Burton v. State, 90-3160
| Decision Date | 06 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-3160,90-3160 |
| Parties | John L. BURTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 596 So.2d 1184, 17 Fla. L. Week. D945 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Spiro T. Kypreos, Pensacola, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Suzanne G. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, defendant below, was convicted of grand theft, after a jury trial; and sentenced to ten years in prison as an habitual violent felony offender. He seeks review of both his conviction and sentence. Because we conclude that the trial court allowed appellant to represent himself at trial without making the inquiries necessary to determine that appellant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, we reverse.
Shortly after appellant had been arrested on the charge of grand theft auto, the public defender's office, which had been appointed to represent appellant, filed a motion for leave to withdraw as appellant's counsel because of a conflict of interest involving another individual represented by that office. The trial court granted the motion, and appointed a private attorney to represent appellant. Approximately two months after that attorney had been appointed, he, too, filed a motion for leave to withdraw. That motion alleged that appellant "ha[d] expressed a desire for a change of counsel, and the attorney/client relationship ha[d] deteriorated to a point where the ... attorney no longer believe[d] that he [could] render effective assistance...." The trial court granted that motion as well, and appointed a second private attorney to represent appellant. Some four months later, that attorney was permitted to withdraw, and yet another was appointed to represent appellant. (The reasons for this change in attorneys cannot be ascertained from the record.)
On the day set for commencement of the trial, appellant, in proper person, filed a "Motion for Attorney to Withdraw," in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with the attorney most recently appointed to represent him. The motion concluded with the statement that "[appellant] is not competent enough to provide assistist [sic ] in his own behalf," thereby suggesting that what appellant was requesting was that the attorney then representing him be replaced by another appointed attorney.
At a hearing held before the scheduled commencement of the trial, appellant explained that he was dissatisfied with his appointed counsel, and that he did not want that attorney involved any further in the case. Appellant said, At that point, the following discussion took place:
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, based upon my knowledge of the case ..., I believe that the allegations that [appellant] is now making are spurious.... I do not believe [appellant] is in a position to represent himself....
[Appellant]: I've represented myself before, Your Honor, and I'll represent myself again.
[Court]: I'm going to let you.
[Appellant]: Thank you, Your Honor.
....
[Court]: There's at least four attorneys that I've appointed to represent him, none of which have pleased him. So I'm going to let [appellant] represent himself. Do you have any qualms at all as to whether or not you're able to represent yourself?
[Appellant]: No, Your Honor. I'm a layman, I'll admit, but I know what needs to be done.
[Court]: Have you ever represented yourself before?
[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor, in federal courts, state courts. I've been through this ordeal before, yes.
[Court]: Okay. He's going to represent himself.
The trial court then continued the trial to the next trial week, which was approximately five weeks off.
On the next scheduled trial date, appellant participated in the selection of a prospective jury, and the trial was then set for the following day. The next morning, a problem regarding one of appellant's witnesses was discussed. After a fairly lengthy discussion, the trial court, on its own motion, continued the trial for another thirty days and reappointed the attorney who had last represented appellant. When appellant responded that he had no objection to having counsel appointed, but that he would not accept that particular attorney the trial court reversed itself and told appellant that appellant could continue to represent himself. The prosecutor again expressed concern that appellant was not competent to represent himself; and again requested that the trial court conduct a "Faretta hearing," and make required findings regarding appellant's ability to represent himself. Once again, the trial court failed to do so.
On the next scheduled trial date, appellant proceeded to trial before a jury, representing himself. After deliberating approximately...
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Langon v. State, 98-0215.
...here, as in Waterhouse, the defendant's competency to waive was otherwise established on the record. See, e.g., Burton v. State, 596 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(noting that the record contained nothing to suggest that the trial court had any information regarding the defendant's mental c......
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Langon v. State, 4
...here, as in Waterhouse, the defendant's competency to waive was otherwise established on the record. See e.g., Burton v. State, 596 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(noting that the record contained nothing to suggest that the trial court had any information regarding the defendant's mental co......
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State v. Young
...criminal justice system. See also Taylor v. State, 610 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA1993) (surveying similar Florida cases); Burton v. State, 596 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA1992). The Instant At trial, the State acknowledged the importance of a Faretta inquiry when the prosecutor attempted to have t......
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Vega v. State
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