointly, with the malicious and wrongful intent of ruining the plaintiff and destroying his business, and in that action charged the plaintiff with wrongful and unlawful conversions of defendant's property, with conspiracy to defraud defendant, with subornation of the servants of defendant to steal its goods, and with other torts and trespasses of unlawful and felonious character, whereby the defendant alleged that it had been damaged in the sum of $15,000. That in such action the defendant caused all of plaintiff's property to be seized on a writ of attachment, and his business and credit to be completely destroyed. That the defendant had no cause of action against plaintiff, and no ground, excuse, or probable cause for the prosecution of the action and the seizure of plaintiff's property, and judgment was duly rendered therein in favor of this plaintiff. That the defendant has converted all of plaintiff's property. Damages are alleged as follows: $25,000 for the destruction of plaintiff's credit, and the shame, disgrace, and mortification caused him; $15,000 for the seizure and conversion of his stock; $56.42 for money converted; and $10,000, the value of the business destroyed. The answer justifies the bringing of the action against plaintiff and Brin, and denies malice, want of probable cause or any injury to the plaintiff.

The action was brought on for trial before Young, J., and a jury, and upon the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the action was dismissed on defendant's motion. Plaintiff appeals from an order refusing a new trial.

Rea, Kitchel & Shaw and Jackson & Pond, for appellant.

C. D. O'Brien, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

The plaintiff sues for the instituting and prosecuting of a civil action against him, and for the procuring of an attachment therein, and its levy upon his goods and chattels, all, as alleged, with malice and without probable cause. In an action of this kind the affirmative is on the plaintiff to show want of probable cause. As respects a criminal prosecution, the following definition of "probable cause" is approved by many authorities, and in Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 161, (182,) by this court, viz., "a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged." This is followed and applied in Casey v. Sevatson, 30 Minn. 516. Mutatis mutandis, this definition is applicable to civil prosecutions or actions. As to them, probable cause may be defined as such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 454; Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187.

What facts, and whether particular facts, constitute probable cause is a question exclusively for the court. What facts exist in a particular case, where there is a dispute in reference to them, is a question exclusively for the jury. When the facts are in controversy, the subject of probable cause should be submitted to the jury, either for specific findings of the facts, or with instructions from the court as to what facts will constitute probable cause. These rules involve an apparent anomaly, and yet few, if any, rules of the common law rest upon a greater unanimity or strength of authority. Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 Term Rep. 493, (Lord Mansfield;) Panton v. Williams, 2 Q. B. 169; Lister v. Perryman, L. R. 4 H. L. 521; Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen, 393; Ash v. Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119; Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Speck v. Judson, 63 Me. 207; Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644; Thaule v. Krekeler, 81 N. Y. 428; Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 161, (182.)

But while the question, what facts make out probable cause, is for the court, it is ordinarily, if not always, really a question of fact to be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case; and hence it has been sometimes regretted that it was not, as in the law of Scotland, a question for a jury. Lister v. Perryman, supra. Considerations of public policy, in view of the importance of not discouraging public prosecutions, or the prosecution of private...