O'Neill v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 08 June 1893
• Citation: 53 Minn. 439,55 N.W. 601
• Parties: O'NEILL v JOHNSON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

53 Minn. 439

55 N.W. 601

O'NEILLvJOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 8, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Complaint held to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution.

2. An action will lie for malicious prosecution of a civil action.

3. The allegations being, in effect, that a garnishment in the action prevented the payment of $54 to plaintiff's firm; that by reason of its nonpayment they were unable to pay their rent and employes, and because they were so unable their landlord became dissatisfied, and terminated their lease, and their employes became dissatisfied, and refused to work, and in consequence thereof their business was ruined,-held, the injury to the business was not the natural and proximate result of the garnishment, and the damage too remote and speculative.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Lochren, Judge.

Action by Frank P. O'Neill against Anna R. Johnson for malicious prosecution. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

J. M. Burlingame, for appellant.

McHale & Abell, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

The court below, in ordering judgment for defendant on the pleadings, undoubtedly did so because it considered the complaint does not state a cause of action. The statement of damage recoverable in such an action is so obscured by statements in regard to damages not recoverable, because too remote and speculative, that we suspect the court overlooked the former, its attention being wholly directed to the latter. An action will lie for maliciously and without probable cause prosecuting a civil action, whereby damage is caused to the defendant in such action. McPherson v. Runyon, 41 Minn. 524,43 N. W. Rep. 392;Burton v. Railway Co., 33 Minn. 189,22 N. W. Rep. 300;Rachelman v. Skinner, 46 Minn. 196,48 N. W. Rep. 776. In an action for malicious prosecution malice is a fact to be pleaded as such, and it would be bad pleading to set forth the evidence to establish it. Want of probable cause, though made up of a question of fact and a question of law, is, like many other composite facts,-such, for instance, as title to property,-a fact for the purpose of pleading, and may be stated directly. In this complaint it is alleged that the action by defendant against plaintiff was instituted maliciously and without probable cause, and it is further alleged “that this plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in no sum, and liable to her in no manner, whatever, which defendant well knew,” from which facts as matter of law there was no probable cause. The termination of that action is alleged, and also that plaint...